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I. INTRODUCTION
A generation has passed since the legislative victories of the 1960s
extending civil rights protection: twenty-five years since the passage of
the historic Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 twenty-four years since the pas-
sage of the Voting Rights Act,2 and twenty-one years since the passage
of the Fair Housing Act of 1968.3 As we enter the second generation of
civil rights enforcement under new Presidential leadership it is impor-
tant to assess the state of civil rights, to examine the experience of first
generation enforcement and the promises of the second generation.
The state of civil rights in the area of housing is a mixture of both
frustration and hope. Unlike the extraordinary advances in integrating
public accommodations, the workplace, and the political system, the
Nation's housing has been largely ignored. Although an increasing num-
ber of blacks are present in America's suburbs and predominantly white
neighborhoods, the stark pattern of racial residential segregation has
worsened. America is more segregated-physically separated by
race-today than at any time in its history. While Americans are aware
of fair housing laws and are a great deal more accepting of a nondis-
crimination ethic, the incidence of racial discrimination-bias against
racial minority group members-in the sale and rental of housing is ex-
traordinarily high. Of all the civil rights battles fought during the last
three decades, only housing discrimination appears to remain totally
unabated, entrenched, and impervious to public policy and civil rights
enforcement.4 The inability to abate widespread discriminatory prac-
tices within the real estate industry is attributable to the weak enforce-
ment tools and efforts of the past, as well as to the national preference
for segregated lifestyles. Thus, while cultural apartheid,5 the legacy of
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
2. Id. §§ 1971-1974e.
3. Id. §§ 3601-3619, 3631, as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988).
4. Lamb, Equal Housing Opportunity, in IMPLEMENTATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS POLICY 148 (C.
Bullock & C. Lamb eds. 1984) (describing housing as "the last frontier in civil rights" and the area
of "least success").
5. Apartheid is defined as separation of the races. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTION-
ARY 98 (3d ed. 1981). The traditional use of the term relates to the policy of segregation in South
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legal apartheid, remains the reality in America, housing remains the
most segregated aspect of American life and the greatest failure of the
civil rights revolution.
The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 19886 dramatically strength-
ens the arsenal available to combat housing discrimination and neigh-
borhood segregation. More generous damages and attorney's fees, plus
an increased federal enforcement role, may generate public and private
enforcement at a level that can begin to make an impact on housing.
This appraisal of civil rights in the area of housing explores the extent,
trends, and causes of persistently high levels of discrimination and ra-
cial isolation. The experience of the fair housing enforcement effort,
both private and public, is analyzed and the impact of the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988 and other current initiatives is assessed.
Despite the hopefulness generated by effective congressional en-
forcement tools, this appraisal of the state of civil rights in housing
presents a rather guarded prognosis of change. Following the Reagan
years, eight years of policy generally antagonistic to civil rights, change
can occur only with Presidential leadership and a sustained combina-
tion of federal, state, local, and private enforcement initiatives. State
and local government, as well as the federal government, must examine
successful local enforcement strategies and attempt to replicate them.
The nonprofit, private component in fair housing, perhaps the most im-
portant force in the first generation of the fair housing effort, may have
to undergo the most significant change in role and direction if nondis-
crimination law in housing is to achieve its goals.
Arguably the greatest impediment to achieving the promise of the
second generation of fair housing is the connection between discrimina-
tion and segregation. The enforcement of antidiscrimination laws alone
may not abate the entrenched pattern of racial segregation. Indeed, en-
forcement alone can generate increased levels of segregation. Those in-
volved in fair housing enforcement must face the relationship between
discriminatory practices and neighborhood segregation. Affirmative ac-
tion, a concept encountering widespread hostility, must be employed
aggressively, or the enhanced efforts to combat housing discrimination
will themselves exacerbate apartheid in America.
Africa. While a definition of "policy" begs the questions of intent, foreseeability, and effect, none-
theless the results of governmental policy will be scrutinized, not merely the policy's articulation.
Malcolm X stressed that the United States differed from South Africa only in that the latter
practiced what it preached, while we preach integration and deceitfully practice segregation. MAL-
COLM X SPEAKS 75 (G. Breitman ed. 1965). By implementing private sector prejudice, government
legitimizes, encourages, facilitates, and endorses that prejudice. See J. KUSHNER, APARTHEID IN
AMERICA (1980), also printed in Kushner, Apartheid in America: An Historical and Legal Analy-
sis of Contemporary Racial Residential Segregation in the United States, 22 How. L.J. 547 (1979).




The 1979 national study on housing discrimination funded by The
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
disclosed that two million acts of housing discrimination were perpe-
trated annually.7 The study also disclosed that a black prospective
renter faced a seventy-five percent chance of being a victim and that
black home buyers experienced discrimination rates just short of that
startling level.8
Advances in public accommodations, employment, and voting are
impressive, although vestiges of employment bias and job segregation
remain. School segregation, largely dismantled in the South, remains
nearly the universal experience in the North, Midwest, and West,9 not
so much because of continuing school board discrimination, but because
of: Supreme Court rulings refusing to desegregate suburbs 0 and al-
lowing premature findings of effective desegregation or unitary district
achievement;" and the failure of government and private agencies to
address the desegregation of housing patterns.
Although local discrimination-in-housing audits disclose varying
levels of bias,'2 the level of discrimination does not appear to be abating
significantly. Indeed, in certain areas of the Nation, rates of discrimina-
tion may be on the rise.'" A sad indication of racial discrimination in
7. R. WIENK, C. REID, J. SIMONSON & F. EGGERS, MEASURING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN
AMERICAN HOUSING MARKETS 64 (1979) [hereinafter HUD AUDIT] (rental bias by region: 59% in
Northeast, 80% in North Central states, 73% in South, and 79% in West).
8. Id.
9. See G. ORFIELD & F. MONFORT, CHANGE AND DESEGREGATION IN LARGE SCHOOL DISTRICTS
(1988), reported in Segregation in Large Schools Seen Widening, L.A. Times, June 23, 1988, pt. I,
at 26, col. 1 (stating that from 1967 to 1986 in the 60 largest public school systems white enroll-
ment declined 16%, black increased 5%, and Latino increased 103%, with significant retention of
white students only where the most radical desegregation techniques were employed). Although
the number of blacks attending schools with 80% to 100% black population was reduced from
68% in 1966 to 49.4% in 1970, in the 32 Northern and Western states the 1966 figure of 57.4%
rose to 57.5% in 1970. U.S. Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare, News Release, at Table 2-A
(June 18, 1971).
10. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). See generally J. KUSHNER, GOVERNMENT DIS-
CRIMINATION: EQUAL PROTECTION LAW AND LITIGATION §§ 9.01-9.06 (1988) (school desegregation
law).
11. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
12. See infra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
13. Cf. Gibbs, Young, Black, in Critical Condition, L.A. Times, May 29, 1988, pt. V, at 1, col.
1. Gibbs reported that high school dropout rates over the past 25 years for black males increased
to 40-50% in recent years, with 20% being unable to read at a fourth grade level. Unemployment
has risen to a level three times worse than in 1960, with only 42% of blacks employed in 1980, and
with half of the blacks ages 16 to 24 never having held a job. In addition, black youths, one-fifth of
teenagers, constituted one-third of all juvenile felony arrests. One of 21 black youths are murdered
before reaching the age of 21, with suicide the third leading cause of death, triple the 1960 rate for
whites. Id.; cf. Secter, A New Bigotry Ripples Across U.S. Campuses, L.A. Times, May 8, 1988, pt.
1052 [Vol. 42:1049
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housing is the rising trend of "move-in" violence against blacks seeking
homes in predominantly white communities. 4 In addition, local studies
performed after the 1979 HUD audit indicated even higher levels of
discrimination. A study of the Dallas rental market demonstrated that
Latinos were exposed to high rates of bias, and that dark-skinned Mexi-
cans experienced nearly universal discrimination in their attempts to
rent homes.' 5 Studies of lending patterns in New York and California
also demonstrated that Latinos typically were subjected to disparate
treatment.' 6 A recent study in the Washington, D.C. area disclosed high
rates of bias, not only in the suburbs of Maryland and Virginia, but also
in the predominantly black District of Columbia.' 7 HUD plans to fund
I, at 1, col. 2, at 21, col. 2 (final ed.) (reporting rising racial harassment and declining minority
success in higher education, with a 50% decline between 1975 and 1985 in number of bachelor's
degrees earned by education majors, and a 41% decline in master's degrees in that discipline,
resulting in a shrinking pool of qualified minority teachers).
14. KLANWATCH PROJECT, "MovE-IN" VIOLENCE: WHITE RESISTANCE To NEIGHBORHOOD INTE-
GRATION IN THE 1980's (1987), reprinted in Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1987: Hearings on S.
558 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1031 (1987) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 5581; see also J. KUSHNER, FAIR HOUSING:
DISCRIMINATION IN REAL ESTATE, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND REVITALIZATION §§ 3.67-3.71 (1983
& Supp. 1988).
15. J. HAKKEN, DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CHICANOS IN THE DALLAS RENTAL HOUSING MARKET
(1979) (finding that dark-skinned Chicanos faced a 96% probability of encountering discrimina-
tion; light-skinned experienced a 65% level); see also ABT ASSOCIATES, FINAL REPORT ON RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION IN THE BOSTON HOUSING MARKET (1981) (showing significant discrimination);
James & Tynan, Segregation and Discrimination of Hispanic Americans-An Exploratory Analy-
sis, in HOUSING DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY 83, 84 (J. Goering ed. 1986) (finding signifi-
cant rates in Denver, Houston, and Phoenix); Bernstein, Black Renters Met Bias in San Diego
Apartment Survey, L.A. Times, Jan. 13, 1989, pt. I, at 26, col. 3 (encountered bias in 40% of tests);
deVise, Housing Discrimination in the Chicago Metropolitan Area: The Legacy of the Brown
Decision, 34 DE PAUL L. REV. 491 (1985) (showing extensive discrimination); Smith, An Analysis of
Black Occupancy of Mobile Homes, 42 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 410 (1976) (underrepresentation
from 4% to 45%). See generally H.R. REP. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1988) [hereinafter
H.R. REP. No. 711]; P. DOWNING, SEGREGATION AND DISCRIMINATION IN RENTAL HOUSING: A REVIaW
OF SELECTED STUDIES, LEGAL CASES AND LEGISLATION (Cong. Res. Serv. Rep. No. 86-677 G 1986),
reprinted in Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1987: Hearings on H.R. 1158 Before the Subcomm.
on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
773 (1987) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 1158].
16. See R. SCHAFER & H. LADD, DISCRIMINATION IN MORTGAGE LENDING (1981); HUD Study
Finds Evidence of Mortgage Discrimination in California, New York, 7 [Current Developments]
Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 1064 (1980) (in addition, according to the MIT and Harvard Joint
Center for Urban Studies, black loan applicants experience 1.58 to 7.82 times the loan denials
experienced by whites); Study Says Race a Factor in NYC Mortgage Lending, 4 Fair Hous.-Fair
Lending Rep. (P-H) 8.5 (1989) (black census tract of identical income range on white tract re-
ceived 14 loans per 1000 units as compared to 42 loans with race the only variable).
17. See REGIONAL FAIR HOUSING CONSORTIUM, RACE DISCRIMINATION IN THE RENTAL HOUSING
MARKET: A STUDY OF THE GREATER WASHINGTON AREA (1986); Study Reveals Discrimination in
Washington Area Apartment Rental Market, 3 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) 10.3 (1988)
[hereinafter Washington Apartment Study] (discussing the Fair Housing Council of Greater
Washington test of 111 properties that disclosed bias in 57% of the tested properties: 43% in D.C.,
70% in Maryland, and 62% in Virginia).
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another two-year study to audit the level of housing discrimination in
twenty-five metropolitan areas.'
The most promising sign of a trend toward a reduction of housing
discrimination was a study in Kentucky indicating that the incidence of
housing discrimination dropped by half in the ten-year period since the
HUD audit.19 The Kentucky study suggests that the rate of housing
discrimination may be a function of measurement techniques, regional
housing market variance, or local civil rights strategies.
Most of the above studies suggest that a high level of bias persists
in rentals, sales, marketing, and financing of housing, although one
study suggests a decline in levels of bias. Several possible, yet unverified
explanations exist for these disparate levels of discrimination. Local au-
dits that indicate decreased rates of discrimination may reflect the en-
forcement level, because aggressive fair housing enforcement reduces
the level of bias. Lowered rates of discrimination may also be a by-
product of school desegregation, under the theory that school diversity
reduces discriminatory attitudes or the motive to maintain existing seg-
regated housing patterns. Similarly, housing bias may be lower in com-
munities already marked by residential integration. Attitudes on racial
integration and race relations generally may dominate housing market
behavior. Rates of discrimination may also vary according to local hous-
ing market characteristics. For example, low vacancy rates and a tight
housing market may encourage discrimination, while soft markets with
high vacancy rates may discourage bias by profit-oriented housing pro-
viders. Measurement methodology, moreover, may have a significant
impact on a study's results; testing techniques vary and may not be
effective in uncovering newer, more sophisticated, and covert forms of
housing discrimination.
18. Two-Year, 25-City Study of Housing Discrimination to be Funded by HUD, 15 [Current
Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 936 (1988).
19. Apartment Discrimination Declines in Louisville, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H)
5 6.5 (1985) (testing demonstrated an 84% decline in the frequency of discrimination from 1977 to
1985; the 7.4% rate of discrimination in 1985 was down from 46.2% in 1977 and 24.3% in 1980);
see also KENTUCKY COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, DESEGREGATION IMPROVES AT HOUSING AUTHORITIES
WITH PLANS, WORSENS AT AUTHORITIES WITHOUT PLANS (1986) (noting small reductions at projects
with affirmative action plans); Kentucky Commission on Human Rights Reports Increasing De-
segregation, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) 1 1.9 (1988); Kentucky Study Finds Housing
Bias Almost Halved Since '77, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) 8.6 (1988) (citing E. GEORGE,
RACE DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING ALMOST HALVED IN LOUISVILLE AND LEXINGTON BUT DISCRIMINA-
TION PERSISTS, 1977-1988 (1987) (42.4% decline to 33.4% rate of bias per test, down from 57.9% in
1977)) (noting a further reduction of public housing segregation where affirmative action plans
were in place, although statewide desegregation pattern has slowed); Kentucky Rental Discrimina-
tion Drops to 10.5 Percent, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) 9.9 (1986) (discussing a state-
wide reduction in rental discrimination, and stressing the impact of landlord reporting and
enforcement).
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The studies of discrimination in the urbanized counties of Ken-
tucky may suggest that aggressive fair housing enforcement signifi-
cantly reduces discriminatory housing practices. Kentucky has been a
national leader in adopting laws requiring public reporting of minority
participation by housing providers and has enjoyed an image of aggres-
sive public enforcement. Kentucky is also the site of organized non-
profit fair housing council activity, including testing and enforcement.
The District of Columbia, by comparison, is far more integrated, with a
substantial black population, and is a center of effective enforcement
activities; yet a recent study of the Washington area demonstrates a
continued pattern of high levels of racial discrimination in housing. 20 A
market theory suggests that the cost to the discriminator imposed by
enforcement should discourage bias and that aggressive enforcement re-
mains the principal strategy to reduce the incidence of housing discrim-
ination. The hypothesis may be accurate, but targeting of scarce
enforcement resources toward a few large operators may not have
achieved the desired market result because the costs of enforcement
may have been insignificant to the perpetrator when compared to the
overall housing operation profit. Targeting the smaller operator and in-
creasing publicity of large awards against large housing providers may
yet prove that the enforcement strategy is the most effective route to
fair housing. Statistics demonstrating the resistance of discrimination
to enforcement may simply reflect the relative lack of national and local
resources targeted to fight the pervasive pattern of housing
discrimination.
The Kentucky studies might alternatively suggest the existence of
a nexus between school desegregation and the level of housing discrimi-
nation. The Kentucky counties were also the site of effective metropoli-
tan school desegregation. Diana Pearce studied fourteen metropolitan
areas, including suburbs, that had experienced school desegregation
programs and found that residential housing segregation declined, par-
ticularly as more minority families moved to the desegregated sub-
urbs. 2 1 These studies suggest that school desegregation is a prerequisite
to fair housing. They also present a conundrum, as frustrated school
desegregation litigators hope fair housing enforcement will generate
20. See REGIONAL FAIR HOUSING CONSORTIUM, supra note 17; Washington Apartment Study,
supra note 17.
21. D. PEARCE, BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS 40 (1980); see also G. ORFIELD, MUST WE BUS?:
SEGREGATED SCHOOLS AND NATIONAL POLICY (1978) [hereinafter G. ORFIELD, MUST WE BUS?]; G.
ORFIELD, TOWARD A STRATEGY OF URBAN INTEGRATION: LESSONS IN SCHOOL AND HOUSING POLICY
FROM 12 CITIES (1982) [hereinafter G. ORFIELD, URBAN INTEGRATION] (arguing that only through
desegregated neighborhoods will home seekers choose integration, and only through such residen-
tial integration will the need for school desegregation remedies be reduced or eliminated).
1989] 1055
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
school integration in the face of ineffective school desegregation
litigation.
The Pearce study strongly supports the hypothesis that American
housing discrimination is a function of American apartheid. Separate
societies tend to discourage integration. Fear of the unknown breeds
racial stereotypes and fear of being an urban pioneer.22 Segregated
housing patterns, long the status quo, are threatened by integrative
moves; such moves, therefore, encourage discrimination by housing
providers. The willingness to perpetuate residential segregation in this
way may be reduced significantly through effective fair housing
enforcement.2
Levels of housing discrimination may be a function of the market-
place. Economists would suggest that higher levels of discrimination
may be anticipated in markets marked by low vacancy rates and that
such discrimination is less likely in soft markets. Housing providers
simply are not likely to be willing to pay a premium to maintain segre-
gation or avoid integration. A market theory suggests the existence of a
production-integration nexus in which segregation, as a function of the
lack of housing mobility, and discrimination, as a function of competi-
tion for scarce resources, are best avoided through expansion of the
housing supply.
It is unfortunate that the 1979 HUD national housing discrimina-
tion audit24 was not analyzed in light of local vacancy rate statistics to
determine whether housing discrimination was responsive to housing
supply. The market model would suggest that with greater demand for
a short supply of units, landlords could discriminate more without fear
of cost or disclosure. In a very tight, rent-controlled rental market,
landlords may be successful in renting solely through word of mouth
advertising and referrals by current tenants or relatives-a scheme that
carries extreme discriminatory impact.2 5 With waiting lists, it is a sim-
22. See J. KUSHNER, supra note 5, at 3 n.1. In Apartheid in America the Author referred to
this phenomenon as the "UFO Syndrome." Id.
23. Galster, More Than Skin Deep-The Effect of Housing Discrimination on the Extent
and Pattern of Racial Residential Segregation in the United States, in HOUSING DESEGREGATION
AND FEDERAL POLICY, supra note 15, at 119, 134.
24. HUD AUDIT, supra note 7.
25. See, e.g., Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973) (membership
in community swimming pool limited to residents within three-quarters of a mile, and sales to
relatives only); Bunn v. Central Realty, 592 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (rental based on
recommendation of former tenants); Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club, Inc., 495 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir.
1974) (holding that friends or relatives rule violated § 1982); Huertas v. East River Hous. Corp.,
674 F. Supp. 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (children of residents); Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Own-
ership Ass'n, 2 Eq. Opportunity Hous. Rep. (P-H) 13,775 (E.D. Pa. July 16, 1976), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 559 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1977) (finding that priority to current residents and their
relatives had resulted in only one cooperative transferred outside of the community since 1964);
1056 [Vol. 42:1049
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ple matter to inform the minority applicant of the ostensible truth that
no units are available. Multiple applications also permit screening for
the "best applicant," a criterion which may often be defined not only by
reference and credit report, but by subjective evaluations of compatibil-
ity with the existing tenant population or the landlord's conscious or
subconscious standards.26
High vacancy rates in communities suffering economic decline and
dislocation, according to the economic model, might suggest declining
levels of housing bias. Studies do not exist, however, to support this
proposition. Perhaps scape-goating by those losing jobs and home eq-
uity in economically depressed communities accounts for heightened ra-
cism and irrational discrimination practices. Nevertheless, aggressive
enforcement might have dramatic effects in such communities where
enforcement remedies carry greater economic significance and where
bias may be easily disclosed by tests that reveal continued vacancies
even after minority group members are turned away.
Despite the Reagan Administration's defense of its decision to cur-
tail the production of housing for those of low and moderate income
and its claim that the problem was affordability 7 rather than a housing
shortage, the homeless stand as a symbol of shortage. A rising level of
racial and ethnic discrimination may be another symbol of a passive
United States v. Grooms, 348 F. Supp. 1130 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (recommendation of current tenants).
26. See, e.g., Gresham v. Windrush Partners, 730 F.2d 1417, 1419-20 (11th Cir.) (preferring
"nice people" with the most favorable rental histories), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 882 (1984); Jordan v.
Dellway Villa of Tenn., Ltd., 661 F.2d 588, 589 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1008 (1982)
(preferring the "best available" applicant); Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1035
(2d Cir. 1979) (arguing that prospective tenant "would not fit into the personality of this family");
Harper v. Hutton, 594 F.2d 1091, 1092 (6th Cir. 1979) (claiming that applicant would not make
good tenant); Wharton v. Knefel, 562 F.2d 550, 556 (8th Cir. 1977) (renting on the basis of how the
manager "feels"); United States v. Reddoch, 467 F.2d 897, 899 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (fearing
white backlash if blacks became tenants); Huertas, 674 F. Supp. at 445 (applying the subjective
criterion of who would be "most effective within the community"); Murphy v. 253 Garth Tenants
Corp., 579 F. Supp. 1150, 1156 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that cooperative housing corporation may
seek out "good neighbor," but may not base decision on subjective discomfort with applicant);
Shaw v. Cassar, 558 F. Supp. 303, 313-14 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (defining "good tenant" without objec-
tive criteria); United States v. Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F. Supp. 643, 650 (N.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd
in part per curiam, 509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1975) (arguing prospective incompatibility); United
States v. Grooms, 348 F. Supp. 1130, 1133 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (arguing noncongeniality); cf. Cummins
v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975) (focusing on employment), vacated, 433 U.S. 903
(1977).
27. CBO Study Says Affordability Predominant Housing Problem, 16 [Current Develop-
ments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 807 (1989) (noting "current housing problem and possible fed-
eral response"); Low-Cost Housing, A Concern for Bush Administration, Aide Says, 16 [Current
Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 643, 644 (1988) (statement of HUD official John Rosso);
Affordability Top Housing Problem in Philadelphia, According to Study, 16 [Current Develop-
ments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 122 (1988) (claiming shortage is not the top problem); Major
Housing Problem is Affordability, Not Quality, CBO Says in New Report, 10 [Current Develop-
ments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 19 (1982) (reporting on Federal Housing Assistance).
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national policy that permits lower income housing stock to be removed
from the market through abandonment, gentrification, inflation, or con-
version of units for occupancy by the more affluent. Yet, while increas-
ing income may generate an expanding housing supply for some, racial
discrimination has not been found to be a class phenomenon. ' Cases
suggest that discrimination is not simply a function of wealth. 9 Unfor-
tunately, studies fail to distinguish rates of discrimination according to
income status. The achievement of fair housing may be dependent on
the rediscovery of government policy keyed to expanding the lower in-
come housing supply along with the middle and upper income supply to
assure a healthy housing market that permits filtration, 0 the process by
which older housing becomes progressively less expensive as the
wealthy move to more newly constructed units and the older stock fil-
ters down to house the poor. Currently, conversion, demolition, and new
household formation generate reverse filtration and homelessness.
3
1
Regional, community, and even neighborhood attitudes toward is-
sues of race, integration, and discrimination may play a significant role
in the level of racial discrimination. Although no studies have been per-
formed to correlate testing audits with these attitudes, one can hypoth-
esize that community or national leadership, together with community
education programs in race relations, might have a significant impact
on such community attitudes. It is likely, however, that white suburban
or urban white segregated enclaves established or maintained partly to
resist school integration, particularly busing remedies, may exhibit
higher levels of racial bias and fear and be less receptive to constructive
28. See J. KUSHNER, supra note 5, at 18-19 n.43; OFFICE OF ECON. OPPORTUNITY, DEP'T OF
Hous. & URBAN DEV., BLACKS PAY MORE FOR LESS (1972) (finding that blacks pay higher rent for
housing of lesser quality than that available to whites); A. PINKNEY, THE MYTH OF BLACK PROGRESS
81-86 (1984) (noting that socioeconomic factors alone fail to account for the persistence of segrega-
tion); accord Bianchi, Farley & Spain, Racial Inequalities in Housing: An Examination of Recent
Trends, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND MINORITY HOUSING IN THE UNITED STATES 19, 35-36 (J. Momeni
ed. 1986) [hereinafter RACE, ETHNICITY]; Farley, Residential Segregation in Urbanized Areas of
the United States in 1970: An Analysis of Social Class and Racial Differences, 14 DEMOGRAPHY
497, 514 (1977); Kain, The Influence of Race and Income on Racial Segregation and Housing
Policy, in HOUSING DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY, supra note 15, at 99, 100.
29. Phillips v. Hunter Trails Community Ass'n, 685 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1982); Robinson v. 12
Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1979).
30. See generally W. GRIGSBY & L. ROSENBERG, URBAN HOUSING POLICY (1975); W. SMITH,
FILTERING AND NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE (1964); Edel, Filtering in a Private Housing Market, in
READINGS IN URBAN ECONOMICS 204-15 (M. Edel & J. Rothenberg eds. 1972). For a contrary per-
spective, see generally A. SCHORR, SLUMS AND SOCIAL INSECURITY (1974), which argued racial segre-
gation, price inflation, a supply unresponsive to excessive demand, and extraordinary need throw
into question the filtration model.
31. Kushner, The Reagan Urban Policy: Centrifugal Force in the Empire, 2 UCLA J. ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y 209, 239-40 (1982) (arguing that "reverse filtration," the accurate model as driven by
gentrification, condominium conversion, and massive new family formation, reduced movement to
new suburbs and propelled back-to-the-city movement).
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leadership or community education programs.
Studies of the incidence of discrimination are premised on testing,
also referred to as auditing or checking. Such tests are most tradition-
ally used in cases involving admission or access denial, or in cases of
steering, in which applicants are shown available housing located only
in areas traditionally inhabited by members of the prospect's race.2 In
access cases, a minority tester inquires about the availability of a unit
for rent or sale. Shortly thereafter a white tester makes a similar in-
quiry; the comparison demonstrates equal or disparate treatment. In
steering cases, the comparison would seek to determine whether white
and minority testers were referred to identical housing markets, neigh-
borhoods, projects, or sections of projects.
There is a great deal of controversy over the appropriate methodol-
ogy of testing. Some advocate what is called a three tester sandwich, in
which a white tester, then a minority tester, and again a white tester
make inquiries within minutes of each other. Typically, the white tester
is shown units, the minority is told of no vacancies, and the following
white inquiry discloses the continued availability of a unit. Although
such a "sandwich" test, if successful, is the most dramatic evidence of
discrimination, it suffers in several regards. First, housing providers
may be put on notice by the similarity and frequency of inquiries in
such a brief period of time. Second, the greater number of tests in-
creases the danger that the testers will give different information or fail
to recall with precision the conversation that occurred. Often reports
filed by testers are incomplete and conclusory, making experience com-
parison difficult. Utilization of two testers, or one tester following a re-
jected minority applicant, is ideal. Testing for some forms of
discrimination also may be carried out entirely by a single tester, even
over the telephone. For example, the City of San Francisco telephones
discriminatory advertisements to newspapers to determine willingness
to carry such offers. Courts universally accept tester testimony 3 and,
while in some cases numerous testers have been utilized,3 4 courts rou-
32. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1978) (rentals); Johnson v.
Jerry Pals Real Estate, 485 F.2d 528 (7th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (sales); Fair Hous. Council v.
Eastern Bergen County Multiple Listing Serv., 422 F. Supp. 1071 (D.N.J. 1976) (sales).
33. Havens v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 368 (1982) (finding minority and neighborhood testers
aggrieved, here using two testers who made several inquiries following victim housing denial);
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 94, 111 (1979) (using several testers); Sher-
man Park Community Ass'n v. Wauwatosa Realty Co., 486 F. Supp. 838 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (holding
testers had standing); United States v. Wisconsin, 395 F. Supp. 732, 734 (W.D. Wis. 1975) (holding
state prohibition of testing invalid); J. KUSHNER, supra note 14, § 3.08.
34. E.g., Havens, 455 U.S. at 368 (two testers making several inquiries following victim hous-
ing denial); Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 94, 111 (several testers); Watts v. Boyd Properties, Inc., 758
F.2d 1482, 1483-84 (11th Cir. 1985) (two testers, one the plaintiff); Gresham v. Windrush Partners,
730 F.2d 1417, 1420-21 (11th Cir.) (several sets of testers), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 882 (1984); Kin-
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tinely accept testimony of one tester as sufficient evidence that false
information was given to a complaining victim. 5
One of the problems with studies based on audits is that conscien-
tious researchers are likely to exclude tests premised on incomplete re-
ports, tests in which the testers dealt with different sales or rental
agents, or tests exhibiting other factors that might skew the results of a
study. More problematic is the increasing sophistication of discrimina-
tion techniques. To test lending policy, for example, it may be neces-
sary for the tester to provide accurate financial data and to pay loan
application fees before a loan decision is made. Sales or rental agents
may use this same type of policy to mask discriminatory practices by
requiring detailed applications, credit checks, and perhaps deposits
prior to rental or sales decisions in times of high demand and short
supply or waiting lists.
ney v. Rothchild, 678 F.2d 658, 659 (6th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (several testers); Grant v. Smith,
574 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1978) (conducting several tests); Connell v. Shoemaker, 555 F.2d 483,
485 (5th Cir. 1977) (two testers followed victim); United States v. Warwick Mobile Home Estates,
Inc., 537 F.2d 1148, 1149 (4th Cir. 1975) (several testers); Marr v. Rife, 503 F.2d 735, 737 (6th Cir.
1974) (several testers followed victim).
35. Tolliver v. Amici, 800 F.2d 149, 150 (7th Cir. 1986) (single tester followed victim); Hamil-
ton v. Svatik, 779 F.2d 383, 386 (7th Cir. 1985) (single tester followed victim); Richardson v. How-
ard, 712 F.2d 319, 320 (7th Cir. 1983) (single tester followed victim); Washington v. Sherwin Real
Estate, Inc., 694 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1982) (single tester followed victim); Price v. Pelka, 690
F.2d 98, 99 (6th Cir. 1982) (single tester followed victim); Phiffer v. Proud Parrot Motor Hotel,
Inc., 648 F.2d 548, 550, 552 (9th Cir. 1980) (single tester followed victim); McDonald v. Verble, 622
F.2d 1227, 1229-30 (6th Cir. 1980) (single tester followed victim); Fountila v. Carter, 571 F.2d 487,
489 (9th Cir. 1978) (single tester followed victim); Wharton v. Knefel, 562 F.2d 550, 553-54 (8th
Cir. 1977) (single tester followed victim); Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559
F.2d 894, 897-98 (3d Cir. 1977) (case brought by single tester); Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536
F.2d 231, 234 n.2 (8th Cir. 1976) (single tester followed victim); Hamilton v. Miller, 477 F.2d 908,
909 (10th Cir. 1973) (single tester followed victim); Wainwright v. Allen, 461 F. Supp. 293, 295-96
(D.N.D. 1978) (single tester followed victim), aft'd mem., 605 F.2d 1209 (8th Cir. 1979); Williamson
v. Hampton Management Co., 339 F. Supp. 1146, 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (single tester followed vic-
tim); Martin v. John C. Bowers & Co., 334 F. Supp. 5, 6-7 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (single tester followed
victim); Bush v. Kaim, 297 F. Supp. 151, 155 (N.D. Ohio 1969) (single tester followed victim);
Harris v. Jones, 296 F. Supp. 1082, 1083 (D. Mass. 1969) (single tester followed victim); LaPierre v.
Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 354 Mass. 165, 169-70, 236 N.E.2d 192, 195 (1968)
(single tester followed victim); Wilson v. Sixty-Six Meimore Gardens, 106 N.J. Super. 182, 184-86,
254 A.2d 545, 546 (App. Div. 1969) (single tester followed victim); see also H.R. CONe. REP. No. 426,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 161, 240, reprinted in 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3458, 3537
(testing funding guidelines issued by HUD under Fair Housing Initiatives Program were not in-
tended to affect litigation and to be limited solely to funding activities).
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III. HOUSING SEGREGATION
American geography is marked by racial segregation.36 The proph-
esy of the Kerner Commission, 7 that America was moving toward two
separate societies, one white and one black, has come to pass. 38 Inte-
grated neighborhoods or living experiences are isolated and too often
represent a transitory status as the neighborhood moves toward segre-
gation.3 9 Communities such as the Village of Bellwood, Illinois, Shaker
Heights, Ohio, University City, Missouri, or the Wilshire District in Los
Angeles are exceptions. Despite isolated neighborhood integration,
schools may, as in the case of Los Angeles, remain racially separate.
Experiments in new, large-scale integrated communities such as Star-
36. See H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 15, at 16 (summarizing the testimony of Douglas S.
Massey); W. COLMAN, CITIES, SUBURBS AND STATES 62-68 (1975); P. DOWNING, supra note 15, re-
printed in Hearings on H.R. 1158, supra note 15, at 773; REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 222 (1968) [hereinafter KERNER COMMISSION REPORT]; A. SCHNARE,
RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION BY RACE IN U.S. METROPOLITAN AREAS (1977); A. SORENSEN, K. TAEUBER
& L. HOLLINGSWORTH, INDEXES OF RACIAL RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION FOR 109 CITIES IN THE UNITED
STATES 1940 TO 1980 (1974); U.S. COMM'N ON CIvIL RIGHTS, TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN: EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING 124-34 (1975) (discussing massive trend of increased central city segrega-
tion); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 1961 REPORT. HOUSING 1 (1961) [hereinafter 1961 REPORT]
(describing suburbs around cities as the "white noose"); see also J. KUSHNER, supra note 5 (collect-
ing and analyzing the literature describing and measuring the pervasive pattern of American racial
residential segregation); Darden, Accessibility to Housing: Differential Residential Segregation for
Blacks, Hispanics, American Indians, and Asians, in RACE, ETHNICITY, supra note 28, at 108, 112
(noting that from 1950-1980 the average segregation between blacks and whites in the Nation's 25
largest cities with 100,000 or more blacks declined only 7%); Jordan, Still Two Nations-One
Black, One White?, 13 Hu. RTS., Fall 1985, at 21; Massey & Denton, Suburbanization and Segre-
gation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 94 AM. J. Soc. 592 (1988) (black segregation, greater than His-
panic and Asian, persists in cities and suburbs suggesting a discriminatory origin); Muth,
'Residential Segregation and Discrimination, in PATTERNS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 107, 113 (G.
Von Furstenberg, B. Harrison & A. Horowitz eds. 1974) (arguing that equal demographic disper-
sion of whites and blacks would require relocation of 80-90% of all blacks in the nation); Com-
ment, Individual Rights and Demographic Realities: The Problem of Fair Housing, 82 Nw. U.L.
REV. 61 (1988); see also Future for Cities Bleak, Census Director Says, 7 [Current Developments]
Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 800 (1980) (according to Vincent P. Barabba, between 1970 and 1979,
the white population of central cities declined by 4 million whereas the number of blacks living in
central cities increased by 1.2 million). According to congressional testimony by University of Chi-
cago's Douglas S. Massey, in 60 cities studied, based on 1980 data, over 50% of blacks would have
to move to achieve integrated neighborhoods, and above 80% would have to move in Cleveland,
Los Angeles, New York, Detroit, St. Louis, and Milwaukee, and 88% in Chicago; segregation typi-
cally has remained the same or worsened since the 1970 census. Residential Segregation Stifling
Black Advancement, Professor Testifies, 15 [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA)
695 (1988).
37. KERNER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 36, at 1, 222; see also 1961 REPORT, supra note
36, at 1 ("white noose").
38. J. KUSHNER, supra note 5, at 1-4.
39. Farley, Residential Segregation and its Implications for School Segregation, 39 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 164, 167 n.12 (1975) (observing that racial turnover occurs over a period of time
and that identifiably integrated communities are merely a transition phase toward segregated
neighborhoods).
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rett City in New York have been threatened by the Justice Department
strategy of challenging integration and integration maintenance quotas
as violative of the Fair Housing Act.40 The large, metropolitan cities are
highly segregated in terms of both residential communities and schools.
The most notorious recent symbol of America's commitment to racial
residential segregation was the short-lived defiance by Yonkers, New
York of an order to desegregate housing following a finding of segrega-
tion in subsidized housing site selection as well as in the school sys-
tem.4 1 The city council initially voted to defy the ruling, even in the
face of imprisonment and fines of up to one million dollars per day that
threatened to bankrupt the city.42 The impact of the contempt order,
upheld by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,43 resulted in an agree-
ment to abide by the desegregation ruling.44 The desegregation of Yon-
kers, however, remains but a dream.45
The 1980 census disclosed some increase in minority group pres-
ence in traditional white suburbs, but that data is skewed by the
growth of segregated black communities within the older urban suburbs
and concentrated areas of suburban districts.4 The halt of both dis-
40. See United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 376 (1988).
41. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 2821 (1988).
42. Yonkers Again Rejects Housing Plan; Contempt Ruling, Fines Upheld, 16 [Current De-
velopments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 344 (1988); Yonkers Held in Contempt, Fined for Re-
jecting Housing Desegregation, 16 [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 253 (1988);
Tumulty, Yonkers Officials Defiant Despite Appeals Court Loss, L.A. Times, Aug. 27, 1988, pt. I,
at 1, col. 5.
43. United States v. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. granted sub nom.
Spalone v. United States, 57 U.S.L.W. 3588 (U.S. Mar. 6, 1989) (Nos. 88-854, 88-855, 88-856, 88-
870) (consolidated on legislative immunity issue).
44. Yonkers Council Approves Housing Plan; Contempt Ruling, Fines Lifted, 16 [Current
Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 389 (1988); Yonkers Ends Contempt, 4 Fair Hous.-Fair
Lending Rep. (P-H) 1 4.2 (1988).
45. Yonkers Public Housing Delayed Further by Dispute with Court, Council Members Say,
16 [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 660 (1988) (site acquisition controversy con-
tinues); Yonkers Seeks Funding, Flexibility from HUD to Build Public Housing Units, 16 [Cur-
rent Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 427 (1988) (compliance still uncertain); cf. Yonkers
Racing Corp. v. City of Yonkers, 858 F.2d 855 (2d Cir.), cert. filed, 57 U.S.L.W. 3455 (U.S. Dec. 19,
1988) (No. 88-1029) (allowing the city to bypass state procedural eminent domain and environmen-
tal standards in condemning land to accommodate the settlement); L.A. Times. Nov. 13, 1988, pt.
I, at 2, col. 5 (final ed.) (reporting that 16 Yonkers residents filed a lawsuit seeking $166 million
from the recalcitrant councilmen, charging that defiance of the decree damaged the city's image
and financial stability and wasted the taxpayers' money).
46. According to the 1980 census, in 38 metropolitan areas with populations of 1 million or
more, the number of blacks living in suburbs grew from 2.3 million in 1970 to 3.7 million in 1980.
The percentage of blacks in the total suburban population in those 38 areas increased from 4.7%
to 6.5%. More than 14.7 million blacks reside in the central cities while 6 million reside in the
suburbs and rural fringe. L.A. Herald Examiner, May 31, 1981, § A, at 6, col. 3. Black presence in
the suburbs, however, is often in the older, fringe communities in a segregated pattern. See U.S.
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persed subsidized housing development and aggressive affirmative ac-
tion in the marketing of housing, together with increasing levels of
poverty within minority groups, 47 may reveal increased levels of racial
segregation as census tracts are studied following the 1990 census.
America was integrated at the turn of the century when Southern
whites desired dispersal of blacks as a means of white self-protection
and urbanized whites desired black workers to have easy access to the
workplace.48 With the rise of suburban living status after World War I,
however, cultural preferences modeled on the living patterns of the rich
excluded blacks from the new neighborhoods. 49 Dramatic apartheid ap-
peared under the New Deal housing programs and the public and war
worker housing constructed during and following World War II.*0 Those
housing projects, built on a purely segregated basis,5 established racial
segregation in numerous cities. The most dramatic cause of segregation,
however, was the mortgage insurance and loan programs administered
by the Veterans Administration and the Federal Housing Administra-
tion,52 programs which provided the financing for America's suburbs.
Regulations required the financed properties to be segregated by condi-
tioning subdivision approval on the inclusion of racial covenants or eq-
uitable servitudes. 
5
The living patterns established under this regime have been fol-
DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., RECENT SUBURBANIZATION OF BLACKS (1979); see also Lake, Racial
Transition and Black Homeownership in American Suburbs, in AMERICA'S HOUSING: PROSPECTS
AND PROBLEMS 419 (G. Sternlieb & J. Hughes eds. 1980); Silver, Housing Policy and Suburbaniza-
tion: An Analysis of the Changing Quality and Quantity of Black Housing in Suburbia Since
1950, in RACE, ETHNICrrY, supra note 28, at 69, 85 (discussing the trend of black suburbanization in
segregated patterns).
47. See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL URBAN POLICY REPORT 40-
41 (1984) (between 1970 and 1982, the number of persons living in poverty in central cities in-
creased 22%, with a doubling of the number of black female-headed families, nearly half of whom
are in poverty); Kushner, supra note 31, at 232 n.91.
48. J. KUSHNER, supra note 5, at 6-24; W. WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE 38-
39 (1978).
49. J. KUSHNER, supra note 5, at 15-25.
50. Id. at 30-37, 68-70. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), which sustained segregated
transportation on a "separate but equal" basis, was the universally executed model for public
housing, war housing, and later subsidized private housing programs administered by Presidents
Franklin Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower.
51. J. KUSHNER, supra note 5, at 30-31.
52. Id. at 20-22.
53. Id. at 16-22. The FHA underwriting manual prior to 1947 contained a specific reference
to race. FHA UNDERWRITING MANUAL 935 (1938) (T 980 contained a model racial restrictive cove-
nant). Although the 1947 manual removed the racial provision, restrictive covenants and homoge-
neity were advocated to protect property values. FHA, UNDERWRITING MANUAL § 1303(b) (1947). J.
KUSHNER, supra note 5, at 22; R. WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETTO 70-73, 152-53 (1948); Dean, None
Other than Caucasian: A Study of Race Covenants, 23 J. LAND & PUB. UTIL. ECON. 428, 430 (1947)




lowed despite changes in the law. Even today HUD's housing programs
are marked by racial segregation in site selection and marketing.14 Cur-
rently, segregation is increased by the plight of virtually all rent supple-
ment recipients who manage to locate housing only in neighborhoods
where they are in the racial majority.5 The federal highway program
also helped fund the segregated suburban exodus. In addition, state and
local highway and urban renewal programs produced massive relocation
which resettled white displacees in suburbia and blacks in the increas-
ingly concentrated minority sections of central cities.5 6 An audit of cur-
rent governmental spending, taxation, and other policies would disclose
a pattern of programs and policies that carry a segregating impact and
would implicate the federal government as the primary contributor to
and implementor of segregation. Tragically, every administration since
President Eisenhower has failed to seek desegregation aggressively in
the public housing program. 8
54. J. KUSHNER, supra note 5, at 33-37; J. KUSHNER, supra note 14, § 7.02; see also cases cited
infra note 135.
55. E.g., D. FALK & H. FRANKLIN, EQUAL HOUSING OPPORTUNITY 22-30 (1976); Bullard, Does
Section 8 Promote an Ethnic and Economic Mix?, 35 J. HOUSING 364 (1978) (stating that an ethnic
and economic mix does not exist in Houston); Kushner & Keating, The Kansas City Housing
Allowance Experience: Subsidies for the Real Estate Industry and Palliatives for the Poor, 7 UR.
LAW. 239 (1975); McGee, Power(lessness) and Dispersion: Comments on Chester McGuire's The
Urban Development Act of 1974, Community Development Funds and Black Economic Problems,
5 BLACK L.J. 39, 44 (1976); Comment, Symbolic Gestures and False Hopes: Low-Income Housing
Dispersal After Gautreaux and the Housing and Development Act of 1974, 21 ST. Lois U.L.J. 759
(1978); see also Study Recommends Curbs on In-Place Section 8 Leasing, 5 [Current Develop-
ments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 1002 (1978) (no integration under Cleveland program). In 1987,
Congress provided that applicants for subsidized § 8 housing may use their certificates anywhere in
the same or contiguous metropolitan statistical area. Housing and Community Development Act of
1987, Pub. L. No. 100-242, § 145, 101 Stat. 1815, 1852 (1988) (amending scattered sections of 12
U.S.C. and 44 U.S.C.). But cf. Gray & Tursky, Location and Racial/Ethnic Occupancy Patterns
for HUD-Subsidized Family Housing in Ten Metropolitan Areas, in HousING DESEGREGATION AND
FEDERAL POLICY, supra note 15, at 235, 248-51 (raising possibility of higher levels of integration
under the § 8 existing housing program than that under prior HUD construction programs, albeit
based on census tracts, which are acknowledged to be poor indicators of neighborhood). Accord
Stucker, Race and Residential Mobility-The Effects of Housing Assistance Programs on House-
hold Behavior, in HOUSING DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY, supra note 15, at 253.
56. J. KUSHNER, supra note 5, at 37-44; Kushner & Werner, Illusory Promises Revisited: Re-
location Planning and Judicial Review, 8 Sw. U.L. REv. 751 (1976). Federal transportation subsidy
recipients should be required to coordinate a land use and housing plan to assure accessibility to
affordable housing and transit, and to include appropriate affirmative action mechanisms to en-
courage and assure integrated housing and neighborhood patterns. See Freilich & Chinn, Trans-
portation Corridors: Shaping and Financing Urbanization Through Integration of Eminent
Domain, Zoning and Growth Management Techniques, 55 U. Mo. X.C. L. REv. 153 (1987);
Kushner, supra note 31; Kushner, Urban Transportation Planning, 4 URB. L. & POL'Y 161 (1981).
57. J. KUSHNER, supra note 5, at 56-64; Kushner, supra note 31.
58. See, e.g., HUD -Plans Cautious Moves Toward Public Housing Integration Knapp Tells
NAHRO, 12 [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 381 (1984); see also Segregation in
Public Housing Found Worse Than in Private Complexes, 3 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H)
1 3.5 (1987) (two Kentucky counties); Studies Find Widespread Segregation in Federally Aided
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Ironically, Brown v. Board of Educatione5 9 though invalidating in-
tentionally segregated public schools, encouraged white flight to the
suburbs and their new, all-white school districts, while urban districts
were taken to court to accomplish the promise of Brown.6 0 The Su-
preme Court's ruling in Milliken v. Bradley,1 which limited urban
school remedies to the urban district absent a finding of a violation by
the suburban districts, insulated the white suburbs from busing and
further encouraged the establishment of separate societies. Blacks, long
denied home ownership in general, and more particularly ownership in
the real estate markets that enjoy the greatest property value apprecia-
tion and access to the best schools, failed to participate in the real es-
tate boom that has so separated the wealthy white home-owning
population from the relatively impoverished black renter population.2
Class as well as race has solidified the foundation of separation. The
continuing pervasive pattern of discrimination in the marketing of
housing prevents any significant reversal of this division.6
Although the Supreme Court will look to the purpose behind the
passage of a law and will invalidate a provision originally passed for a
discriminatory purpose despite the neutral, even nondiscriminatory
contemporary impact,4 the Court has not inquired into the sordid ori-
gins of apartheid. The causes are more easily treated as "unknown and
.. . unknowable," like some pre-Columbian ritual. 5 Nevertheless, Mil-
liken v. Bradley allows an investigation to determine if the state's ac-
tions led to segregated schools,6 6  if suburban school districts
participated in the segregating violation,67 if district boundaries were
gerrymandered to maintain segregated schools 6 8 and even if central city
Housing, 3 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) 1 2.3 (1987) (Baltimore); Flournoy & Rodrigue,
Separate and Unequal, Dallas Morning News, Feb. 10-17, 1985.
59. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
60. J. COLEMAN, S. KELLY & J. MOORE, TRENDS IN SCHOOL SEGREGATION, 1968-73 (1975); J.
KUSHNER, supra note 5, at 29 (collecting studies supporting and disputing the significance of
"white flight").
61. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). In refusing to equalize district school funding in San Antonio Inde-
pendent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1983), the Burger Court approved of racially
"separate and unequal" schools, and thus neighborhoods, in a cruel and ironic play on the discred-
ited Plessy doctrine. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 759-61 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
62. Bullard, Blacks and the American Dream of Housing, in RAcE, ETHNICITY, supra note 28,
at 53, 63 (denial of basic form of wealth accumulation); Kain & Quigley, Housing Market Discrimi-
nation, Homeownership and Savings Behavior, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 263 (1972).
63. Galster, supra note 23, in HoUSING DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY, supra note 15,
at 131-34.
64. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (convict disenfranchisement).
65. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 756 n.2 (Stewart, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 748-51; id. at 755 (Stewart, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 745.
68. Id. at 748-49; id. at 755 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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school district violations carried a segregative impact in the suburbs.6 9
In United States v. Yonkers Board of Education,"° proof centered both
on traditional school violations and on the city's segregated site selec-
tion for public housing. Although relief has been minimal, the Yonkers
case has established the principle that publicly caused segregated hous-
ing patterns may permit desegregation remedies. Hills v. Gautreaux71
similarly approved a metropolitan-wide remedy following segregated
public housing site selection in Chicago; the remedy, however, was to-
tally dependent on congressionally approved housing subsidies-an en-
dangered species during the Reagan years.
Existing segregation in housing patterns discourages prospective
residents from choosing integrated housing. Whites seeking predomi-
nantly white neighborhoods and school districts pay a premium to live
in segregated communities. Interestingly, the desirability of such areas
further encourages segregated living patterns because these areas offer
the greatest investment opportunity and display the highest equity ap-
preciation. Many blacks understandably fear the role of urban pioneer
because they often would be the lone black family in the neighborhood,
their children isolated and identifiable in the schools, and their families
prey to suspicious neighbors, merchants, and police. However exagger-
ated such images may be, only those minority group members commit-
ted to enjoying the best schools, safest neighborhoods, and the best
housing investments-typically those professionals who have exper-
ienced integrated living patterns in the workplace or university and who
possess the considerable price of admission-are willing to venture from
traditional neighborhoods. On the other hand, white demand for hous-
ing in traditionally black neighborhoods is even lower than the limited
supply of opportunities for integrated living patterns. Thus, any hope
for integration through natural market forces, even with the presence of
aggressive fair housing enforcement, is simply nonexistent.
Ironically, integration is likely to be facilitated only through affirm-
ative action, ranging from race-conscious affirmative marketing, subsi-
dies, and housing access priority to the classic integration maintenance
quota that was utilized at Starrett City, New York.7 2 The integration
conundrum is that integration can become a reality only through the
implementation of discrimination. Integration levels may be increased
only slightly by eliminating discrimination through fair housing
69. Id. at 745.
70. 801 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1986), afi'd, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
2821 (1988).
71. 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
72. United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
376 (1988); see also infra Part VIII, subpart C.
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enforcement."3
Affordable housing shortages, occurring in many American cities
because of the decline in lower income housing starts and the depletion
of the existing housing stock through abandonment, demolition, and
conversion to condominiums or other such properties, have increased
dramatically the competition for housing. Shortages have escalated
rents, facilitated landlord discrimination, and spawned the tragedy of
homelessness. Renewed housing production and a housing subsidy pro-
gram is needed simultaneously to house the Nation and to reduce levels
of discrimination. Production, however, presents alternative dilemmas.
First, the subsidy and tax incentives for rental housing in existence for
the past two decades may have generated new households: the elderly,
gays, separated families, and singles, all of whom proliferated in the
past generation and further tightened a housing stock with few vacan-
cies. In short, more production may generate more households. Second,
production has not generated integration. Projects built in the suburbs
are virtually all-white in occupancy, while urban projects, because they
have tended to be sited in minority neighborhoods, have been destined
to become all-minority occupied. The effort to dismantle suburban ex-
clusionary zoning actually extended segregated living patterns by often
housing lower income whites who otherwise may have remained in the
city and its school district. The production-integration nexus may re-
quire affirmative action programs to assure that housing production
does not continue to be a segregative force.
Even as the Nation moved toward healing its racial problems dur-
ing the civil rights movement of the 1960s and commenced the needed
war on poverty, the forces of segregation were at full steam, generating
the seas of suburban subdivisions that surrounded the remains of a de-
populating central city. The extraordinary advances of racial minorities
in education and employment have been short lived.74 The green of fis-
cal support has followed the white affluent population to the suburbs.
Better schools and housing, together with the plants and offices of ma-
jor employers, are now typically located outside the city. Segregated
73. Galster, supra note 23, in HOUSING DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY, supra note 15,
at 134.
74. Johnston, Family Income Climbs, But Not Among Blacks, L.A. Times, Sept. 1, 1988, pt.
I, at 21, col. 1 (reporting that family income increased overall in 1987 by 1%, per capita by 1.6%,
but declined for blacks and Latinos; poverty rate for blacks increased from 31.1% to 33.3%, while
the rate was 13.5% for the Nation overall); Kushner, supra note 31, at 232 n.91; May, Blacks Look
Back with Anger at Reagan Years, L.A. Times, Jan. 20, 1989, pt. I, at 1, col. 5 (poverty rate rose to
33.1% with drastic program reductions); Black Male College Enrollment Declines, L.A. Times,
Jan. 16, 1989, pt. I, at 2, col. 3 (despite growth in total enrollment, over last decade from 11 to 12.5
million, black male enrollment fell from 470,000 to 436,000, or from 4.3 to 3.5%, with black women
rising from 5.1 to 5.2%).
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neighborhoods generate racial stereotyping and fear of the unknown;
that fear breeds dislike, if not hatred. Employment decisions are af-
fected by the conscious or subconscious discomfort of whites or minori-
ties when interviewing for jobs. Some hope that a separate black
community might foster strengthened economic networks and opportu-
nities. If that dream is not fulfilled, separate societies will further widen
the class gap between the races. Urban unrest, failure, and violence is a
direction from which this Nation must turn. Society is moving toward
either heightened segregation or integration. Few would dispute which
course is the more dangerous and tragic.
IV. PRE-1988 PRIVATE FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT
Private parties had two basic alternatives for enforcing federal fair
housing laws prior to passage of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of
1988: (1) the administrative conciliation complaint procedure created
by section 810 of Title VIII;75 and (2) judicial action in either federal or
state court. The federal court option is a direct judicial action under the
former section 812 of Title VIII,76 which was typically joined in cases
involving racial and ethnic-based bias with a claim under section 1982.77
In addition, enforcement under state or local fair housing laws could be
achieved by either filing directly with the state or local agency, having a
section 810 complaint referred to a state or local HUD-certified agency,
bringing a direct lawsuit authorized by the state in state court, or at-
taching the state claim as a pendent claim in a federal fair housing
lawsuit.
A. Administrative Conciliation
Although HUD has received an increasing number of administra-
tive complaints, 8 its procedures have been largely ineffectual because
75. 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1982).
76. Id. § 3612 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
77. Id. § 1982.
78. HUD received 4658 complaints during fiscal year 1988, referring 3308 cases to state and
local agencies; HUD successfully conciliated 214 complaints and state and local agencies 908 com-
plaints. HUD Releases FY 1988 Complaint Statistics, 4 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) 1 8.11
(1989). HUD received 4699 § 810 fair housing complaints in 1987, with referral of 2770 to certified
state and local agencies. 134 CONG. REc. S10,456 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1988) (statement of Sen. Ken-
nedy); see also Residential Segregation Stifling Black Advancement, Professor Testifies, 15 [Cur-
rent Development] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 695 (1988). In 1977, by comparison, about 3391
complaints were filed with HUD. Of these, 277 were successfully conciliated, and of those, in only
about one-fourth of the cases was the contested housing obtained by the victim of discrimination.
U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL. RIGHTS, Tm FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT EFFORT 29, 32 (1979); see
also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STRONGER FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT NEEDED To UPHOLD FAIR
HOUSING LAws 27 (1978); Administration Ready to Propose Own Broadened Fair Housing Legis-
lation, 10 [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 1126 (1983) [hereinafter Administra-
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few of these complaints were referred to the Justice Department for
pattern and practice litigation" and only a small number were resolved
through the voluntary conciliation proceeding authorized under section
810 of Title VIII.s° If a jurisdiction has a fair housing law certified by
HUD as being the substantial equivalent of Title VIII, HUD has re-
ferred the complaints in that jurisdiction to state or local agencies for
conciliation or other proceedings."'
tion Ready to Propose] (reporting that in 1982, of 5112 complaints, about 1300 were chosen for
conciliation and 1070 cases were actually resolved by conciliation). For a discussion on limited
enforcement, see The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1979: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter
Senate Hearings]; Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1979: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1979); and Effron, Fair Housing Rises in Importance as Civil Rights Issue, L.A. Daily J., May 9,
1983, at 1, col. 6, at 14, col. 3 (reporting that only six new cases had been filed since President
Reagan took office). See Fair Housing Experts Back Stronger Enforcement of Anti-Bias Laws, 11
[Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 390 (1983) (testimony before United States
Civil Rights Commission); Kemp, The 1968 Housing Act: Have Its Goals Been Accomplished?, 14
REAL ESTATE L.J. 327, 331 (1986) (no viable HUD agreement authority); Waldrop, Enforcement of
the Fair Housing Act: What Role Should the Federal Government Play?, 74 Ky. L.J. 201 (1985-
86); cf. CITIZENS COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, A DECENT HOMm A REPORT ON THE CONTINUING FAILURE
OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT To PROVIDE EQUAL HOUSING OPPORTUNITY (1983); Civil Rights En-
forcement in General Revenue Sharing Program Criticized in Report, 11 [Current Developments]
Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 792 (1984) (House Judiciary Committee study citing interoffice feuds
and sloppy investigation); McGrew, Collier & Forrest, Fair Housing: An Agenda for the Washing-
ton Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights, 27 How. L.J. 1291 (1984); Organizations Blame HUD,
Congress for Increase in Housing Segregation, 13 [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep.
(BNA) 747 (1986) (site selection, tenant assignment, and poor fair housing enforcement); Rice,
Judicial Enforcement of Fair Housing Laws: An Analysis of Some Unexamined Problems that
the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1983 Would Eliminate, 27 How. L.J. 226 (1984); Flournoy &
Rodrigue, Separate and Unequal, Dallas Morning News, Feb. 10-17, 1985.
79. Between the passage of Title VIII in 1968 and 1980, the Justice Department brought
about 300 lawsuits. See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1980, H.R. REP. No. 865, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 4 (1980); G. METCALF, FAIR HOUSING COMES OF AGE 17 (1988) (reporting 300 total cases fol-
lowing passage or 32 cases per year, 66 cases or 16 per year under the Carter Administration, while
under the Reagan Administration no cases in 1981, 2 in 1982, and 5 cases initiated in 1983); G.
ORFIELD. MUST WE Bus?, supra note 21, at 90 (indicating only 23 complaints per year processed by
the Justice Department with no complaints ever having been processed from "a number of"
states); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE STATE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 1979 (1980) (indicating that the
Justice Department handles about 32 cases per year); see also DOJ Civil Rights Division Sums Up
FY '87, 3 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) 9.6 (1988) (filing of 25 lawsuits in 11 states, 17 of
which were brought under Title VIII; investigations in 200 cases, victories in two cases, one of
which was the invalidation of integration maintenance policies in Starrett City, and 25 consent
decrees obtained, 10 of which involved rental housing bias); Justice Department, Massachusetts
Agency Form Pact on Housing Discrimination Cases, 12 [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev.
Rep. (BNA) 185 (1984) (Justice Department to prosecute several state-prepared cases); infra note
82 (noting when Title VIM's criminal punishment alternative applies).
80. See supra note 79.
81. Thirty-eight states and eighty-four units of local government have been certified as hav-
ing laws substantially equivalent to Title VIII; another fourteen units of local government have
applications pending. 24 C.F.R. § 115.6(e)(1) (1987), amended by 53 Fed. Reg. 260, 23,757, 26,318,
41,630 (1988), and 52 Fed. Reg. 15,304, 29,038, 41,410 (1987); see Residential Segregation Stifling
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B. Judicial Action
There are three techniques for private judicial enforcement of fair
housing laws: (1) citizen lawsuits under section 812 of Title VIII, (2)
alternative claims under section 1982, and (3) suits commenced under
state or local laws. 2 Although judicial enforcement occasionally has
been effective in securing access to denied dwellings, halting segregative
zoning practices, and providing substantial damages and attorney's fees
in well-litigated cases, the impact of judicial enforcement has been sig-
nificant only in creating a body of precedent favorable to litigation and
in rewarding the rare litigant. Very few lawyers are interested and
versed in fair housing litigation, and few victims of discrimination are
both aware of their victimization and willing to press their claims to
litigation. The results of litigation, while often dramatic in individual
cases, have appeared too sporadically to deter housing providers from
engaging in widespread discriminatory behavior. Moreover, most re-
ported decisions and settlements come from a small number of metro-
politan areas marked by the presence of competent attorneys dedicated
to litigating fair housing cases.
1. Standing
The United States Supreme Court has given standing under Title
VIII the broadest possible definition consistent with article III." Any-
one aggrieved may bring suit, not simply the victim of a denial of hous-
ing. Testers, 4 community residents, 5 fair housing organizations,8" real
Black Advancement, Professor Testifies, 15 [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA)
695 (1988). Should HUD's proposed Title VIII regulations be made final, 88 states and localities
would enjoy certification. 53 Fed. Reg. 44,992, 45,019-20 (1988).
82. The Justice Department may also bring civil suits on pattern and practice grounds, or
criminal charges. Title VIII's criminal punishment alternative applies in cases involving force or
the threat of force and the willful threat or actual injury, intimidation, or interference with fair
housing rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 3631 (1982); see also United States v. Gilbert, 813 F.2d 1523 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 173 (1987); United States v. White, 788 F.2d 390 (6th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Redwine, 715 F.2d 315 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1216 (1984); United
States v. Johns, 615 F.2d 672 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 829 (1980); United States v. Anza-
lone, 555 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978); J. KUSHNER, supra note 14, at
§§ 3.67-3.71.
83. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village
of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 96-97 (1979); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209
(1972).
84. See Havens, 455 U.S. at 363; Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 91. But cf. Nur v. Blake Dev. Corp.,
655 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (finding neither Title VIII nor § 1982 standing for nonminority,
nonneighborhood, local commission-employed testers).
85. See Heights Community Congress v. Hilltop Realty, 774 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1019 (1986); Smith v. City of Cleveland Heights, 760 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1056 (1986); Broadmoor Improvement Ass'n v. Stan Weber & Assocs., 597
F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc)
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estate professionals,8 7 and units of local government88 are permitted to
bring suit and obtain relief. Standing under section 1982 is likely to be
limited to plaintiffs who can satisfy the Supreme Court's prudential
standing requirement by showing"" that they have suffered a specific
injury at the hands of the defendant and that the injury is one for
which the court can provide redress.9 0 This issue has not been reached
(standing in white property owner to challenge filing of racially restrictive deeds); Project Basic
Tenants Union v. Rhode Island Hous. & Mortgage Fin. Corp., 636 F. Supp. 1453 (D.R.I. 1986);
NAACP v. Harris, 567 F. Supp. 637 (D. Mass. 1983), remanded sub nom. NAACP v. Secretary of
HUD, 817 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1987); Concerned Tenants Ass'n of Indian Trails Apartments v. In-
dian Trails Apartments, 496 F. Supp. 522 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Sherman Park Community Ass'n v.
Wauwatosa Realty Co., 486 F. Supp. 838 (E.D. Wis. 1980) Heights Community Congress v. Rosen-
blatt Realty, 73 F.R.D. 1 (N.D. Ohio 1975); see also Residents of Cincinnati Public Housing Have
Standing To Challenge HUD, CMHA's Policies, 11 [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep.
(BNA) 285 (1983) (discussing Hutchins v. Cincinnati Metro. Hous. Auth., No. C-1-79-131 (S.D.
Ohio Aug. 15, 1983)). But see Turner v. A.B. Carter, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 360 (E.D. Va. 1980); cf. Coali-
tion of Bedford-Stuyvesant Block Ass'n v. Cuomo, 651 F. Supp. 1202 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding no
standing in resident to challenge siting of shelters for the homeless absent pattern of segregation,
discriminatory impact, or housing denial); National Urban League v. Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, 78 F.R.D. 543 (D.D.C. 1978) (no general standing in national organization).
86. See Saunders v. General Servs. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D. Va. 1986) (disruption of
group activities); Mealing v. Liu, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) 15,538 (E.D.N.Y. 1986);
Education/Instruction, Inc. v. Copley Management & Dev. Corp., Fair Hous.-Falr Lending Rep.
(P-H) V 15,530 (D. Mass. 1984); Housing Council v. Eastern Bergen County Multiple Listing Serv.,
422 F. Supp. 1071 (D.N.J. 1976). But see Anderson v. City of Alpharetta, 770 F.2d 1575 (11th Cir.
1985) (holding 265 square mile county too extensive to allow Havens neighborhood standing);
South Suburban Hous. Center v. Santefort Real Estate, 658 F. Supp. 1450 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (unclear
if distinguishing Title VIII from constitutional standard); Williams v. Adams, 625 F. Supp. 256
(N.D. Ill. 1985) (holding that aggrieved party must allege injury to organization or members, not
simply frustration of group's activities).
87. See Crumble v. Blumthal, 549 F.2d 462 (7th Cir. 1977) (intervention); Smith v. Stechel,
510 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1975); Wilkey v. Pyramid Constr. Co., 619 F. Supp. 1453 (D. Conn. 1985);
Williams v. Miller, 460 F. Supp. 761 (N.D. Ill. 1978), aff'd mem., 614 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1979);
Tokaji v. Toth, 1 Eq. Opportunity Hous. Rep. (P-H) 1 13,679 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Riddick v. Hill, 1
Eq. Opportunity Hous. Rep. (P-H) 1 13,628 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 1973).
88. See Heights Community Congress v. Hilltop Realty, 774 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1019 (1986); Village of Bellwood v. Gladstone, Realtors, 569 F.2d 1013 (7th Cir.
1978), modified, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); Village of Bellwood v. Dwayne Realty, 482 F. Supp. 1321 (N.D.
Ill. 1979); Village of Park Forest v. Fairfax Realty, 1 Eq. Opportunity Hous. Rep. (P-H) 1 13,699
(N.D. ll. Jan. 28, 1975), subsequent proceedings, 1 Eq. Opportunity Hous. Rep. (P-H) T 13,784
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 1976); cf. City of New York v. Fillmore Real Estate, Ltd., 665 F. Supp. 178
(E.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that city suffering segregation and loss of tax revenues enjoys § 1982
standing to challenge real estate steering).
89. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
90. Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 116 n.33, 120 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (although specific issue
was not reached by the Court, only Justice Rehnquist argued that § 1982 is governed by constitu-
tional test under Warth, 422 U.S. at 490); Saunders v. General Servs. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1042
(E.D. Va. 1986); Davis v. The Mansards, 597 F. Supp. 334, 347 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (no tester stand-
ing); Malone v. City of Fenton, 592 F. Supp. 1135, 1154, 1156 n.12 (E.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd mem., 794
F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1986). Many courts, however, have applied the Title VIII standaid in § 1982
cases. See Watts v. Boyd Properties, Inc., 758 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1985); Fillmore Real Estate,
665 F. Supp. at 178; Village of Bellwood v. Gorey & Assocs., 664 F. Supp. 320 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Old
1072 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1049
because typically the plaintiff simultaneously brings the case under Ti-
tle VIII.
The breadth of the standing rulings suggests various innovative
strategies for fair housing enforcement in its second generation. 1 The
Supreme Court appointment of Justice Kennedy, however, whose vote
has enabled the Court to reconsider the extent to which the early civil
rights statutes may reach private conduct,92 suggests that the Rehn-
quist Court may, as a revisionist forum, reverse many civil rights ad-
vances of the past generation. Justice Kennedy may urge
reconsideration of broad standing in fair housing cases both to advance
what appears to be his own conservative civil rights agenda" and to
West End Ass'n v. Buckeye Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) T 15,548
(N.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 1986); see also Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d
894 (3d Cir. 1977).
91. See infra notes 245-56 and accompanying text (suggesting, for example, litigation by pri-
vate nonprofit organizations in small claims court to reach a broader target).
92. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 108 S.
Ct. 65 (1987) (No. 87-107), reargument docketed, 108 S. Ct. 1419 (1988) (No. 87-107) (per curiam)
(restoration to docket for oral argument) (holding that a racial workplace harassment rule is not
covered by § 1981); Reidinger, Runyon Under the Gun, 74 A.B.A. J., Nov. 1988, at 78; Savage,
Split Court Reopens '76 Rights Case, L.A. Times, Apr. 26, 1988, pt. I, at 1, col. 1 (Kennedy casting
deciding vote on Court's own initiative to reconsider Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976)).
The Court has heard oral argument. McLean, 57 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1988) (No. 87-107).
93. See American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401,
1407-08 (9th Cir. 1985) (refusing to apply Title VII employment disparate impact analysis except
as to specific employer practice, thus refusing to apply to sex-based comparable worth policies in
cases such as those in which specific job descriptions are paid according to market rates reflecting
sex-segregated job classification); Mountain View-Los Altos Union High School Dist. v. Sharron,
709 F.2d 28 (9th Cir. 1983) (narrow construction of Education for All Handicapped Children Act,
refusing to allow parents to transfer their handicapped child and then seek reimbursement from
school district while an administrative proceeding was pending, an interpretation unanimously re-
jected in School Comm. v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985)); Gerdom v. Continental
Airlines, 692 F.2d 602, 610 (9th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (joining dissent from invalidation of rule
imposing strict weight requirements on female flight hostesses), cert. dismissed, 460 U.S. 1074
(1983); Aranda v. Van Sickle, 600 F.2d 1267, 1275 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (inter-
preting facts as failing extraordinarily difficult test to permit challenges to at-large elections, re-
sulting in minority vote dilution), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 951 (1980); Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd.
of Educ., 611 F.2d 1239, 1242 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (restrictive view of contin-
ued jurisdiction in school desegregation cases). But cf. New York State Club Ass'n Inc. v. City of
New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988) (Justice Kennedy joining opinion that held large private clubs
subject to local public accommodations nondiscrimination obligations). Justice Kennedy may be
characterized as "mainstream" based upon his several equal protection opinions that tended to
follow in lock step with Supreme Court precedent. See Sullivan v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 772 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding deportation of gay despite hardship, relying on
statutory grounds and not reaching the equal protection issue); Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788,
801 n.8, 807 (9th Cir. 1980) (examining military discharge for homosexual activities following a
three-tier, traditional model, acknowledging that the fifth amendment includes equal protection
and that consensual homosexual conduct may be protected as a fundamental right), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 905 (1981); Tsosie v. Califano, 630 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1980) (upholding denial of Social
Security benefits for child adopted by surviving spouse after death of eligible wage earner, despite
child in home and supported for 11 years prior to death, applying rational basis test), cert. denied,
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vindicate the limited standing ruling he authored on the Ninth Cir-
cuit 94 -a ruling discredited by a later Burger Court decision.95
2. Proof of Violations
Although section 1982 probably requires proof of intentional or
purposeful discrimination to make the plaintiff's prima facie case,96
451 U.S. 940 (1981); In re Paris Air Crash, 622 F.2d 1315, 1320 (9th Cir.) (traditional rational basis
deference to the denial of punitive damages in wrongful death actions), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 976
(1980); Flores v. Pierce, 617 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir.) (reviewing discriminatory denial of liquor licences
to Mexican-Americans through circumstantial proof of intent), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 875 (1980);
James v. Ball, 613 F.2d 180 (9th Cir. 1979) (applying one person-one vote to large water district),
af'd, 451 U.S. 355 (1981); Fisher v. Reiser, 610 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1979) (sustaining denial of
workers' compensation cost-of-living adjustment to nonresidents), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 930
(1980); United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 988 (9th Cir.) (applying rational basis test, failing to find
male prisoner sodomy statute sex-based, assimilating state law, resulting in higher penalty than
federal statute covering male rape of female), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 852 (1978).
94. TOPIC v. Circle Realty Co., 532 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976)
(neighborhood residents denied standing to challenge discrimination, the court treating claims as
those of third parties attempting to raise claims of others).
95. Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 115; see also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363
(1982).
96. See Vaughner v. Pulito, 804 F.2d 873, 877 (5th Cir. 1986) (requiring intent under Title
VIII as well); Hamilton v. Svatik, 779 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1985); Phillips v. Hunter Trails Commu-
nity Ass'n, 685 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1982) (assuming intent); Denny v. Hutchinson Sales Corp., 649
F.2d 816 (10th Cir. 1981); Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club, Inc., 495 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1974); Old
West End, 675 F. Supp. at 1100 (proving intent by circumstantial evidence); Huertas v. East River
Hous. Corp., 674 F. Supp. 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (proving intent by disparate treatment); Pollitt v.
Bramel, 669 F. Supp. 172 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (proving intent by disparate treatment); Huntington
Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 668 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (requiring more than
effects), rev'd on other grounds, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir.), afl'd per curiam on other grounds, 109 S.
Ct. 276 (1988); Fillmore Real Estate, 665 F. Supp. at 178 (implying intent); Nur v. Blake Dev.
Corp., 655 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (proving intent by disparate treatment); Coalition of
Bedford-Stuyvesant Block Ass'n, Inc. v. Cuomo, 651 F. Supp. 1202 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (proving intent
by impact); Givens v. Department of Hous. & Urban Dev., Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) %
15,528 (N.D. Tex. 1985); Rogers v. 66-36 Yellowstone Blvd. Coop. Owners, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 79
(E.D.N.Y. 1984); Malone v. City of Fenton, 592 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd mem., 794
F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1986); Kaplan v. 442 Wellington Coop. Bldg. Corp., 567 F. Supp. 53 (N.D. Ill.
1983); DeFrank v. Pawlosky, 480 F. Supp. 115 (W.D. Pa. 1979), af'd mem., 633 F.2d 209 (3d Cir.
1980); Fred v. Kokinokos, 347 F. Supp. 942 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). But see Evans v. Tubbe, 657 F.2d 661
(5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981) (treating claim as if Title VIII); Phiffer v. Proud Parrot Motor Hotel,
Inc., 648 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1980); Wharton v. Knefel, 562 F.2d 550 (8th Cir. 1977); Clark v. Uni-
versal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974); Thomas v. First
Fed. Say. Bank, 653 F. Supp. 1330 (N.D. Ind. 1987); Metro Fair Hous. Servs., Inc. v. Morrowood
Garden Apartments Ltd., 576 F. Supp. 1090 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (disparate treatment), rev'd on other
grounds sub noma. Watts v. Boyd Properties, Inc., 758 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1985); Harris v. Wissert,
514 F. Supp. 1153 (E.D. Wis. 1981); Concerned Tenants Ass'n of Indian Trails Apartments v.
Indian Trails Apartments, 496 F. Supp. 522 (N.D. Ill. 1980); United States v. City of Parma, 494 F.
Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982);
Wainwright v. Allen, 461 F. Supp. 293 (D.N.D. 1978), aff'd mem., 605 F.2d 1209 (8th Cir. 1979); cf.
General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982) (requiring intent under §
1981). For a criticism of the Court's rationale, see J. KUSHNER, supra note 14, at 66. But cf. City of
Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 129-35 (1981) (White, J., concurring). In Greene Justice White
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claimants in Title VIII actions need merely to demonstrate that an ac-
tion or practice carries a discriminatory 7 or segregative"8 impact in or-
der to shift the burden to the defendant. Alternatively, when a single
plaintiff claims a housing denial without regard to a policy or pattern,
the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by proof of disparate treat-
ment,99 typically a denial to an eligible minority applicant followed by a
subsequent transfer to another party or the continued availability of
the dwelling in the market. 100
In Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, 10' the Su-
preme Court, in a per curiam opinion, refused to reach the issue of the
appropriateness of the above "disparate impact" or "effects" test, but
found it satisfied by suburban exclusionary zoning. The record disclosed
apartment exclusion from all suburban neighborhoods of a town of two
hundred thousand. The case arose from the town's refusal to rezone a
parcel for multifamily use. The only section of the virtually all-white
town that permitted apartments was a central city urban renewal area
located inside the only census tract occupied by a significant number of
rejected street closing claim for lack of racial impact on property values, but Justice White went on
to specify the need to prove intent. Id. Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun rejected the
White view. Id. at 148-49 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
97. Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1988) (implicit), aff'g 618 F. Supp. 1133 (C.D. Cal.
1985); Huntington, 844 F.2d at 934-35; United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1100
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 376 (1988); Hanson v. Veterans Admin., 800 F.2d 1381 (5th Cir.
1986); Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1986); Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736
F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1984); Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1982); City of Parma, 661
F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982); United States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789
(5th Cir. 1978); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
422 U.S. 1042 (1975); United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 484 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 936 (1974); cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (employment).
98. Volpe, 858 F.2d at 467 (implicit); Huntington, 844 F.2d at 937-38; United States v. Yon-
kers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1217 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2821 (1988);
Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass'n v. County of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1984)
(insufficient proof of impact); United States v. City of Birmingham, 727 F.2d 560 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984); Hope, Inc. v. County of DuPage, 717 F.2d 1061 (7th Cir. 1983), rev'd
on rehearing, 738 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (vacated for lack of standing); Smith v. Town
of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1982); City of Parma, 661 F.2d at 562; Resident Advisory Bd.
v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 149 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978); Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1025 (1978); Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Islip, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) 1 15,577
(E.D.N.Y. 1987).
99. Hamilton v. Svatik, 779 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1985); Houston v. Benttree, Ltd., 637 F.2d
739 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981); Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d
1032 (2d Cir. 1979); Duckett v. Silberman, 568 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978); Smith v. Anchor Bldg.
Corp., 536 F.2d 231 (8th Cir. 1976); Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974); Old West End Ass'n v. Buckeye Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 675 F. Supp.
1100 (N.D. Ohio 1987); cf. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (employment).
100. E.g., Svatik, 779 F.2d at 383; 12 Lofts Realty, 610 F.2d at 1032; Williams, 499 F.2d at
819.
101. 109 S. Ct. 276 (1988) (per curiam), aff'g 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988).
1074
1989] FAIR HOUSING AMENDMENTS ACT 1075
minorities. The Court agreed with the Second Circuit that the scheme
carried both a discriminatory and segregative impact. Further, the
Court found that the desire to encourage developers to invest in the
deteriorated and needy section of town was a clearly inadequate justifi-
cation. Although the Court noted the limited nature of the jurisdic-
tional question presented in light of the parties' stipulation to the
applicability of an effects test, Huntington presents the Court's most
significant tacit endorsement of the Fair Housing Act's prima facie ef-
fects test.10 2 Congress implicitly endorsed the effects test when it passed
the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and rejected efforts to
amend the bill to require an intent test.'03
After the plaintiff establishes either disparate impact or disparate
treatment, the defendant must then justify the action as one taken in
pursuit of a bona fide, compelling governmental purpose, 104 with no less
discriminatory alternative available to achieve the goal, 05 or in the case
of private defendants, one taken pursuant to a rational and necessary
business purpose. 0 6 Should a defendant demonstrate a valid justifica-
tion, the burden, at least in the private sector, would shift back to the
plaintiff to demonstrate that the business necessity was a pretext for
engaging in discrimination. 10 7 The defendant's failure to rebut either
the prima facie case' 08 or the evidence that the justification was pretex-
tual' 09 allows the inferential demonstration of intentional discrim-
ination. 1 0
102. Only Justices White, Marshall, and Stevens joined in a dissent, voting to hear the ap-
peal and set the case for oral argument. Huntington, 109 S. Ct. at 277 (White, J., dissenting).
103. H.R REP. No. 711, supra note 15.
104. Huntington, 844 F.2d at 939; Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 126.
105. Huntington, 844 F.2d at 939; Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 149; Burney v. Housing Auth., 551 F.
Supp. 746 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
106. Svatik, 779 F.2d at 383; 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d at 1032 (objective business ne-
cessity); Williams, 499 F.2d at 826; Madison v. Jeffers, 494 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1974) (per curiam)
(rebutting the inference of purposefulness); Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Coop. Bldg., 463
F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1972) (honest basis unrelated to race); Old West End, 675 F. Supp. at 1100;
Pollitt v. Bramel, 669 F. Supp. 172 (S.D. Ohio 1987); Parks v. Coleman, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending
Rep. (P-H) 15,519 (D. Conn. 1985); Davis v. The Mansards, 597 F. Supp. 334 (N.D. Ind. 1984);
Darden v. Nebilak, Eq. Opportunity Hous. Rep. (P-H) 18,037 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (lack of objective
rebuttal evidence); Burney v. Housing Auth., 551 F. Supp. 746 (W.D. Pa. 1982); Wainwright v.
Allen, 461 F. Supp. 293 (D.N.D. 1978), aff'd mem., 605 F.2d 1209 (8th Cir. 1979) (legitimate non-
discriminatory reasons); Lamb v. Sallee, 417 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Ky. 1976); Bush v. Kaim, 297 F.
Supp. 151 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
107. 12 Lofts Realty, 610 F.2d at 1040 n.13; Dillon v. Bay City Constr. Co., 512 F.2d 801 (5th
Cir. 1975); Old West End, 675 F. Supp. at 1100; Huntington, 668 F. Supp. at 762; Pollitt, 669 F.
Supp. 172.
108. E.g., Svatik, 779 F.2d at 383; 12 Lofts Realty, 610 F.2d at 1032 (objective business ne-
cessity); Williams, 499 F.2d at 826.
109. E.g., 12 Lofts Realty, 610 F.2d at 1040 n.13.
110. Cf. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981) (disparate
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This burden of proof is far more limited than that required under
the equal protection clause, which requires the plaintiff to show both
intent11' and that a purposeful bias was a motivating factor"' for the
defendant's conduct. Title VIII requires only that the improper bias be
one factor in the defendant's decision to act." 3 The lenient burden of
proof makes Title VIII litigation accessible to plaintiffs and forces de-
fendants to explain housing practices in terms of profit-based, good
business policy. Typical fair housing cases are among the easiest to liti-
gate. Often, private fair housing groups will perform a test that demon-
strates the nearly undeniable fact of disparate treatment. The lawyer
must merely put such a test into evidence and concentrate on demon-
strating and dramatizing the plaintiff's injury. Such proof easily satis-
fies the demands of Title VIHII" and also satisfies the more onerous
constitutional prima facie intent examination. 11
3. Damages
One reason there has been relatively little fair housing litigation is
that courts and juries awarded very small damage awards during the
treatment); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977)
(motive irrelevant in impact cases).
111. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
112. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 252.
113. United States v. City of Birmingham, 727 F.2d 560 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821
(1984); Hope, Inc. v. County of DuPage, 717 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1983), rev'd on rehearing, 738 F.2d
797 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1982); 12 Lofts
Realty, 610 F.2d at 1032; Taylor v. Fletcher Properties, Inc., 592 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1979); Miller v.
Poretsky, 595 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Payne v. Bracher, 582 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1978); Sorensen v.
Raymond, 532 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1976); Moore v. Townsend, 525 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1975); Wil-
liams, 499 F.2d at 819; Madison v. Jeffers, 494 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Haythe v.
Decker Realty Co., 468 F.2d 336 (7th Cir. 1972); Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Coop. Bldg.,
463 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1972); Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1970).
114. See, e.g., Tolliver v. Amici, 800 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1986); Svatik, 779 F.2d at 383; Watts
v. Boyd Properties, Inc., 758 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1985); Gresham v. Windrush Partners, Ltd., 730
F.2d 1417 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 882 (1984); Richardson v. Howard, 712 F.2d 319 (7th
Cir. 1983); Washington v. Sherwin Real Estate, Inc., 694 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1982); Price v. Pelka,
690 F.2d 98 (6th Cir. 1982); Kinney v. Rothchild, 678 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Phiffer
v. Proud Parrot Motor Hotel, Inc., 648 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1980); McDonald v. Verble, 622 F.2d
1227 (6th Cir. 1980); Grant v. Smith, 574 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1978); Fountila v. Carter, 571 F.2d 487
(9th Cir. 1978); Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894, 897-98 (3d Cir.
1977); Wharton v. Knefel, 562 F.2d 550 (8th Cir. 1977); Connell v. Shoemaker, 555 F.2d 483 (5th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Warwick Mobile Home Estates, Inc., 537 F.2d 1148 (4th Cir. 1976);
Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231, 234 n.2 (8th Cir. 1976); Mar v. Rife, 503 F.2d 735 (6th
Cir. 1974); Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., Inc., 491 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Jerry Pals Real
Estate, 485 F.2d 528 (7th Cir. 1973); Hamilton v. Miller, 477 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1973).
115. See, e.g., Phiffer, 648 F.2d at 548; Grayson v. S. Rotundi & Sons Realty, Fair Hous.-Fair
Lending Rep. (P-H) 15,516 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 1984); cf. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (bus
terminals); Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202 (1958) (bus).
1989] FAIR HOUSING AMENDMENTS ACT 1077
early years of fair housing enforcement.116 In recent years the public,
counsel, juries, and judges have grown hostile to acts of racial discrimi-
nation because they have learned more about the pain, suffering, and
humiliation inflicted upon the victims of discrimination and the shock
of realization that one is a second-class citizen in a racist society. The
courts1  and some state agencies authorized to award general dam-
ages 1 ' have increased awards so that single victim settlements and
awards during the past few years have generally exceeded twenty thou-
sand dollars,119 and commonly approach one hundred thousand dol-
116. J. KUSHNER, supra note 14, at app: 9-1.
117. See id.
118. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 12,900-12,993 (West 1988).
119. See Tolliver, 800 F.2d at 149 ($15,000); Svatik, 779 F.2d at 383 ($20,000 with $2500
reversed); Green v. Century 21, 740 F.2d 460 (6th Cir. 1984) ($42,200 but $1200 vacated); Henry v.
Webermeier, 738 F.2d 188 (7th Cir. 1984) (consent decree, $45,000); Miller v. Apartments &
Homes of N.J., Inc., 646 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 1981) ($36,252); Murphy v. Monona Shores Assocs., Fair
Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) 1 19,366 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (consent decree, $66,000); Ward v.
Lanusse, No. C-87-1189-RHS (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 1988) (settlement, $35,000); Westside Fair Hous.
Council v. Woodmere Ltd., Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) 7 19,361 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (consent
decree, $35,000); Huertas v. East River Hous. Corp., 674 F. Supp. 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ($28,083.63);
Pollitt v. Bramel, 669 F. Supp. 172 (S.D. Ohio 1987) ($50,000); Wrightwood Improvement Ass'n v.
Riccordino Realty, No. 86-C-5627 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (consent decree, $15,000); Mealing v. Liu, Fair
Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) 19,356 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (consent decree, $27,500); Thomas v. MK
Properties, Civ. No. 86-0250 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 1986) (consent decree, $30,000); Bell v. Thomas, Inc.,
115 F.R.D. 299 (W.D. Va. 1986) (consent decree, $20,000); Ferguson v. Zortman, No. 85-1561 (M.D.
Pa. July 2, 1986) ($25,000); Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Development & Constr. Co., Fair
Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) 19,353 (D. Md. 1986) (consent decree, confidential but at least
$50,000); Smith v. Schermerhorn, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) i 19,347 (N.D. Ill. 1986)
($64,000); Gonzalez v. Damato, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) T 19,346 (D. Conn. 1985) (con-
sent decree, $20,000); Rogers v. 66-36 Yellowstone Blvd. Coop. Owners, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 79
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) ($26,000); Davis v. Mansards, 597 F. Supp. 334 (N.D. Ind. 1984) ($68,526.50);
Shaw v. Cassar, 558 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Mich. 1983) ($30,000); Harkness v. Fuchs, Eq. Opportunity
Hous. Rep. (P-H) 1 19,341 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (consent decree, $19,000); Behul v. Regal, No. 79-C-
960 (E.D. Wis. June 7, 1982) ($35,000), aff'd, 714 F.2d 149 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 994
(1983); New York v. Data-Butterfield, Inc., Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) 1 19,337 (E.D.N.Y.
1982) (consent decree, $43,500); Jones v. Morgan Builders, No. 81 Civ. 6984 WK (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9,
1982) ($38,000), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 714 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1982); Osinubi v. Wilfert, No. 74-
1851-G (D. Mass. Jan. 19, 1982) ($46,000); Brown v. Van Plaza Realty Corp., 3 Eq. Opportunity
Hous. Rep. (P-H) 1 15,409 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) ($50,001); 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., Fair Hous.-Fair Lend-
ing Rep. (P-H) 19,333 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (consent decree, $40,000); Armstrong v. Hertz Homes,
Inc., Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) T 19,326 (D.N.J. 1979) (consent decree, $26,500); Dyer v.
Schecter, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) 19,321 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 19, 1978) (consent decree,
$41,000); Sutton v. Bloom, 5 Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 1182 (N.D. Ohio 1978), rev'd, 710 F.2d
1188 (6th Cir. 1983) ($63,101 reversed), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984); Stitt v. Puccinelli, No.
C-77-2236 (N.D. Cal. 1978) ($32,000), aff'd mem., 628 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1980); Chomicki v. Wit-
tekind, 128 Wis. 2d 188, 381 N.W.2d 561 (Ct. App. 1985) ($19,000); Scanlon, A Report on the
Committee's Fair Housing Project 1975-1983, 27 How. L.J. 1458, 1465-68 (1984) (discussing: Lucas
v. Rosenkrantz, Inc., No. H83-258 (D. Md. 1983) ($17,000 settlement); Tsou v. Crestview Corp.,
No. 82-213-R (E.D. Va. 1982) ($17,000); Butler v. Aitcheson, No. K78-1120 (D. Md. 1978)
($26,000); Lucas v. Kay Management Co., No. Y-78-2459 (D. Md. 1978) ($22,500 settlement)).
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lars.120 Nonetheless, some courts lag far behind the national pattern as
they continue to make only symbolic awards reminiscent of an earlier
era.12' Section 1982 carries no damage cap, 22 while the original Title
VIII law limited punitive damages to one thousand dollars; thus, during
the first generation of fair housing action, section 1982 served as a vehi-
cle to circumvent Title VIII.12' The rise in compensatory damage
awards should soon generate the first one million dollar verdict. Such a
symbolic award, and the publicity it is likely to spawn, may begin to
carry a deterrent effect and, more importantly, open the eyes of the
practicing bar to the ease and profit of litigating fair housing cases.
120. See Douglas v. Metro Rental Servs., Inc., 827 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1987) ($128,500 award
reduced to $43,500); Phillips v. Hunter Trails Community Ass'n, 685 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1982)
($221,016); Willis v. H & M Enters., Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) T 6.5 (D.D.C. 1988) (set-
tlement of $327,500 for refusal to rent by stating unit already rented); Bryant v. Kay Bros. Build-
ers, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) 19,367 (D. Md. 1988) (consent decree, $100,000
including fees in settlement to tester); Smith v. Crystal Lake Apartments, No. 87-CV-71971 DT
(E.D. Mich. 1988) ($85,000 jury award); Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., Fair Hous.-Fair Lending
Rep. (P-H) 19,350 (D. Md. 1986) (consent decree, $125,000); Westside Fair Hous. Council v. C. &
H. Inv. Group, Inc., Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) 1 19,342 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (consent decree,
$80,000); Grayson, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) 15,516 ($565,000 verdict reduced to
$360,000 as settlement to avoid appeal); Spiteri v. Ventura Village Green, No. 78988 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Feb. 17, 1988) (consent decree, $150,000 settlement for ethnic harassment and illegal eviction);
Ballou v. Aaron, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) 19,351 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1986) ($137,500); Paul-
lin v. Sutton, 724 P.2d 749 (Nev. 1986) (per curiam) ($100,000 award vacated).
121. See Wadsworth v. Clindon, 846 F.2d 265 (4th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) ($6000 with $5000
punitive award set aside for retrial); Tolliver, 800 F.2d at 149 ($15,000); DiFilippo v. Morizio, 759
F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1985) ($2250); Marable v. Walker, 704 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1983) ($1000); Price
v. Pelka, 690 F.2d 98 (6th Cir. 1982) ($2000); Kinney v. Rothchild, 678 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1982)
($1285); Pinchback v. Armistead Homes Corp., 689 F. Supp. 541 (D. Md. 1988) ($2500 awarded to
prospective cooperative purchaser discouraged from application); Coel v. Rose Tree Manor Apart-
ments, Inc., 15 Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 516 (E.D. Pa. 1987) ($650); Stewart v. Crossen, No. 2-83-
0093 (M.D. Tenn. June 3, 1986) ($8800); Parks v. Coleman, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H)
15,519 (D. Conn. 1985) ($8300); McGraw v. Oliver, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) 1 15,539
(E.D. Va. 1985) ($8440); Hobson v. George Humphreys, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 344 (W.D. Tenn. 1982)
($12,783.55); Haynes v. Copeland Realty, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) T 15,457 (N.D. Ohio
1982) ($3500); Espinoza v. Hillwood Square Mut. Ass'n, 532 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Va. 1982) ($1066);
Debose v. Mueller, 552 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1982) ($500); Metropolitan Dade County Fair Hous.
& Employment Appeals Bd. v. Sunrise Village Mobile Home Park, Inc., 511 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 1987)
($7000); Pleasant E. Assocs. v. Cabrera, 125 Misc. 2d 877, 480 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Civ. Ct. 1984) ($1000);
Chomicki v. Wittekind, 128 Wis. 2d 188, 381 N.W.2d 561 (Ct. App. 1985) ($19,000); Scanlon, supra
note 118, at 1468 (discussing Tsou v. Crestview Corp., No. 82-213-R (E.D. Va. 1982) ($17,000)).
122. See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Wadsworth, 846 F.2d at
265; Tolliver, 800 F.2d at 149; Svatik, 779 F.2d at 383; Marable, 704 F.2d at 1219; Phillips, 685
F.2d at 184; Apartments & Homes of N.J., 646 F.2d at 101 n.11; Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 597
F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1979); Fountila v. Carter, 571 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1978).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1982); see also Wadsworth, 846 F.2d at 265; Phillips, 685 F.2d at
184 (suggesting limit inapplicable to § 3617 interference, intimidation, and coercion cases); Foun-
tila, 571 F.2d at 487; Crumble v. Blumthal, 549 F.2d 462 (7th Cir. 1977); Seaton v. Sky Realty Co.,
491 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974); Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1973).
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4. Injunctive Relief
Courts have regularly been willing to issue restraining orders to
halt the transfer of dwellings denied to victimized home seekers. 2 " Un-
fortunately, the dwelling may already have been sold or rented to an
innocent white, making problematic any order to convey or hold the
dwelling vacant. Nevertheless, courts could make affirmative relief or-
ders to halt further bias and to attempt to change the status quo.'25
Injunctive orders that seek affirmative action to assure preference for
minorities in future sales or rentals are a remedial technique that has
not been used to its potential. Rather, the economics of litigation is
reflected in remedies that focus on compensating the victim and coun-
sel, but that unfortunately ignore the societal impact of widespread dis-
criminatory practices: Segregation. This narrow focus is exacerbated by
victims' lack of enthusiasm to reside in housing marked by bias and by
the low profile that the Justice Department has maintained in recent
years. Through the use of prospective orders, fair housing litigation
could have a significant impact on the advancement of integration while
also furthering its obvious aim of decreasing discrimination.
5. Attorney's Fees
Court-awarded attorney's fees are critical in fair housing litigation
because large damage awards are speculative and civil rights litigation
is always a struggle that potentially will last for years. For this reason,
section 1982 has been the centerpiece of fair housing litigation. Success
under that provision allows generous court-awarded fees in addition to
damages relief.12  On the other hand, Title VIII, in its original form,
limited eligibility for attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs unable to
finance litigation. 2 The attorney's fee limitation, along with the puni-
124. See Johnson v. Snyder, 639 F.2d 316 (6th Cir. 1981); McDonald v. Verble, 622 F.2d 1227
(6th Cir. 1980); Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Coop. Bldg., 463 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1972);
United States v. American Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers, 442 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. Ill. 1977);
Collins v. Spasojcevic, 1 Eq. Opportunity Hous. Rep. (P-H) 11 13,654 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Snowden v.
Siano, 1 Eq. Opportunity Hous. Rep. (P-H) 13,608 (D. Ariz. 1973); Young v. Netherlands Owners,
Inc., 306 F. Supp. 1282 (D.D.C. 1969).
125. See Gresham v. Windrush Partners, 730 F.2d 1417 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 882
(1984); Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that rights of
third parties attach under state law, here on lease signing and payment of deposit). But cf. State v.
Bergeron, 290 Minn. 351, 187 N.W.2d 680 (1971) (ordering sham transfer cancelled).
126. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1988 (1982); see also Bunn v. Central Realty, 592 F.2d 891 (5th
Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1978); Fountila, 571 F.2d at 487;
Gore v. Turner, 563 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1977); Hodge v. Seller, 558 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1977).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1982); see also Tolliver, 800 F.2d at 149; Bunn, 592 F.2d at 891;
Crumble, 549 F.2d at 462; Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231, 236 (8th Cir. 1976); Fort v.
White, 530 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1976); Hairston v. R & R Apartments, 510 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir. 1975);
Marr v. Rife, 503 F.2d 735 (6th Cir. 1974); Jeanty v. McKey & Poague, Inc., 496 F.2d 1119 (7th
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tive damage cap, made section 1982 the primary enforcement vehicle
during the first generation. Although the provision did not demand in-
digency, 25 Title VIII was nonetheless a questionable and speculative
source for fee awards, and for the plaintiff with any significant assets or
sizeable income, no source at all.12 9 For those prevailing under section
1982, however, fee awards have been increasingly generous and have
kept pace with escalating damages. 130
Cir. 1974); Steele, 478 F.2d at 380.
128. See Tolliver, 800 F.2d at 149 (plaintiff earning $26,000 with daughter unable to bear
$11,385 in fees); Moore v. Townsend, 525 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1975) (fee award to party earning
$28,000 salary in 1975, which would equate to roughly $60,000 today factoring in inflation); Hair-
ston, 510 F.2d 1090 ($5232 annual income eligible); Marr, 503 F.2d at 735 ($11,000 earnings and
uncontested fee award); Steele, 478 F.2d at 380 ($12,000 and $14,000 incomes sufficient), aff'd, 858
F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1988); Keith v. Volpe, 644 F. Supp. 1317 (C.D. Cal. 1986); Heights Community
Congress v. Hilltop Realty, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 8 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (finding nonprofit community
organization eligible for fees despite annual budget of approximately $100,000 and despite contin-
gent fee agreement because plaintiff was not a city able to raise budget); Bishop v. Pecsok, 431 F.
Supp. 34 (N.D. Ohio 1976) ($9663 annual income eligible); Lamb v. Sallee, 417 F. Supp. 282 (E.D.
Ky. 1976) ($6200 annual income eligible); Elazer v. Wright, 2 Eq. Opportunity Hous. Rep. (P-H)
15,197 (S.D. Ohio 1976) ($10,000 annual income eligible); Stevens v. Dobs, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 618
(E.D.N.C. 1974) ($10,000 and $1500 award entitled to fee award); Sanborn v. Wagner, 354 F. Supp.
291 (D. Md. 1973) (must not materially endanger plaintiff's status as home seeker or home owner);
Williamson v. Hampton Management Co., 339 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Ill. 1972) ($15,000 income
eligible).
129. See Samuel v. Benedict, 573 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding plaintiff able to afford
litigation by contingent fee contract and $2500 damage award); Crumble, 549 F.2d at 462 (finding
average financial means sufficient to deny fees even where nominal recovery); Pollitt v. Bramel, 669
F. Supp. 172 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (finding that plaintiff failed to produce proof of inability, and that
$25,000 punitive award could cover fees); Clemons v. Runck, 402 F. Supp. 863 (S.D. Ohio 1975)
(denying fees to plaintiff with $30,200 income, $4500 award, and $10,000 in savings).
130. See Burney v. Housing Auth., 735 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1984) ($26,956.90 remanded to in-
crease to market rate); Jones v. Amalgamated Warbasse Houses, Inc., 721 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1983)
($26,000, but $41,750 agreed in settlement); Apartments & Homes of N.J., 646 F.2d at 101
($21,845); Bryant v. Kay Bros. Builders, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) 1 19,367 (D. Md.
June 8, 1988) (consent decree, $100,000 including damages in settlement to tester); Murphy v.
Monona Shores Assocs., Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) 1 19,366 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (consent
decree, $44,000); Huertas v. East River Hous. Corp., 674 F. Supp. 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
($227,418.70); Thomas v. MK Properties, Civ. No. 86-0250 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 1986) (consent decree,
$30,000); Bell v. Thomas, Inc., 115 F.R.D. 299 (W.D. Va. 1986) (consent decree, $27,500); Mealing
v. Liu, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (P-H) 1 19,356 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (consent decree, $27,500); Fergu-
son v. Zortman, No. 85-1561 (M.D. Pa. July 2, 1986) ($25,000); Heights Community Congress, 643
F. Supp. at 8 (settlement, $196,306.39); McGraw v. Oliver, Wash. Post, Dec. 28, 1985, at A4, col. 1
(E.D. Va. 1985) ($30,000); United States v. J.I. Sopher & Co., No. 75 Civ. 5366 (CHT) (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (settlement, $50,000); Westside Fair Hous. Council v. C. & H. Inv. Group, Inc., Fair Hous.-
Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) 19,342 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (consent decree, $80,000); Davis v. Mansards,
597 F. Supp. 334 (N.D. Ind. 1984) ($42,627); McKenna v. Peekskill Hous. Auth., 573 F. Supp. 976
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) ($35,450.51); Espinoza, 532 F. Supp. at 440 ($21,906.68); J. KUSHNER, supra note
14, at app. 9-2.
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V. PRE-1988 FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT INITIATIVES
Federal fair housing enforcement prior to the Fair Housing Amend-
ments Act of 1988 centered primarily on the receipt of administrative
complaints made under section 810 of Title VIII.131 Of the complaints
HUD received, any that arose in a jurisdiction with a fair housing law
certified as being substantially equivalent to Title VIII were referred
back to that jurisdiction. HUD urged voluntary conciliation of the re-
maining complaints. The litigation arm of federal enforcement has con-
sisted of those few Title VIII pattern and practice cases that HUD has
referred to the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department.13 2 In
addition, HUD has distributed the small amounts of funds allotted by
Congress for public and private fair housing enforcement'" and has en-
gaged in extremely limited enforcement of its affirmative obligation to
promote fair housing as established in section 608 of Title VIII.134 Al_
though this obligation has been interpreted to require the imposition of
affirmative marketing obligations on HUD-assisted developers 35 and
131. 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1982). On the overall historical weakness of the federal fair housing
enforcement effort, see Kushner, An Unfinished Agenda: The Federal Fair Housing Enforcement
Effort, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 348 (1988).
132. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1982); see also J. KUSHNER, supra note 14, §§ 8.30-8.34. Title
VIII's criminal punishment alternative applies in cases involving force or the threat of force and
the willful threat or actual injury, intimidation, or interference with fair housing rights. 42 U.S.C. §
3631 (1982). See United States v. Gilbert, 813 F.2d 1523 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 173
(1987); United States v. White, 788 F.2d 390 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Redwine, 715 F.2d
315 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1216 (1984); United States v. Johns, 615 F.2d 672 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 829 (1980); United States v. Anzalone, 555 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978); see also J. KUSHNER, supra note 14, §§ 3.67-3.71.
133. See 24 C.F.R. § 111 (1988) (providing Fair Housing Assistance Program to public certi-
fied agencies). For further discussion, also see The 1987 Housing Act, containing the Fair Housing
Initiatives Program (FHIP), which provides some funding for testing and private enforcement.
Housing and Community Development Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-242, § 561, 101 Stat. 1815,
1942 (1988) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3616). HUD has issued proposed regulations under FHIP
that would limit testing to cases with complaints by victims, thereby excluding random testing and
testing in response to underrepresentation statistics, and would require two sets of paired testers,
rendering the program helpful but not significant. The rules also preclude program participants
from providing compensated education regarding proper fair housing compliance to identified per-
petrators, which will discourage participation by some fair housing groups. See 53 Fed. Reg. 25,576
(1988) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 125) (proposed July 7, 1988). Groups should apply for train-
ing funds to avoid conflict with the restrictive rules.
134. See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (1982). On the failure of the Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan
Administrations to recognize and carry out the HUD affirmative obligation to advance fair housing
goals contained in Title VIII, see J. KUSHNER, supra note 14, §§ 1.04, 7.02; and Exec. Order No.
11,063, 3 C.F.R. §§ 652, 653 (1959-63), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 1982 app. at 6-8 (1982) (issued by
President Kennedy) (barring discrimination in federal housing programs, a requirement largely
ignored by the federal government).
135. See, e.g., Alshuler v. Department of Hous. & Urban Dev., 515 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Ill.
1981), aff'd, 686 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1982). Affirmative marketing obligations are irrelevant when
projects are located in segregated communities and undercut by widespread discriminatory prac-
tices by HUD-regulated landlords. J. KUSHNER, supra note 14, § 4.21; see also HUD Seeks Public
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the establishment of voluntary agreements with housing industry par-
ticipants to attain fair housing,3 s HUD has typically ignored this obli-
gation in its pattern of funding segregated and segregative housing
programs. 137 Curiously, HUD's defense has been that congressional di-
rectives make civil rights obligations impossible to implement or under-
Housing Affirmative Compliance Agreement Program for 1989, 15 [Current Developments] Hous.
& Dev. Rep. (BNA) 979 (1988) (race-neutral techniques).
136. See 42 U.S.C. § 3609 (1982); see also J. KUSHNER, supra note 14, § 4.21; Affirmative Fair
Housing Agreement: Real Estate License Law Officials, reprinted in Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep.
(P-H) 19,903 (adopted by Georgia Real Estate Commission Jan. 11, 1978); Memorandum of Un-
derstanding Between HUD and NAR [National Ass'n of Realtors] Modifying and Clarifying the
VAMA Approved by the Parties on 12-16-75, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) 19,909 (Nov.
17, 1986) (extension to May 19, 1987); Realtors, Other Industry Groups Sign Fair Housing Com-
mitments with HUD, 15 [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 71 (1987); Voluntary
Affirmative Fair Housing Marketing Agreement (Realtors), 41 Fed. Reg. 43,211 (1976).
137. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976); United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837
F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2821 (1988); Alshuler, 686 F.2d at 472; Graves v.
Romney, 502 F.2d 1062 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 963 (1975); Munoz-Mendoza v.
Pierce, 711 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1983) (finding eligibility for urban development action grant in face
of segregation); Taylor v. City of Millington, 476 F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1973); Otero v. New York City
Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973); Blackshear Residents Org. v. Romney, 472 F.2d 1197
(5th Cir. 1973); Shannon v. Department of Hous. & Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970);
NAACP v. Boston Hous. Auth., 16 [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 60 (D.
Mass. 1988) (HUD suing for failure to act to desegregate public housing); Almonte v. Pierce, 666 F.
Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (subsidized housing admissions preference to whites); NAACP v. City of
Dunkirk, No. Civ.-80-360 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 1983) (fee award); Hutchins v. Cincinnati Metro.
Hous. Auth., No. C-1-79-131 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 15, 1983) (standing, settlement); NAACP v. Harris,
567 F. Supp. 637 (D. Mass. 1983) (segregated public housing-based challenge to community devel-
opment eligibility), vacated sub nom. NAACP v. Secretary of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149
(1st Cir. 1987); Young v. Pierce, 544 F. Supp. 1010 (E.D. Tex. 1982); Burney v. Housing Auth., 551
F. Supp. 746 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (segregated as of 1971); Clients' Council v. Pierce, 532 F. Supp. 563
(W.D. Ark. 1982), rev'd, 711 F.2d 1406 (8th Cir. 1983); Williamsburg Fair Hous. Comm. v. New
York City Hous. Auth., 450 F. Supp. 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Hale v. Department of Hous. & Urban
Dev., 2 Eq. Opportunity Hous. Rep. (P-H) T 13,782 (W.D. Tenn. 1976), consent decree, Fair Hous.-
Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) 19,341 (W.D. Tenn. 1985); Lewis v. Housing Auth., 1 Eq. Opportunity
Hous. Rep. (P-H) 13,567 (N.D. Ala. 1973); Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971),
aff'd per curiam, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972); Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969);
El Cortez Heights Residents & Property Owners Ass'n v. Tucson Hous. Auth., 10 Ariz. App. 132,
457 P.2d 294 (1969); Greer v. Illinois Hous. Dev. Auth., 150 Ill. App. 3d 357, 501 N.E.2d 723 (1986);
Middlesboro Hous. Auth. v. Kentucky Comm'n on Human Rights, 553 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. Ct. App.
1977); Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Chester Hous. Auth., 458 Pa. 67, 327 A.2d 335
(1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 974 (1975); Court Orders Black and White Tenants to Swap Apart-
ments in Texas Public Housing, 11 [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 675 (Jan. 2,
1984) (discussing Young v. Clarksville Hous. Auth., No. P-82-37-CA (E.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 1983));
HUD, Toledo PHA Cited for Discriminatory Practices Against Minorities and Poor, 11 [Current
Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 147 (July 18, 1983) (discussing Jaimes v. Lucas Metro.
Hous. Auth., No. C 74-68 (N.D. Ohio June 8, 1983), modified sub nom. Jaimes v. Toledo Metro.
Hous. Auth., 758 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir. 1985)); see also Lawsuit Filed Over Houston PHA's Alleged
Discrimination Before Demolition of Project, 12 [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep.
(BNA) 641 (Jan. 14, 1985) (examining Penrice & Johnson v. Housing Auth. (S.D. Tex. filed Aug.
1984) (alleged steering of Vietnamese into building planned for demolition to lessen resident resis-
tance)); Flournoy & Rodrigue, Separate and Unequal, Dallas Morning News, Feb. 10-17 (1985).
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stand.138 HUD traditionally has sought voluntary solutions to the fair
housing problem, and its ambivalence towards enforcement can be seen
in its resistance to testing.'39
Perhaps the most significant impact of Title VIII has been its certi-
fication of state and local programs as substantially equivalent to Title
VIII,'4 0 which has encouraged state and local governments to pass such
fair housing legislation. The effect of an equivalency certification is that
section 810 administrative complaints are referred to the state or local
administrative agency. In addition, the certified state and local agencies
are then eligible to receive grants from HUD to support enforcement
efforts.' 4'
The original section 810 administrative complaint process was less
than effective. It was purely voluntary and conciliation was achieved in
very few cases. Although agreements reached in conciliation were en-
forceable, 42 HUD lacked any power to enforce Title VIII, obtain tem-
porary relief for complainants, or coerce recalcitrant respondents.
138. Goering, Introduction: Racial Desegregation and Federal Housing Policies, in HOUSING
DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY, supra note 15, at 197, 199.
139. HUD has established and funded community housing resource boards to assist in imple-
menting voluntary affirmative marketing agreements with local real estate brokers. See 47 Fed.
Reg. 18,298 (1982) (funding notice). Although the grants may not be used for testing, Funding
Procedures Outlined for Community Housing Resource Boards, 9 [Current Developments] Hous.
& Dev. Rep. (BNA) 875 (1982), HUD is on record as supporting the use of testing, Pierce Backs
Continued Use of "Testers" to Combat Housing Discrimination, 10 [Current Developments]
Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 404 (1982). See Community Fair Housing Boards Actively Collaborate
with Local Governments, 11 [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 1028 (1984)
(HUD-funded community housing resource boards (CHRBs) seek voluntary compliance). HUD's
program of fair housing assistance to public enforcement agencies has been criticized for insuffi-
cient use of testing. ABT ASSOCIATES, FAIR HOUSING AssisTANcE PROGRAM EvALUATION (1985); Ex-
panded Use of Testers Recommended in Evaluation of HUD Program, 13 [Current
Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 702 (1986); see also H.R. 4, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987)
(bill, as passed by House, establishing a fair housing initiatives program to fund public and private
testing); Comparison of House, Senate Housing Bills, 15 [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev.
Rep. (BNA) 90, 101 (1987); HUD, Realtors Agree on Guidelines for Federal Funding of Private
Testers, 13 [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 1061 (1986) (requires "paired"
tests); Witnesses Say Guidelines Would "Gut" Title VIII Enforcement, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending
Rep. (P-H) 1 2.1 (1986) (testimony on the early unsuccessful bill, S. 6478, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986)). The FHIP program was eventually approved in the Housing and Community Develop-
ment Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-242, § 561, 101 Stat. 1815, 1942 (1988) (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. § 3616). See Congress OK's FHIP, 3 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) 8.2 (1988) (Con-
gress authorizing HUD to develop guidelines for the grant program, S. 825, signed Jan. 5, 1988);
see also supra note 132.
140. See supra note 81.
141. See 42 U.S.C. § 3616 (1982); see also 24 C.F.R. §§ 111.101-111.108 (1988); J. KUSHNER,
supra note 14, § 10.03; HUD Announces Competition for Funding Under Fair Housing Assistance
Program, 8 [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 144 (1980).
142. 24 C.F.R. § 105.32 (1988) (explaining that appropriate action can mean only referral to
the Justice Department); J. KUSHNER, supra note 14, §§ 8.29, 9.01; cf. United States v. Reece, 457
F. Supp. 43 (D. Mont. 1978) (suit to compel compliance with HUD conciliation agreement).
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The Attorney General was authorized under section 813 of the orig-
inal Title VIII statute14  to bring pattern and practice cases that
presented novel or important questions of fair housing law or that
sought to eliminate discriminatory patterns of violations.14 4 Although
the courts were split on the issue, the weight of authority did not per-
mit such cases to be used as vehicles to obtain compensatory relief for
victims. 145 Although pattern and practice litigation was used in the
early years to obtain excellent judicial interpretation of the scope of
Title VIII, the Reagan Administration allowed the process to go into
relative desuetude. Characteristic of the Administration's policies, the
Reagan Justice Department largely ignored the effects-test definition of
a prima facie case developed by a predecessor Civil Rights Division.4"
After several years of disregarding Title VIII,' 47 the Justice Department
commenced its own pattern and practice of utilizing Title VIII to chal-
lenge affirmative action in housing.14s Although the Justice Department
143. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1982); J. KUSHNER, supra note 14, §§ 8.30-8.34.
144. See United States v. Northside Realty Assocs., 501 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1974) (Northside
I/), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976) (executive branch discretion to define); United States v. Bob
Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973); United States v.
University Oaks Civic Club, 653 F. Supp. 1469 (S.D. Tex. 1987); United States v. Mitchell, 327 F.
Supp. 476 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
145. United States v. Rent-A-Homes Sys. of Ill., Inc., 602 F.2d 795 (7th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Long, 537 F.2d 1151 (4th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 871 (1976); United States v. Orlofsky, 538 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); United States v. Taylor, 2 Eq. Opportunity Hous. Rep. (P-H) 15,249 (S.D. Ind. 1978). But
see United States v. Berg Enters., 2 Eq. Opportunity Hous. Rep. (P-H) 1 13,773 (S.D. Fla. 1976);
United States v. Chatham, 415 F. Supp. 1214 (N.D. Ga. 1975); United States v. Dittmar Co., 1 Eq.
Opportunity Hous. Rep. (P-H) % 13,730 (E.D. Va. 1975); United States v. Hilton-Sykes Rental
Agency, Inc., 1 Eq. Opportunity Hous. Rep. (P-H) 13,727 (M.D. IIl. 1975); United States v. Pelzer
Realty Co., 377 F. Supp. 121 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (must plead money damages), afl'd, 537 F.2d 841
(5th Cir. 1976); United States v. West Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 1 Eq. Opportunity Hous. Rep. (P-
H) 1 13,641 (N.D. ]M. 1974); cf. United States v. Northside Realty Assocs., 605 F.2d 1348 (5th Cir.
1979) (Northside IV) (no damages in contempt proceedings).
146. Selig, The Justice Department and Racially Exclusionary Municipal Practices: Crea-
tive Ventures in Fair Housing Enforcement, 17 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 445, 486 n.193 (1984) (prohibit-
ing attorneys from arguing effects test in post-trial briefs); Washington Council of Lawyers,
Reagan Civil Rights: The First Twenty Months, 8 BLACK L.J. 68 (1983) (highly critical, citing
Justice Department opposition to "effects" violation standard). See generally supra notes 95-113
and accompanying text.
147. G. METCALF, supra note 80, at 17 (no cases initiated in 1981, two in 1982, and five in
1983); Effron, Fair Housing Rises in Importance as Civil Rights Issue, L.A. Daily J., May 9, 1983,
at 1, col. 6, at 14, col. 3 (only six new cases filed since President Reagan took office). For data from
earlier administrations, see supra note 78.
148. See, e.g., United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 376 (1988); United States v. Atrium Village Assocs., No. 87c-6527 (N.D. Ill. filed July,
1987) (challenging racial quotas in admission to rental housing); HUD Questions Use of Block
Grant Funds for Integration Maintenance in Ohio, 13 [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep.
(BNA) 296 (1985) (noting also that loans to minorities may not meet 51% community development
rule, because few families are to be assisted); New England PHA Agrees to End Integration Main-
tenance Quotas, 13 [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 585 (1985) (noting that
1084
1989] FAIR HOUSING AMENDMENTS ACT 1085
has obtained several consent decrees seeking traditional fair housing
goals,149 there have been no officially reported decisions advancing fair
housing15 unless one so characterizes the Department's successful dis-
mantling of integration maintenance programs. 5'
Holyoke, Massachusetts public housing authority discontinued successful program established
under earlier Justice Department consent decree, now attacked by Justice Department); see also
PHA Barred from Placement of Tenants, 3 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) 9.2 (1988) (Jus-
tice Department-approved consent decree ending discriminatory public housing segregation by
tenant assignment through the long-discredited "freedom of choice" policy); cf. NAACP v. Meese,
615 F. Supp. 200 (D.D.C. 1985) (granting motion to dismiss in suit to prevent Justice Department
from seeking to reopen affirmative action consent decrees in employment cases).
HUD has proposed highly unrealistic policies to achieve integration consistent with the Jus-
tice Department ideology, such as: (1) creating magnet projects with enhanced amenities; (2) race-
neutral tenant transfers to maximize desegregation; (3) buddy system transfers to projects where
the transferee is in the minority; (4) marketing to those least likely to apply; and (5) improved
project security. Race-Neutral Steps Can Help Racial Balance in Public Housing, Brachman
Says, 15 [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 434 (1987) (housing authority repre-
sentative, NAHRO, urging subsidized transfers for integration, waiting list priority for those will-
ing to integrate, improving minority projects, site selection in nonimpacted sites outside of
authority jurisdiction, and integration maintenance programs once integration achieved). Guide-
lines have been proposed. See Washington Council of Lawyers, supra note 146; PHA Guidelines
Will Help HUD Curb Housing Discrimination, Says Brachman, 15 [Current Developments] Hous.
& Dev. Rep. (BNA) 800 (1988); Voluntary Desegregation Options Part of New Compliance Pro-
gram Offered to PHAs, 16 [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 343 (1988) (seeking
to avoid race-preferential treatment through policies such as allowing applicants at the top of the
waiting list to wait until a unit is available in a project where their race does not predominate,
allowing voluntary transfers to such projects, and providing marketing programs and magnet and
security funding to attract tenants); see also BHA, NAACP Stipulation Expands Voluntary Com-
pliance Agreement Coverage, 16 [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 512 (1988)
(HUD-approved plan to provide priority as remedy for past segregation practices to victimized
applicants and those prevailing in an arbitration hearing who alleged they were discouraged from
applying in places where their race does not predominate); HUD Seeks Public Housing Affirma-
tive Compliance Agreement Program for 1989, 15 [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep.
(BNA) 979 (1988) (use of race-neutral techniques); Justice Responds to Study by Washington
Council of Lawyers, 24 TRENDS, Dec. 1982, at 3. Compare Selig, The Reagan Justice Department
and Civil Rights: What Went Wrong, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 785 with Reynolds, The Reagan Admin-
istration and Civil Rights: Winning the War Against Discrimination, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1001
(critique of Selig noticeably silent on fair housing). See generally Days, Turning Back the Clock:
The Reagan Administration and Civil Rights, 19 HAxv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 469 (1984); Greenberg,
Civil Rights Enforcement Activity of the Department of Justice, 8 BLACK L.J. 60, 61, 63 (1983)
(characterizing Reagan civil rights enforcement efforts with less than approval); Wolvovitz &
Lobel, The Enforcement of Civil Rights Statutes: The Reagan Administration's Record, 9 BLACK
L.J. 252 (1986).
149. DOJ Civil Rights Division Sums Up FY '87, 3 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) 9.6
(1988) (25 consent decrees obtained by Civil Rights Division); cf. Note, Participation and Depart-
ment of Justice School Desegregation Consent Decrees, 95 YALE L.J. 1811 (1986) (victims interests
not represented by Justice Department).
150. R. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW 92 n.184 (Supp. 1986) (stating that
"[i]ncredibly, not a single § 3613 case filed by the current Administration has resulted in a re-
ported decision on the merits!").
151. See, e.g., Starrett City, 840 F.2d at 1096; New England PHA Agrees to End Integration
Maintenance Quotas, supra note 147. The only ostensible exception is United States v. Yonkers
Board of Education, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2821 (1988), commenced
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Although HUD maintains a small but dedicated staff to administer
the fair housing program, the Department traditionally has treated fair
housing as an unwanted program. HUD has been sued repeatedly for
callously disregarding the unfair housing implications of its perceived
primary mission of funnelling community development block grants
and serving the development community in pursuit of HUD housing
insurance and subsidies.'52 As described above, the Civil Rights Divi-
sion of the Justice Department has committed its limited fair housing
resources to dismantling integration programs while the Civil Division
has spent a great deal of time defending HUD for its segregative hous-
ing practices. 5 ' Symptomatic of the failure to establish federal fair
housing priorities, President Reagan repealed long-awaited Title VIII
substantive regulations promulgated in the last days of the Carter Ad-
ministration."" Likewise, the Reagan Administration's reduction of ra-
cial participation reporting rendered enforcement and auditing more
difficult.15 Federal enforcement priorities need to be established if the
congressional goals contained in Title VIII are to be realized.
under the previous Administration, but prosecution of the case has been led by private intervening
civil rights attorneys.
152. See cases cited supra note 135; see also J. KUSHNER, supra note 14, §§ 3.53, 6.01, 7.02.
HUD's proposed regulations implementing the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 endorse
integrative marketing efforts. 53 Fed. Reg. 44,992 (1988) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 109.16(b)).
Other provisions, however, such as 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(2) (prohibiting selective advertising and
information), § 100.120(b)(1) (prohibiting preferential loans), and § 100.120(b)(3) (prohibiting dis-
criminatory terms), could be interpreted so as to discourage or prohibit certain affirmative action
marketing, affirmative action counseling, and other integration incentives.
153. See cases cited supra note 135; see also J. KUSHNER, supra note 14, §§ 3.16 (rentals),
3.25 (sales), 3.52 (tenant assignment), 6.01 (community development), 7.02 (site selection).
154. Memorandum from the President, 17 WEEKLY COUP. PRES. Doc. 73 (Jan. 29, 1981) (mor-
atorium on new regulations); see also J. KUSHNER, supra note 14, §§ 1.04, 7.02 (failure of the John-
son, Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan Administrations to issue substantive regulations or otherwise
enforce Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, prohibiting discrimination in government programs);
id. §§ 10.01, 10.04 (failure of the Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan Administrations to promulgate
substantive regulations under Title VIII, defining obligations and violations). HUD has proposed
rules under the amended statute that provide some examples of violations, yet closely adhere to
statutory language. 53 Fed. Reg. 44,992 (1988) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 109.16(b)).
155. J. KUSHNER, supra note 14, § 10.01; United States Department of Housing & Urban
Development, Notice H 81-12 (Oct. 8, 1981) (repealing the requirement that housing authorities
report on minority participation); cf. 12 C.F.R. § 338.4 (1988) (Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion elimination of data-keeping on loan applicants by race and sex); FDIC Cuts Down Fair Hous-
ing Reporting Requirements, 1 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) 4.3, at 3 (1985) (eliminating
log sheets); Pierce Protests OMB Rejection of Forms to Collect Data on Minorities, 12 [Current
Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 923 (1985) (broad halt to equal opportunity reporting).
But cf. HUD Seeks to Improve Collection of Racial Data on Subsidized Housing, 13 [Current
Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 537 (1985). Congress has now mandated collection of
racial data on those eligible and participating in housing and community development programs.
Housing and Community Development Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-242, § 562, 101 Stat. 1815,
1944 (1988) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3608a).
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VI. THE FAIR HOUSING AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1988
In almost every year since 1977156 Congress has attempted to
strengthen Title VIII, particularly by establishing a significant federal
enforcement arm. Title VIII was written without enforcement teeth.
157
Moreover, severe statutory and judicial limits on damages 5 ' and attor-
ney's fees' 59 discouraged private utilization, and there existed no signifi-
cant public enforcement to fill the void. The House Report on the
earlier version of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988,160 the pro-
posed Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1980, stated:
The primary weakness in the existing law derives from the almost total dependence
upon private efforts to enforce its provisions. For financially capable victims of
housing discrimination, the Act has provided litigation remedies. For the vast ma-
jority of victims, however, this course of action is not feasible. Alternative enforce-
ment under title VIII is limited to "pattern and practice" cases brought by the
Attorney General. While these cases have dealt with virtually every important type
of discrimination, and have had a significant impact on the state of the law, relief
for individual victims of housing discrimination has not been readily available
through this avenue. 161
The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988162 goes a long way toward
156. The minimally modified 1977 bill was reintroduced by Senator Kennedy as the Fair
Housing Amendments Act. S. 558, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. S2256 (daily ed. Feb. 19,
1987). The original amendments legislation was proposed by Congressmen Drinan and Edwards.
H.R. 5200, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); see H.R. REP. No. 865, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); see also
Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R. 2540 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). The
measure has been reintroduced almost annually. See, e.g., S. 2040, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG.
REC. S848 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1986); S. 1220, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. S6155 (daily ed.
May 5, 1983). On the Senate side, the original bill was reintroduced by Senator Mathias as the Fair
Housing Amendments Act of 1981. S. 570, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 5028 (1981). A
similar version of the bill was offered in the House by Congressmen Railsback and Fish. H.R. 1973,
97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 2516 (1981). Congressman Fish reintroduced the House ver-
sion. H.R. 1158, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. H734 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1987); H.R. 4119,
99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REc. H332 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1986); H.R. 3482, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.,
129 CONG. REc. H4894 (daily ed. June 30, 1983).
157. J. KUSHNER, supra note 14, § 10.04; Mathias, The Fair Housing Amendments Act, 15
REAL EST. L.J. 353 (1987); Rice, supra note 78; Waldrop, supra note 78; see also Senate Subcom-
mittee Approves Bill to Strengthen Fair Housing Enforcement, 15 [Current Developments] Hous.
& Dev. Rep. (BNA) 114 (1987).
158. See supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
160. Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988) (effective Mar. 12, 1989) (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601-3620, 3631).
161. See H.R. REP. No. 865, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1980); see also H.R. REP. No. 711, supra
note 15, at 16, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2173.
162. Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3620,
3631). See generally J. KUSHNER, supra note 14 (Supp. 1989) (forthcoming). For the legislative
history, see Hearings on S. 558, supra note 14; Hearings on H.R. 1158, supra note 15; H.R. REP.
No. 711, supra note 15; 134 CONG. REC. H6491 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1988) (House acceptance of Senate
amendments); 134 CONG. REC. S10,544 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1988) (Senate passage of amended bill);
134 CONG. REc. S10,532 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1988); 134 CONG. REc. S10,454 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1988);
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eliminating the basis for this earlier criticism.
A. Procedural Changes
1. Administrative Enforcement
The most significant change in the law is the modification of the
administrative process under section 810 of the law. Just as under the
prior law, an aggrieved party may file an administrative complaint and
the complaint will be referred to a state or local government agency if
that agency's program has been certified by HUD as operating under
laws substantially equivalent to Title VIII.165 The state or local certified
agency then has thirty days to institute proceedings. 64 Under the prior
law, if the locality had no certified agency, then HUD could refer the
matter to the Justice Department if a pattern and practice of illegal
behavior was presented. The typical complaint, however, could be re-
solved only by voluntary conciliation between the parties. If the respon-
dent refused to participate or failed to agree to a resolution of the
complaint, HUD simply informed the complainant of the right to sue in
court.
Under the amended section 810, the complainant or HUD itself
may file a complaint. The limitations period is now one year rather
than the former 180 days. HUD then has 100 days to complete an in-
vestigation. The new law authorizes HUD to issue subpoenas1 6 5 and
provides for witness fees. 166 The failure to appear and testify can result
in up to one year imprisonment and a fine of up to one hundred thou-
sand dollars.167 Such penalties also apply to the falsification of docu-
ments6 8 and the alteration or destruction of evidence. 69 During this
time conciliation is to commence, and the process may call for the mat-
ter to be submitted to arbitration. If the complaint is not resolved
through conciliation, HUD will either dismiss the complaint or file a
charge. HUD may not proceed to issue a charge if the complainant has
134 CONG. REC. H4932 (daily ed. June 29, 1988); 134 CONG. REc. H4912 (daily ed. June 29, 1988)
(House passage of bill); 134 CONG. REc. H4898 (daily ed. June 29, 1988); 134 CONG. Rc. H4673
(daily ed. June 23, 1988).
163. Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 810(f), 102 Stat. 1619, 1627 (1988) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §
3610(f)); see also supra note 82.
164. Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 810(f)(2)(A), 102 Stat. at 1627 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §
3610(f)(2)(A)).
165. Id. § 811(a), 102 Stat. at 1628 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3611(a)).
166. Id. § 811(b), 102 Stat. at 1629 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3611(b)).
167. Id. § 811(c), 102 Stat. at 1629 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3611(c)).
168. Id. § 811(c)(2)(A), (B), 102 Stat. at 1629 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3611(c)(2)(A),
(B)).
169. Id. § 811(c)(2)(C), 102 Stat. at 1629 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3611(c)(2)(C)).
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brought federal suit under section 813 and the trial has commenced."'
Complaints involving zoning disputes are referred to the Justice De-
partment for litigation, 171 and HUD may also order prompt Justice De-
partment litigation in any case in which interim relief, such as an
injunction, is called for to protect the rights of the complainant.
172
Under the amended section 812, which provides for HUD enforce-
ment through litigation, the respondent, complainant, or other ag-
grieved person on whose behalf the complaint or charge was filed has
twenty days to elect to have the matter determined in federal court so
as to protect the party's right to a jury trial."73 If the election is made,
HUD authorizes a civil suit that the Attorney General must commence
within thirty days of election."'7 Aggrieved parties may intervene in
such civil proceedings."7 If the election is not made, the matter comes
before an administrative law judge."' The administrative law judge
must commence the hearing within 120 days of the filing of the
charge1 7 and must issue a decision within sixty days of the conclusion
of the hearing. 7'8 The statute provides for discovery,"79 and the admin-
istrative hearings are subject to the Federal Rules of Evidence. 8 When
trial in a private lawsuit has also been commenced under state law or
section 813, the administrative law judge may not proceed to resolve
the matter or otherwise progress with administrative proceedings.'
Upon finding a violation of the law, the administrative law judge
may make an order under section 812(g)(3) awarding actual damages,
injunctive and other equitable relief, and may assess a civil penalty
against the violator. The statute authorizes penalties of up to ten thou-
sand dollars for the first discriminatory practice finding, twenty-five
thousand dollars if the respondent has been adjudged to have commit-
ted a violation during the five-year period ending on the date of the
charge filing, and up to fifty thousand dollars if there have been two or
170. Id. § 810(b), 102 Stat. at 1626 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3610(b)); id. § 810(g)(4), 102
Stat. at 1628 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3610(g)(4)).
171. Id. § 810(g)(2)(C), 102 Stat. at 1628 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3610(g)(2)(C)).
172. Id. § 810(e), 102 Stat. at 1626 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3610(e)); id. § 810(g)(2)(C),
102 Stat. at 1627-28 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3610(g)(2)(C)).
173. Id. § 812(a), 102 Stat. at 1629 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a)).
174. Id. § 812(o)(1), 102 Stat. at 1632 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3612(o)(1)) (venue deter-
mined according to 28 U.S.C. ch. 87).
175. Id. § 812(o)(2), 102 Stat. at 1632 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3612(o)(2)).
176. Id. § 812(b), 102 Stat. at 1629 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3612(b)).
177. Id. § 812(g)(1), 102 Stat. at 1630 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3612(g)(1)).
178. Id. § 812(g)(2), 102 Stat. at 1630 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3612(g)(2)).
179. Id. § 812(d), 102 Stat. at 1629-30 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3612(d)).
180. Id. § 812(c), 102 Stat. at 1629 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c)).
181. Id. § 812(f), 102 Stat. at 1630 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3612(f)).
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more adjudged violations during the prior seven years. 182 The time lim-
its do not apply, however, if the perpetrator is an individual repeat of-
fender rather than a different employee of the same offending
organization. The administrative law judge, just as any federal judge,
may award attorney's fees to prevailing parties under section 812(p).
Bona fide purchasers, tenants, or encumbrancers without notice of the
charge are not subject to injunctive orders interfering with their real
estate transactions. 183 The Secretary of HUD has thirty days to review
the findings of the administrative law judge,8 4 and the final order may,
within thirty days, be reviewed 85 or the ruling enforced by the United
States Court of Appeals.' The administrative law judge's findings are
deemed conclusive if no petition for judicial review is filed within forty-
five days of the date the order was entered. s7 Such a conclusive finding
binds subsequently filed HUD petitions for enforcement. If HUD does
not petition to enforce the administrative law judge's order within sixty
days, and if no party files a petition to review the order, any person
entitled to relief without time limitation may file a petition in the Court
of Appeals to enforce the order. 8 Any order dismissing charges must
be disclosed publicly.8 9 In addition, HUD may seek Justice Depart-
ment enforcement of conciliation agreement violations.9 0 HUD also
must notify state licensing agencies when licensed real estate profes-
sionals, lenders, or other licensed businesses are found to have engaged
in discriminatory practices. 191
2. Private Litigation
Section 813, replacing what was known as section 812 under the
prior law, provides for private enforcement in federal court. The
amendment provides a two-year statute of limitations rather than the
182. Id. § 812(g)(3), 102 Stat. at 1630 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3612(g)(3)). Copies of
orders against repeat offenders are to be referred to the Attorney General. Id. § 812(g)(6), 102 Stat.
at 1631 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3612(g)(6)).
183. Id. § 812(g)(4), 102 Stat. at 1631 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 361 2 (g)(4)).
184. Id. § 812(h)(1), 102 Stat. at 1631 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3612(h)(1)).
185. Id. § 812(i)(2), 102 Stat. at 1631 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3612(i)(2)) (venue in the
circuit where the discriminatory housing practice is alleged to have occurred).
186. Id. § 812(), 102 Stat. at 1631 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3612()) (venue for enforce-
ment in the circuit where the practice is alleged to have occurred or where the respondent resides
or conducts business; the petition may seek temporary relief).
187. Id. § 812(1), 102 Stat. at 1632 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3612(1)).
188. Id. § 812(m), 102 Stat. at 1632 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3612(m)) (venue in the
circuit where the discriminatory housing practice is alleged to have occurred).
189. Id. § 812(g)(7), 102 Stat. at 1631 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3612(g)(7)).
190. Id. § 810(c), 102 Stat. at 1626 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3610(c)).
191. Id. § 812(g)(5), 102 Stat. at 1631 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 361 2 (g)(5)).
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former 180 days. 92 In addition, the two years does not include any peri-
ods during which administrative proceedings were pending under sec-
tions 810 and 812.'1s Just as under the prior law, the section 813 action
may be commenced even if a section 810 administrative complaint has
been filed with HUD."" Section 813 actions are barred, however, once
the complainant consents to a section 810 HUD-, state-, or locally ob-
tained conciliation agreement. 95 Section 813 private litigation also is
barred once a section 812 hearing before an administrative law judge
has commenced on the record. 9 ' The Attorney General may intervene
in section 813 proceedings on timely certification that the case is of gen-
eral public importance. 19 The federal judge in a section 813 case can
appoint an attorney for the complainant' and can waive fees, costs,
and security if the complainant is financially unable to bear such
costs.9  The judge also may award unlimited actual and punitive dam-
ages and grant injunctive relief, including orders for affirmative ac-
tion.200 Attorney's fees also are available* under section 813.21 As in
administrative proceedings, bona fide purchasers, tenants, or encum-
brancers without notice of the administrative complaint or litigation are
not subject to injunctive orders interfering with their real estate trans-
actions.202 This is a dramatic improvement over the original law, which
placed a one thousand dollar cap on punitive damages and limited at-
torney fee awards to those financially unable to afford counsel. 03
3. Federal Litigation
Section 814, which replaces what was known as section 813 under
the prior law, allows pattern and practice litigation by the Justice De-
partment as well as the enforcement of conciliation agreements. A pat-
tern and practice action may be filed when the Attorney General
has reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a
pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights granted
192. Id. § 813(a)(1)(A), 102 Stat. at 1633 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A)).
193. Id. § 813(a)(1)(B), 102 Stat. at 1633 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(B)) (the
tolling does not apply to actions arising from a breach of a conciliation agreement).
194. Id. § 813(a)(2), 102 Stat. at 1633 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(2)).
195. Id.
196. Id. § 813(a)(3), 102 Stat. at 1633 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(3)).
197. Id. § 813(e), 102 Stat. at 1634 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3613(e)).
198. Id. § 813(b)(1), 102 Stat. at 1633 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3613(b)(1)).
199. Id. § 813(b)(2), 102 Stat. at 1633 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3613(b)(2)).
200. Id. § 813(c), 102 Stat. at 1633-34 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)).
201. Id. § 812(p), 102 Stat. at 1633 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3612(p)); id. § 813(c)(2), 102
Stat. at 1633-34 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2)).
202. Id. § 813(d), 102 Stat. at 1634 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3613(d)); see note 183 and
accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 116-22, 126-30 and accompanying text.
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by.. . [Title VIII] . . . or that any group of persons has been denied any of the
rights granted by. . . [Title VIII] . . . and such denial raises an issue of general
public importance.20 '
Unlike the prior law, the new law may subject pattern and practice
cases to a statute of limitations. Actions to enforce HUD referrals of
discriminatory housing practices must be brought within eighteen
months of the date of the occurrence or termination of the alleged dis-
criminatory practice. 05 Actions for breach of conciliatory agreements
must be commenced within ninety days.206 The Attorney General also is
authorized to enforce subpoenas on behalf of HUD. °7 Relief in litiga-
tion commenced by the Justice Department under section 814 may in-
clude injunctive relief,208 damages to aggrieved persons,209 and civil
penalties of up to fifty thousand dollars for the first violation, and one
hundred thousand dollars for subsequent violations. 210 The court may
permit aggrieved parties to intervene in section 814 proceedings. 211 The
court also may award attorney's fees to parties other than the Justice
Department or other federal agencies. 12
B. Changes in Coverage
1. Extension to the Disabled
The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 extends Title VIII cov-
erage to the disabled.21 3 The disabled are frequently the victims of
housing discrimination.2 1' Landlords concerned with image, compatibil-
204. Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 814(a), 102 Stat. at 1634 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3614(a)).
205. Id. § 814(b)(1)(B), 102 Stat. at 1634 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3614(b)(1)(B)).
206. Id. § 814(b)(2)(B), 102 Stat. at 1634 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3614(b)(2)(B)).
207. Id. § 814(c), 102 Stat. at 1634 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3614(c)).
208. Id. § 814(d)(1)(A), 102 Stat. at 1634-35 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3614(d)(1)(A)).
209. Id. § 814(d)(1)(B), 102 Stat. at 1635 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3614(d)(1)(B)).
210. Id. § 814(d)(1)(C), 102 Stat. at 1635 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3614(d)(1)(C)). The
House bill anticipated that the amounts specified would be maximums and that court awards
would be based on a consideration of "the nature and circumstances of the violation, the degree of
culpability, any history of prior violations, the financial circumstances of that defendant and the
goal of deterrence, and other matters as justice may require." H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 15, at
40.
211. Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 814(e), 102 Stat. at 1635 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3614(e)).
212. Id. § 814(d)(2), 102 Stat. at 1335 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3614(d)(2)).
213. Id. § 804(f), 102 Stat. at 1620-22 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)) (reaching dis-
crimination in sales, rentals, or otherwise denying housing or making it unavailable; discrimination
in conditions, privileges, services, facilities, or refusal to provide accommodations in rules); id. §
805(a), 102 Stat. at 1622 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a)) (reaching discrimination in residen-
tial real estate-related transactions, including lending services); id. § 806, 102 Stat. at 1622 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3606) (reaching discrimination in brokerage services); id. § 901, 102 Stat. at
1635 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3631) (including the disabled in the class of persons protected
by the criminal penalty section of the Act).
214. See J. KUSHNER, supra note 14, § 2.09; Anderson, Private Housing for the Disabled: A
Suggested Agenda, 56 NoTRE DAME LAw. 247 (1980); Anderson & Steinhoff, Housing for Physi-
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ity with other tenants, minimization of architectural access modifica-
tions, or simply their own discomfort in confronting the disabled may
be quick to refuse accommodations. Ironically, popular compassion was
reflected in the nearly universal support for extension of Title VIII to
protect the disabled. Concern nevertheless arises regarding the cost of
architectural modifications, which the new law places on the disabled
tenant.215
The new law defines handicap as "a physical or mental impairment
which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activi-
ties."21 The law specifically excludes from protection current illegal use
of or addiction to a controlled substance.217 In addition to the disabled,
the law also prohibits discrimination against one associated with a
handicapped person.218 AIDS sufferers and others afflicted with disease
won protection under the law through the defeat of an amendment that
attempted to exclude those with communicable diseases.21 9 Neverthe-
less, the law does not cover those "'whose tenancy would constitute a
direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals or whose ten-
ancy would result in substantial physical damage to the property of
others.' "220 Disabled persons are also protected under some state and
local fair housing laws.221
The new law also will have a broad impact on the physical accessi-
bility of housing. Beginning in February 1991, all newly constructed
multifamily housing with four or more units and elevators, and all
ground floor units of projects with four or more units22 will have to
assure access to common areas and include adaptive design features.
Such features include wheelchair passage, accessible light switches,
electrical outlets, thermostats and other environmental controls, rein-
forcements in bathrooms to accommodate future grab bar installation,
cally Disabled: A Case Waiting to Happen, 21 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 578 (1987); Mandelker, Hous-
ing Issues, in AIDS AND THE LAW 142 (1987); Steinman, The Effect of Land-Use Restrictions on
the Establishment of Community Residences for the Disable& A National Study, 19 URB. LAW. 1
(1987).
215. Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 804(f)(3)(A), 102 Stat. at 1620 (to be codified at 42 U.S.c. §
3604(f)(3)(A)) (allowing an agreement by a tenant to restore the interior of the premises to the
condition that existed before the modification, excepting reasonable wear and tear).
216. Id. § 802(h)(1), 102 Stat. at 1619 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h)(1)).
217. Id. § 802(h)(3), 102 Stat. at 1619 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h)(3)).
218. Id. § 804(f)(2)(C), 102 Stat. at 1620 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2)(C)).
219. See H.R. 1158, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H4929-31 (daily ed. June 29, 1988)
(Burton amendment); House Judiciary Committee Approves Bill with ALJ, Handicapped Provi-
sions, 15 [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 958 (1988).
220. Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 804(f)(9), 102 Stat. at 1622 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §
3604(f)(9)).
221. J. KUSHNER, supra note 14, § 2.09.
222. Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 804(f)(7), 102 Stat. at 1622 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §
3604(f)(7)).
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and kitchens and bathrooms that allow wheelchair maneuverability.
223
2. Extension to Families with Children
The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 extends coverage both
to familial discrimination,224 defined as discrimination against persons
under the age of eighteen who reside with their legal custodian or such
person's designee, and to discrimination against those who are pregnant
or in the process of securing legal custody of a person under age eigh-
teen.225 There exists pervasive discrimination in renting to these two
groups. 2 26 Such discrimination is frequently imposed as a marketing
scheme to attract singles. All too frequently, however, the scheme is
designed to discourage renting to racial minorities. Even when such a
racial design is not the motivating factor, the racial effect is dramatic.
In many urban metropolitan centers, those renters with children are
typically ethnic, national origin, or racial minority group females.2 By
contrast, white women with children tend to rent or own homes in the
suburbs. In central urban communities, a no children rule will carry a
223. Id. § 804(f)(3)(C), 102 Stat. at 1621 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C)). The
access requirements for new construction are met if the development complies with the American
National Standard, id. § 804(f)(4), 102 Stat. at 1621 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (f)(4)), and
state or local adoption of the standard results in compliance with Title VIII, id. § 804(f)(5)(A), 102
Stat. at 1621 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(5)(A)). Section 804(f)(5)(C) provides that HUD
shall encourage state and local governments to review and approve projects for compliance. Id. §
804(f)(5)(C), 102 Stat. at 1621 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(5)(C)).
224. See id. § 804(a)-(e), 102 Stat. at 1622 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(e)); id. §
805, 102 Stat. at 1622 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3605); id. § 806, 102 Stat. at 1622 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3606); id. § 901, 102 Stat. at 1635 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3631).
225. Id. § 802(k), 102 Stat. at 1620 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3602(k)).
226. See Hearings on H.R. 1158, supra note 15, at 363 (statement of James B. Morales)
(collecting and summarizing reports and studies from across the country); Senate Hearings, supra
note 78, at 63, 199-206 (providing a description of the problem and a collection of state laws
prohibiting such bias); H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 15, at 19-20; D. ASHFORD & P. ESTON, THE
EXTENT AND EFFECTS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CHILDREN IN RENTAL HOUSING: A STUDY OF FIVE
CALIFORNIA CITIES (1979) (finding that 71% of advertised apartments in Los Angeles allow no chil-
dren); J. GREENE & G. BLAKE, How RESTRICTIvE RENTAL PRACTICES AFFECT FAMILIES WITH CHIL-
DREN (1980); HUMAN RIGHTs/FAIR HOUSING COMM'N OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO,
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN IN THE SACRAMENTO RENTAL MARKET (1983)
(finding that 40% of the sample engaged in child discrimination one year after court ruled it ille-
gal); J. KUSHNER, supra note 14, § 2.07; U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., HOUSING OUR FAMI-
LIES (1981); see also R. MARANS, A REPORT ON MEASURING RESTRICTIVE RENTAL PRACTICES
AFFECTING FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN (1980) (finding that 25.5% of all rental units exclude children;
another 50% discourage children by policies); Barnett, Child Exclusion Policies in Housing, 67 Ky.
L.J. 967 (1979); Stanley, Age Restrictions in Housing: The Denial of the Family's Right to Its
Integrity, 19 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 61 (1984); Note, Why Johnny Can't Rent-An Examination
of Laws Prohibiting Discrimination Against Families in Rental Housing, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1829
(1981) [hereinafter Note, Why Johnny Can't Rent]; Note, Exclusion of Families with Children
from Housing, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1121 (1985).
227. See D. ASHFORD & P. ESTON, supra note 226.
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dramatic racially discriminatory impact, an impact that has not been
successfully defended on business-backed, profit-based rationales. '
Even under the prior law, several courts found "no child" rules to be a
pretext for racial discrimination"2 9 or a violation of Title VIII that es-
tablished a disparate impact prima facie case.230 Child discrimination
also is prohibited under some state and local laws.23'
The new amendments that prohibit child discrimination do, how-
ever, exempt from compliance senior citizen housing complexes of two
types: (1) those complexes whose residents will all be older than sixty-
two years of age;232 and (2) those that house at least one person fifty-
five years of age or older per unit.233 For housing complexes seeking
exemption under the latter scheme, HUD is directed to issue regula-
tions limiting its reach to those in which special senior citizen facilities
and services are provided, eighty percent of the units are so occupied,
and the senior citizen policy is published as a rule and enforced."
3. Additional Extensions
The new amendments extend the express reach of Title VIII to
several additional discriminatory practices. Title VIII now expressly
covers real estate loans for repairs and improvements23 ' as well as sec-
ondary lending practices such as bias in loan-based securities and real
estate appraisals.3 6 Furthermore, the definition of "aggrieved" under
228. See Tolliver v. Amici, 800 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1986); Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736
F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1984); Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1982); Langley v. Monu-
mental Corp., 496 F. Supp. 1144 (D. Md. 1980); Elazer v. Wright, 2 Eq. Opportunity Hous. Rep.
(P-H) 1 15,197 (S.D. Ohio 1976); Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180
Cal. Rptr. 496, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982). But see Fred v. Kokinokos, 347 F. Supp. 942
(E.D.N.Y. 1972).
229. Tolliver, 800 F.2d at 150; Betsey, 736 F.2d at 986-89; Langley, 496 F. Supp. at 1144;
Elazer, 2 Eq. Opportunity Hous. Rep. (P-H) 1 15,197; State Comm'n for Human Rights v. Ken-
nelly, 30 A.D.2d 310, 291 N.Y.S.2d 686, afl'd, 23 N.Y.2d 722, 244 N.E.2d 58, 296 N.Y.S.2d 367
(1968); see also Fair Hous. Found. v. Acapulco Apartments, No. FCR 83-84, B1-0022, FHL 83-84,
B1-0137h (Cal. Dep't Fair Employ. & Hous. Aug. 22, 1984) (settlement); cf. People v. McKale, 25
Cal. 3d 626, 602 P.2d 731, 159 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1979) (religious discrimination).
230. See, e.g., Betsey, 736 F.2d at 988.
231. See, e.g., Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d at 744-45, 640 P.2d at 129, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 511; Senate
Hearings, supra note 78, at 63, 200-02 (describing problem and collecting state laws prohibiting
such bias); J, KUSHNER, supra note 14, § 2.07; Note, Why Johnny Can't Rent, supra note 226.
232. Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 807(b)(2)(B), 102 Stat. at 1623 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §
3607(b)(2)(B)).
233. Id. § 807(b)(2)(C), 102 Stat. at 1623 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(2)(C)).
234. Id. § 807(b)(2)(C)(i)-(iii), 102 Stat. at 1623 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)
(2)(C)(i)-(iii)). Section 807(b)(3) provides that housing will not fail to meet the senior citizen re-
quirements because those residing at the time of passage do not meet the requirements. Id. §
807(b)(3), 102 Stat. at 1623 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(3)).
235. Id. § 805(b)(1)(A), 102 Stat. at 1622 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3605(b)(1)(A)).
236. Id. § 805(b)(2), 102 Stat. at 1622 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3605(b)(2)).
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Title.VIII now reaches persons who believe they "will be injured by a
discriminatory housing practice about to occur," '237 in addition to those
already injured.2 38 Interference, coercion, or intimidation claims may
now be vindicated through HUD administrative proceedings as well as
through the previously permitted route of private civil litigation. 3 '
C. Administrative Modifications
Administrative modifications include new provisions for the recog-
nition of state and local equivalent fair housing laws. During the forty
months following passage of the amendments those agencies with in-
terim referral certification will be considered certified, and each juris-
diction has the forty months, with a possible eight-month extension, in
which to amend its laws or regulations to achieve substantial
equivalency.24 ° Certification is to be reconsidered at least every five
years.
241
The new amendments authorize the Secretary of HUD to issue im-
plementing regulations 242 and require the submission of an annual re-
port to Congress covering complaints, investigations, hearings under the
administrative enforcement provisions,243 and participation of protected
minorities in HUD administered programs. 4
D. Potential Impact
The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 is the most significant
civil rights enactment in a generation, providing the mechanisms to en-
force the fair housing laws effectively. The generous damages and attor-
ney's fees available should attract competent attorneys willing to take
on fair housing cases. The relief provisions, together with the extended
statute of limitations, the liberalized standing rules achieved by ex-
tending the definition of "aggrieved," and the liberal "effects" prima
facie case, make Title VIII the most attractive litigation strategy. All
fair housing cases should now be brought under Title VIII.
The administrative law court program has the potential for ex-
237. Id. § 802(i)(2), 102 Stat. at 1620 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i)(2)).
238. Id. § 802(i)(1), 102 Stat. at 1620 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i)(1)).
239. Id. §§ 812-813, 818, 102 Stat. at 1629-34 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3612-3613, 3618).
240. Id. § 810(f)(4), 102 Stat. at 1627 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3610(f)(4)).
241. Id. § 810(f)(5), 102 Stat. at 1627 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3610(f)(5)).
242. Id. § 815, 102 Stat. at 1635 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3614(a)). HUD has issued
regulations under the new law which, while providing some examples of violations, follow statutory
language closely. 53 Fed. Reg. 44,992 (1988). The rules have since been finalized. 54 Fed. Reg. 3232
(1989).
243. Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 808(e)(2), 102 Stat. at 1624 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §
3608(e)(2)).
244. Id. § 808(e)(6), 102 Stat. at 1624 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(6)).
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tending effective enforcement throughout the Nation; publicity and re-
ported cases should encourage participation by the bar and bring
greater awareness to potential victims as well as deterrence to real es-
tate professionals. Whether parties will elect to have HUD charges
heard in federal court rather than before an administrative law judge
will depend on the performance of the administrative law program.
Counsel may prefer administrative law judges regardless of the more
generous relief available under section 813 if the administrative law
judges display expertise in fair housing law. Aggrieved parties are likely
to seek the most sensitive and compassionate tribunal; thus, a percep-
tion that the local federal court favors either complainants or respon-
dents likely will influence the forum decision. The article III federal
court alternative is likely to be more complex and subject to delay. The
court alternative may, therefore, appeal to the respondent with re-
sources to delay proceedings with prolix motions, discovery, and trial
practices. Other respondents may, however, prefer the administrative
law judge alternative because the shorter proceeding is likely to reduce
significantly the cost of defense. Even if the complaint never reaches
litigation, the new administrative enforcement provisions will enhance
the utility of conciliation because respondents will face costly litigation
and sanctions if they do not cooperate.
Despite the new mechanisms, whose effectiveness will depend
greatly upon the support of HUD and the Justice Department, and in
reality upon leadership from the Bush Administration, the most desira-
ble enforcement strategy will continue to be private litigation, now
under section 813 of Title VIII. Only through section 813 can courts
award punitive damages and fashion creative affirmative action decrees.
A fundamental problem in resource allocation may be posed by the
extension of Title VIII to prohibit discrimination against the disabled
and families with children. While child discrimination frequently
presents a racial impact, expanding the mission of fair housing enforce-
ment to such family discrimination may dilute the primary, racial
equality mission. Child discrimination carries no moral stigma, and
landlords frequently advertise "adults only" occupancy standards
openly. This form of discrimination is easy to identify and requires no
testing because the victim is informed directly of the reason for exclu-
sion. The overt nature of these violations may lead authorities to allo-
cate scarce enforcement resources to such cases rather than the harder
to uncover, sophisticated forms of racial and ethnic discrimination. If
additional enforcement resources are not allocated to compensate for
the diversion of resources from race cases, the primary mission of fair
housing laws might be thwarted. The same diversion of resources con-
cern applies to discrimination against the disabled. Despite the obvious
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justice in prohibiting these forms of discrimination, this diversion from
the effort to dismantle the institution of race discrimination and segre-
gation will further delay the fundamental purpose and promise of the
Fair Housing Act.
VII. STATE AND LOCAL ENFORCEMENT
The quality and effectiveness of state and local fair housing en-
forcement is widely mixed. Although some states and cities have agen-
cies committed to ending housing discrimination, most states have had
little experience investigating, processing, and resolving fair housing
disputes, and some cities are not even aware that their city council once
passed fair housing legislation. Nonetheless, state and local fair housing
enforcement is the laboratory for experiments in enforcement strategy,
and both early and sustained successes in this laboratory may show the
direction of future effective fair housing enforcement.24
Perhaps the most significant local initiatives are state and local
laws requiring housing providers to make regular reports of minority
participation in their projects, real estate office services, and applicant
pools. 46 Reporting not only deters some discrimination and encourages
landlords, brokers, and subdivision home sellers to include minorities,
but the reports may also be used to target potential discriminators for
testing. Reporting can have the greatest impact when it is used to iden-
tify large operators and demonstrate extraordinary underrepresentation
of minorities in relation to the community population and the applicant
pool.
The typical minority applicant or tester is convinced that he was
not treated discourteously or disparately from white applicants. The
shock comes when one compares the report submitted by the white tes-
ter.24 More units are available, an application is solicited, and the dis-
crimination is uncovered. Because of the prevalence of housing
shortages, most applicants told of long waiting lists or units already
leased do not suspect discrimination. HUD's own study has demon-
strated that the pervasive scheme of discrimination can be identified
only through testing because the victim is seldom made aware of the
245. Goering, Minority Housing Needs and Civil Rights Enforcement, in RAcE, ETHNICITY,
supra note 28, at 205-09 (growth in state and local enforcement efforts).
246. Montgomery County v. Fields Road Corp., 282 Md. 575, 386 A.2d 344 (1978) (finding
requirement that landlords with 25 or more units make quarterly reports on minority tenants and
applications was an appropriate exercise of the general welfare power, as the provision provides an
alert to potential problems and encourages landlords to be sensitive to their responsibilities); New
Jersey Builders, Owners & Managers Ass'n v. Blair, 60 N.J. 330, 288 A.2d 855 (1972) (sustaining
state multiple dwelling reporting rule); Kentucky Rental Discrimination Drops to 10.5 Percent,
supra note 18 (statewide, stressing impact of landlord reporting and enforcement).
247. REGIONAL FAIR HOUSING CONSORTIUM, supra note 17, at 12-14.
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disparate treatment received.248 Thus, without comprehensive testing,
Title VIII is relegated to a symbolic, minor role in the quest for fair
housing. The Fair Housing Initiatives Program (FHIP) contained in the
recently passed 1987 Housing Act could make a small start in the right
direction, but proposed regulations would limit utilization to cases in
which a victim comes forward and demands successive testing.249 State
and local agencies with access to reporting information are not so lim-
ited and can maximize resources by targeting possible discrimination.
Testing only in response to complaints will identify simply the coinci-
dental or outrageous case; those state and local agencies that are en-
joying the greatest success regularly utilize noncomplaint based testing
in their administration.
Too many jurisdictions-reflecting an earlier era when housing bias
was acceptable to the majority-have limited the reach of, or remedies
under, fair housing laws.150 The states and jurisdictions enjoying en-
forcement success have various investigatory and remedial tools availa-
ble. Most significant, and most effective, is the availability of
substantial damages for the victim. The small rewards typically
awarded by most states and local agencies are an insult to the victim
and a joke to the real estate industry. 51 California agency awards have
248. HUD AUDIT, supra note 7.
249. Housing and Community Development Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-242, § 561, 101
Stat. 1815, 1942 (1988) (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). See supra
note 133; see also HOME v. Sibcy Cline, Inc., Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) T 19,912 (S.D.
Ohio 1988) (consent decree) (affirmative action relief settlement in steering case, including two
annual funded random tests by the fair housing organization); HUD, Realtors Agree on Guidelines
for Federal Funding of Private Testers, 13 [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA)
1061 (1986) (requiring "paired" tests); Witnesses Say Guidelines Would "Gut" Title VIII En-
forcement, supra note 139 (testimony on the early unsuccessful bill, S. 6478, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986)).
250. See Indiana Civil Rights Comm'n v. Holman, 177 Ind. App. 648, 380 N.E.2d 1281 (1978)
(damages limited to pecuniary loss); Italiano v. State Div. of Human Rights, 36 A.D.2d 1009, 321
N.Y.S.2d 422 (1971) (out-of-pocket loss), af'd, 30 N.Y.2d 796, 286 N.E.2d 274, 334 N.Y.S.2d 898
(1972); Commonwealth Human Relations Comm'n v. Feeser, 29 Pa. Commw. 437, 371 A.2d 549
(1977) (no awards for humiliation); Straw v. Commonwealth Human Relations Comm'n, 10 Pa.
Commw. 99, 308 A.2d 619 (1973) (no mental anguish awards), affd, 478 Pa. 567, 387 A.2d 467
(1978); Rody v. Hollis, 81 Wash. 2d 88, 500 P.2d 97 (1972) ($1000 cap on agency awards); State
Human Rights Comm'n v. Pearlman Realty Agency, 161 W. Va. 1, 239 S.E.2d 145 (1977) (inciden-
tal damages for mental distress); see also CAL. CIv. CODE § 52 (Deering 1988) ($250 punitive dam-
ages cap); CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 12,900, 12,955, 12,987 (Deering 1988) ($1000 punitive damages cap);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 5 (West 1988) ($2000 cap); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.071(2) (West
Supp. 1988) (damages from $25 to $500); Oklahoma Governor Signs State Fair Housing Law, 13
[Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 267 (1985) (allowing punitive damages of $1000
for the first offense, $2000 for the second violation, and $5000 for each subsequent violation).
251. In fiscal 1987, HUD received 4699 fair housing complaints and referred 2770 to certified
state and local agencies. These referrals resulted in awards of $375,100, or $135.41 per complaint.
HUD conciliation resulted in awards of $411,500, or an average of $213.32, demonstrating adminis-
trative proceedings to be the least effective enforcement technique. Residential Segregation Sti-
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reached one hundred thousand dollars252 and Michigan has reached
three hundred thousand dollars;2 53 the impact of such awards is a mes-
sage to violators that enforcement can wipe out profits, and a message
to their lawyers that the settlement price is likely to be a high figure.
Because in most jurisdictions there are no fair housing plaintiff's
attorneys, effective fair housing enforcement has depended on aggres-
sive state and local agency enforcement. The strengthened HUD pro-
ceedings under the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 should
provide a viable remedy and leadership for the modest state enforce-
ment presence. National leadership could have its greatest impact by
defining section 810 "substantial equivalency" as the elimination of
damage caps in state and local fair housing laws.
In the struggle to identify resources to take on the mammoth task
of curtailing housing discrimination, the untapped resource is state and
local government. Fair housing activists have been too comfortable with
their levels of funding and have failed to lobby effectively for enhanced
public enforcement. Indeed, one potentially justified fear is that en-
hanced public sector enforcement may result in reduced funding for
private sector enforcement. Nevertheless, public enforcement, including
criminal prosecution of fair housing violators, might have a significant
deterrent impact, provide excellent fair housing publicity, and educate
the community about the presence and nature of housing discrimina-
tion. Such prosecutions, by casting discriminators in their true light-as
criminals-may generate larger and more effective damage awards in
civil cases.
The federal role in local enforcement has been virtually nonexis-
tent.254 Instead of providing leadership, training, and direction, HUD's
role has been simply to administer a modest grant program to assist
enforcing agencies and nominally to administer the equivalency certifi-
cation process. In the administration of the community development
block grant program, HUD has required recipients simply to do some-
thing, such as fund local nonprofit fair housing councils or other groups
interested in fair housing. HUD, if it desires to be serious about fair
housing enforcement, could issue community development block grant
regulations describing an acceptable fair housing enforcement pro-
fling Black Advancement, Professor Testifies, 15 [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep.
(BNA) 695 (1988).
252. Department of Fair Employment v. Davis Realty Co., [1986-1987] Cal. Fair Employ-
ment & Hous. Comm'n Precedential Dec. (CEB) 5 (Jan. 23, 1987) ($97,158) (house rental).
253. Michigan Comm'n on Civil Rights v. Martin, 24 TRENDs, Dec. 1982, at 2 ($300,000)
(eviction for entertaining minority guest).
254. Kushner, supra note 131.
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gram.255 Such a program could provide for the following: (1) local re-
porting of racial and national origin data for occupants and applicants
by landlords, developers who market subdivisions and condominiums,
and real estate brokers; (2) a comprehensive program for testing those
housing providers with significant minority underrepresentation; and
(3) the funding of government litigation programs or private, nonprofit
fair housing organizations with the capacity and commitment to pro-
vide representation for complainants in fair housing litigation.2 56 Al-
though public relations and education is clearly needed, HUD's low
enforcement profile projects a largely ceremonial image. HUD is best
known for fair housing "road shows 2 57 and April "fair housing month"
poster contests. The Reagan Administration, despite benign intentions,
conveyed the message that federal fair housing enforcement did not ex-
ist; national leadership failed to condemn discrimination and
segregation.
Despite all the focus on federal, state, and local fair housing en-
forcement, virtually all fair housing enforcement has relied upon infor-
mation and evidence gathered by dedicated local fair housing councils
and other volunteer nonprofit organizations and referred to lawyers and
agencies. Most of the private fair housing litigation and most of the
best publicly enforced fair housing proceedings arose from the referrals,
testing, counseling, and publicity carried on by the fair housing
councils.
Despite the leadership and central role played by the nonprofit
councils during the first generation of fair housing, these councils face a
dilemma for the second generation. Typically the only enforcement op-
tion available to these groups is referral to an overworked and often
ineffective public agency. The nonprofit councils are thus left without
255. The block grant program must be administered affirmatively in conformity with the
policies of Title VIII. 24 C.F.R. § 570.307(k)(2), superseded by, 53 Fed. Reg. 34,416, 34,450, 44,468
(1988) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. §§ 530.303(d), 570.904); see also The Housing and Community
Development Amendments of 1981, § 302(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 5306 (1982); Community Development
Briefs, 16 [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 68 (1988) (fair housing enforcement
activities eligible as public service or program administrative cost, but subject to the funding caps
of 15% and 20% respectively, thus competing with other program obligations and needs); HUD
May Seek Legislation to Make Fair Housing a Separate CDBG-Eligible Activity, 16 [Current
Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 569 (1988).
256. This should be based on the Leadership Council For Metropolitan Open Communities
program in Chicago, one of the Nation's best fair housing programs.
257. Spiegel, A HUD Roadshow Raises Questions of Conflict, L.A. Times, Dec. 27, 1987, pt.
II, at 1, col. 1 (reporting three-year, $1 million promotional roadshow for fair housing by Secretary
Samuel R. Pierce, with funds partially raised through pressure and near extortion on HUD-as-
sisted contractors, developers, and housing managers); see also Spiegel, Inspector Criticizes HUD
for Solicitation, L.A. Times, July 26, 1988, pt. II, at 1, col. 1 (criticism of soliciting private dona-
tions; conflict of interest inquiry pending).
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essential backup support. Those councils that have had the greatest im-
pact have enjoyed being located in communities where one or more law-
yers have dedicated themselves to litigating fair housing cases on a
virtually full-time basis. Such communities are few and far between. Al-
though Congress in the 1987 Housing and Community Development
Act finally authorized some funding for private fair housing enforce-
ment, no means of enforcement are available. Even if funds are ap-
propriated for the newly passed FHIP program, the program will only
support a small amount of testing and may fund only activities previ-
ously performed on a volunteer basis or previously funded from other
sources in localities already engaged in enforcement. These groups
should, however, be funded so that they can have greater outreach and
perform more comprehensive testing. A further dilemma is that many
of the groups are partially funded through the community development
block grant program. This funding poses for the groups a conflict of
interest that discourages them from fighting the most important fight:
Urging or suing local government, their funding source, to make availa-
ble greater resources and to establish more effective laws and machin-
ery to pursue fair housing.
It of course remains to be seen whether the structure of the Fair
Housing Amendments Act of 1988, with its strengthened conciliation
mechanism and enforcement power, including the administrative law
judge proceeding, will fill the need for effective enforcement. The mis-
sion of the nonprofit councils should be advanced by this addition to
their referral resources. Nevertheless, the most effective remedies will
continue to be large damage awards and affirmative action remedial de-
crees that reach a broad class of victims. Both remedies remain a func-
tion of section 813 private litigation, which requires private nonprofit
councils to engage attorneys or refer to fair housing lawyers. Yet an-
other dilemma is presented by the need to refer section 813 litigation to
others, for often only the nonprofit fair housing groups have the com-
mitment to demand integrative affirmative action solutions to dis-
putes-a demand that may conflict with private section 813 litigation
strategies. Indeed, many fair housing plaintiff's attorneys are hostile to
affirmative action and the prospect of integration, recognizing that both
may be inconsistent with short-term nondiscrimination and with maxi-
mizing client relief and attorney's fees. Many idealistic attorneys simply
feel that widespread hostility toward affirmative action and desegrega-
258. Housing and Community Development Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-242, § 561, 101
Stat. 1815, 1942 (1988) (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.) (Fair
Housing Initiative Program (FHIP)); see also supra note 246.
259. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5321 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), amended by Housing and Community
Development Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-242, 101 Stat. 1815 (1988).
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tion could result in a backlash that would weaken fair housing antidis-
crimination law and policy.
Those communities, and concomitantly those fair housing councils
and groups with effective programs, share the common characteristic of
available, experienced fair housing attorneys to prosecute claims. Repli-
cation of such success would require either a national fair housing liti-
gation program, an unlikely occurrence in light of the demise of the
National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing, or the restruc-
turing of local, regional, or statewide fair housing resources to create a
litigation capability. NCDH was primarily funded by foundations, and
when funds ran out efforts at fund raising proved fruitless. Despite the
excellent lobbying, backup, and litigation efforts of NCDH, it never
even attempted to provide counsel in individual cases other than to
take part in major litigation that presented novel or fundamental fair
housing issues. State fair housing coalitions must concentrate on pool-
ing federal fair housing and block grant funds with local individual, cor-
porate, and foundational contributions to establish a legal program
capable of funding staff counsel to represent claimants in fair housing
litigation.
Most groups are unable to find attorneys to whom referrals can be
made. Staff counsel could supervise a program to train paralegals to
assist fair housing councils in litigating those fair housing cases in
which large damage awards are not at stake-cases brought by testers,
councils, or those against modest defendants in state small claims
courts. The primary mission of nonprofit councils must continue to be
the recruiting and training of attorneys to take fair housing cases, test-
ing to identify discrimination and to support litigation, pressing for in-
tegrative solutions as well as victim compensation in fair housing
disputes, and local lobbying for effective public enforcement and for
support of private enforcement.
Councils could center their strategy on testing of and negotiation
with larger defendants; through such programs, councils could hold out
to defendants settlement agreements providing for attorney's fees and
affirmative action as an alternative to lengthy and costly court proceed-
ings. Chicago's Leadership Council For Metropolitan Open Communi-
ties has established a conciliation negotiation process as a prelitigation
strategy designed to do just that.26 0
260. Alternative Dispute Settlement, 4 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) T 1.3 (1988); see
Leadership Council For Metro. Open Communities v. M.R. Jenkins Real Estate, Fair Hous.-Fair





A number of fundamental questions touching on fair housing policy
remain unresolved and pressing. Questions surrounding the coverage of
fair housing laws need to be addressed. For example, there exists exten-
sive discrimination against currently unprotected groups delineated
along the lines of wealth, marital status, family size, and sexual prefer-
ence. Prior to passage of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988,
these comments applied to discrimination against the disabled and
families with children. A compelling case can be made for extension of
fair housing laws and the mission of fair housing organizations to deal
with these unprotected groups. However, extension carries with it the
conundrum of resource dilution raised earlier. 26' Fair housing also re-
quires a close analysis of those without access to any housing at all. The
national tragedy of homelessness is tied to the policies that are aggra-
vating housing discrimination patterns. Reduction of both discrimina-
tion and homelessness may require the resolution of the shortage
syndrome. Lurking like a dark cloud over the fair housing movement,
however, is the newly constituted Rehnquist Court, as reflected in Mc-
Lean Credit Union v. Patterson.6 2 Through that case the Court could
dismantle the fair housing jurisprudence developed over the past gener-
ation. Last and perhaps of greatest importance is the conundrum of
nondiscrimination and the goal of integration, a goal that may be at-
tainable only through affirmative action programs. The status of affirm-
ative action, the most controversial issue within the fair housing
community, must be addressed.
A. Statutory Coverage
A compelling case has been presented for extending fair housing
protection to a broad group of currently unprotected classifications, just
as the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 has extended coverage to
the disabled and families with children. Such extension, however, will
dilute current fair housing resources and divert the fair housing move-
ment further from its primary and unaccomplished mission-the strug-
gle for racial equality and the dream of an integrated society. It is
essential to investigate whether the broadened constituency of fair
housing will attract additional resources so as to expand current efforts
261. See supra Part VI, subsec. D.
262. 108 S. Ct. 1419 (1988) (No. 87-107) (per curiam) (racial harassment in the workplace
ruled not covered by § 1981) (restoration to docket for oral argument), appealed from 805 F.2d
1143 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 65 (1987) (No. 87-107), argued, 57 U.S.L.W. 3292
(U.S. Oct. 12, 1988); Savage, Split Court Reopens '76 Rights Case, L.A. Times, Apr. 26, 1988, pt. I,
at 1, col. 1 (Justice Kennedy casting deciding vote on Court's own initiative to reconsider Runyon
v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976)).
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rather than dilute the present minimal fair housing effort.
1. Wealth
In housing markets with low vacancy rates, rents become higher
and competition for available housing becomes greater. The housing
that remains affordable to those of lower income may be marketed in a
manner preferring those of higher income, because landlords seek to
identify the applicant most likely to be a good, paying tenant and also
seek to enhance project status and avoid the stigma perceived to be
associated with the poor. Rules requiring minimum income have be-
come more common, and on one occasion such rules were validated by a
federal court.63 The problem with these minimum income tests is two-
fold: First, worthy tenants in need of housing may be foreclosed be-
cause they lack wealth; and second, the income tests may become a
surrogate for excluding those on public assistance, namely racial and
ethnic minorities in urban areas.
Under Title VIII, such disparate impact should shift the burden to
the landlord to demonstrate a business necessity. But in Boyd v. Lefrak
Organization,6 4 the Second Circuit failed to follow the Title VIII dis-
parate effects formula and validated a rule requiring weekly income to
equal ninety percent of monthly rent. This formula operated to exclude
welfare families who, in the New York City market, are composed dis-
proportionately of minority groups. The reasoning and holding of Boyd
has been criticized and undermined by subsequent Second Circuit rul-
26ings, 65 but the minimum income rules are proliferating.
The Second Circuit never felt the need to examine the business
base for the rule. Although no one can contest the proposition that in-
ability to afford the rent is a basis for rejecting an application, on closer
inspection the per se validation of minimum income rules is flawed.
Public assistance tenants are arguably the best tenants, enjoying a
guaranteed income that is not dependent on job stability and local eco-
nomics. Yet, because welfare level families typically must pay in excess
of fifty percent of their income for housing, they often do not meet arti-
ficially constructed affordability formulae. Such formulae, however, are
simply not premised on business necessity. The exclusion of welfare re-
cipients is more likely tied to the landlord's desire not to stigmatize the
project as "welfare housing."
263. Boyd v. Lefrak Org., 509 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 896 (1975).
264. Id.
265. Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934 (2d Cir.), aff'd
per curiam, 109 S. Ct. 276 (1988); United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1101 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 376 (1988); Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir.
1979).
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Many states and local units of government have specifically prohib-
ited rental practices that consider the source of an applicant's income
and have particularly proscribed discrimination against welfare recipi-
ents.2 6 Although courts typically construe Title VIII to prohibit such
bias, 67 the prohibition is not obvious from the statutory language;
therefore, either Congress should amend Title VIII to cover such bias
explicitly or HUD should issue regulations specifying the prohibition.
2. Marital Status
Despite Title VIII's coverage of gender discrimination, ea landlords
and lenders frequently engage in marital status bias, often refusing to
consider support as income or, alternatively, refusing to rent to unmar-
ried couples.269 The latter form of marital status discrimination is
clearly not covered by Title VIIP 70 unless a statistical case can be
mounted to demonstrate that such marital status rules carry a dispro-
portionate racial, ethnic, religious, or gender-based impact. 1 In lend-
266. E.g., Attorney Gen. v. Brown, 400 Mass. 826, 511 N.E.2d 1103 (1987); D.C. CODE ANN. §
1-2515(a) (1987); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 101.22(1) (West 1973 & Supp. 1982); J. KUSHNER, supra note
14, §§ 2.08, 2.16.
267. Huntington, 844 F.2d at 934; Starrett, 840 F.2d at 1101; 12 Lofts Realty, 610 F.2d at
1032; cf. Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding that "no child" rule
has racial impact); Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1982) ("no child" rule impact
analysis).
268. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606 (1982); see also Anderson v. United Fin. Co., 666 F.2d 1274
(9th Cir. 1982) (finding it a violation to require spouse's signature if applicant individually quali-
fies for loan); Murphy v. 253 Garth Tenants Corp., 579 F. Supp. 1150 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (refusal to
transfer cooperative apartment to single woman); Shellhammer v. Lewallen, Eq. Opportunity
Hous. Rep. (P-H) 1 15,472 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (sex harassment), aff'd mem., 770 F.2d 167 (6th Cir.
1985); Braunstein v. Dwelling Managers, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 1323 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); United States v.
Gorman Enters., 6 [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 981 (D. Okla. Feb. 28, 1979)
(consent decree) (refusal to rent to two single women violative); United States v. Reece, 457 F.
Supp. 43 (D. Mont. 1978) (holding that rule allowing rentals only to women with cars violated
conciliation agreement); United States v. Citizens Mortgage Corp., Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep.
(P-H) 19,324 (E.D. Va. 1978) (consent decree) (refusal to lend to divorced woman violative);
United States v. Jefferson Mortgage Co., Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) 19,320 (D.N.J.
1978) (consent decree) (refusal to lend to woman not using birth control violative); United States
v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) 19,319 (D. Utah 1978)
(consent decree) (harsher creditworthiness test for wife's income invalid); Morehead v. Lewis, 432
F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Ill. 1977), aff'd mem., 594 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. George F.
Mueller & Sons, 2 Eq. Opportunity Hous. Rep. (P-H) 15,196 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (consent decree)
(refusal to consider wife's income violative); United States v. Builders' Inst., Fair Hous.-Fair Lend-
ing Rep. (P-H) % 19,323 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (consent decree) (refusal to rent to working mothers,
single parents, or to consider wife's income violative); J. KUSHNER, supra note 14, § 2.05.
269. J. KUSHNER, supra note 14, § 2.14.
270. H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 15, at 23 (Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 not
intended to reach discrimination on the basis of marital status).
271. Cf. Marable v. H. Walker & Assocs., 644 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1981) (marital status pretext
for race discrimination).
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ing, marital status is covered by federal law.272 Although the hidden
gender-based forms of bias are covered by existing law, the law would
benefit from more explicit statutory or regulatory clarification. Bias
against unmarried couples, on the other hand, is more problematic. The
Supreme Court has endorsed moral-based discrimination,273 opening
the door for courts and legislatures to sanction a landlord's shielding
family or tenant sensibilities by finding such restrictions to be rational
even if not dictated by business necessity. Title VIII explicitly pre-
cludes such a morals defense only if the policy carries disproportionate
racial or sexual impact. While numerous state and local laws prohibit
marital status bias,274 no serious effort has been mounted to expand Ti-
tle VIII coverage.
3. Family Size and Composition
Landlords frequently limit occupancy through facially neutral fam-
ily size rules.2 7 5 However, because minority group families frequently
are larger than white families, such rules may meet the Title VIII prima
facie case requirement. Landlords should then be required to demon-
strate that the proposed occupancy would violate health and safety
code requirements. But such local health ordinances themselves may
violate Title VIII unless the standards reflect nationally acceptable
health criteria based on the number of bedrooms or square footage of
the dwelling. It is possible that stringent occupancy standards reflect
local motives to exclude rental housing altogether, rental housing for
large families generally, or the poor or minority groups specifically.
Other variations on the theme are to restrict occupancy according
to the age and sex of children, to require separate bedrooms for chil-
272. See Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1982); see also Markham v.
Colonial Mortgage Serv. Co., 605 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (must aggregate incomes of unmarried
couples); Anderson, 666 F.2d at 1274 (violative to require spouse's signature where applicant indi-
vidually qualifies for loan).
273. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (consensual homosexual sodomy unprotected
on purely moral grounds).
274. J. KUSHNER, supra note 14, § 2.14.
275. E.g., Braunstein v. Dwelling Managers, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 1323 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding
that single parent with child of same sex may be relegated to single bedroom unit while parent
with child of different sex allotted two bedroom unit); Zakaria v. Lincoln Property Co. No. 415,
185 Cal. App. 3d 500, 229 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1986) (invalidating policy of no more than four persons
in three-bedroom unit as applied to federally subsidized tenants); Smith v. Ring Bros. Manage-
ment Corp., 183 Cal. App. 3d 649, 228 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1986) (invalidating rule limiting two-bed-
room occupancy to parents with one child unless second child born postoccupancy, because the
rule favors unborn in violation of city ordinance); Ruling Calls Occupancy Limit Bias Against
Children, L.A. Times, Nov. 27, 1988, pt. I, at 3, col. 1 (final ed.) (State Fair Employment and




dren of different sexes, or to prohibit parent and child room-sharing.
Such standards, often approved by HUD in the subsidized housing pro-
grams, may also be used to deny larger units to families desiring sepa-
rate bedrooms for children. When HUD and the landlord desire to
allocate large bedrooms for larger needy families, the policy is defensi-
ble. The policy of excluding rentals on the basis of obscure moral con-
cerns for children sharing rooms, however, is generally a consideration
better left to the privacy and parental supervision of the family. The
landlord, under Title VIII, should be required to demonstrate business
necessity linked to concerns of overcrowding and excessive facilities us-
age. Housing shortages dictate accommodation of family desires for
room-sharing.
4. Sexual Preference
With the epidemic spread of AIDS, homophobia and sexual prefer-
ence discrimination is widespread. Although some local jurisdictions
and state laws prohibit such bias, 7 the law simply does not afford pro-
tection, and efforts to expand federal civil rights protection have proved
ineffective.278 One ramification of expanding Title VIII coverage to the
disabled under the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 is that Title
VIII now protects those afflicted with the AIDS virus. 79 Paradoxically,
landlords fearing AIDS may express their bias by engaging in sexual
preference discrimination, yet may be estopped if the applicant is in
fact afflicted with the disease. In light of the rampant national
276. Braunstein, 476 F. Supp. at 1328.
277. See Hubert v. Williams, 133 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 184 Cal. Rptr. 161 (App. Dep't.
Super. Ct. 1982) (protecting homosexual orientation under state law); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 33051 (West Supp. 1987) (barring sexual orientation bias under state redevelopment law); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 101.22(1) (West 1988); J. KUSHNER, supra note 14, §§ 2.15, 2.16; see also Fair Hous.-
Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) T 10.8 (1986) (New York City banning sexual orientation bias in owner-
occupied two-unit buildings).
278. S. 1432, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S9493 (daily ed. July 15, 1985) (Civil
Rights Act of 1985 prohibited sexual orientation discrimination in housing, employment, and fed-
eral programs).
279. 134 CONG. REc. H4929 (daily ed. June 29, 1988) (Burton amendment); House Judiciary
Committee Approves Bill with ALJ, Handicapped Provisions, 15 [Current Developments] Hous.
& Dev. Rep. (BNA) 958 (1988) (reviewing unsuccessful Republican efforts to amend pending fair
housing legislation to exclude people with communicable diseases under the proposed handicapped
coverage of the Title VIII amendments); see also J. KUSHNER, supra note 14, § 2.09; Mandelker,
supra note 214, in AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 214; cf. School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987)
(noting that contagious disease may be considered a handicap under § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act); Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (injunction
against exclusion of AIDS children from public school absent proof of threat to school population);
Ray v. School Dist., 666 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1987); District 27 Community School Bd. v.
Board of Educ., 130 Misc. 2d 398, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (holding that automatic exclu-
sion of AIDS victims from school violates § 504); Carey & Arthur, The Developing Law on AIDS
in the Workplace, 46 MD. L. REv. 284 (1987).
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homophobia, however, the best strategy may be to press for informed
legislative protection at the state and local level.
5. Homelessness
Contemporary homelessness is becoming primarily a problem of
families and children."' Government has halted its commitment to de-
cent homes for all.281 HUD affirmatively pursues policies allowing local
government to approve the destruction or conversion of lower income,
subsidized, and single room occupancy housing.282 Although five million
units of affordable housing were available to the four million persons
with annual incomes below five thousand dollars in 1970, by 1983 the
5.5 million individuals in that income group were competing for only 3.5
280. J. KOZOL, RACHEL AND HER CHILDREN 4-5 (1988).
281. The Housing Act of 1949 established the national "goal of a decent home and a suitable
living environment for every American family." 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982); see Moore, Lost in
America: Low Rent Housing, L.A. Times, June 12, 1988, pt. V, at 3, col. 1 (HUD's $35.8 billion
1980 budget reduced to $14.7 billion in 1987).
282. According to a 1988 National Housing Preservation Task Force study, by 1995 as many
as 1.5 million privately owned, government subsidized rental units could vanish from the low-cost
inventory, with one-third deteriorated and two-thirds converted or defaulted. Moore, supra note
281, at 3, col. 1. The 1987 amendments to the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property
Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 100-17, 101 Stat. 246 (1987) (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655), reach displacement by any activities receiving federal assistance, including
the community development block grant program. The legislative modifications create a one-for-
one replacement requirement and relocation compensation must be sufficient to assure that for five
years following displacement the displacee will not have to pay more than 30% of household in-
come for housing costs. Previously, the Act only allowed assistance for direct displacement. Anti-
Displacement Rule Specifies Aid Required of CDBG, UDAG Grantees, 16 [Current Develop-
ments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 238 (1988). It remains to be seen if the new requirements will be
implemented to mitigate the effects of redevelopment and gentrification, particularly where dis-
placement and demolition or rehabilitation is undertaken by private developers receiving approval
from block grant-funded local government. The Department of Transportation has issued draft
regulations implementing the 1987 law which would apply to HUD. 53 Fed. Reg. 27,598 (1988) (to
be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 24) (proposed July 21, 1988). The Housing and Community Develop-
ments Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-242, § 509, 101 Stat. 1815, 1927 (1988) (to be codified in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.), seeks to conserve low income housing by prohibiting
displacement through the requirement of locally prepared antidisplacement and relocation assis-
tance plans. Section 507 requires the block grant Housing Assistance Plan to provide for the mini-
mization of displacement and the preservation of housing for low and moderate income persons,
including single room occupancy housing, as well as the expansion of the supply of affordable
housing. Id. § 507, 101 Stat. at 1926.
HUD's community development block grant regulations provide coverage for direct acquisi-
tion under block grant projects. The regulations also require a strategy that minimizes displace-
ment and mitigates its adverse effects for those affected by private HUD-assisted rehabilitation
activities or indirect displacement. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 570.606, 570.305 (1988). The Housing and
Community Developments Act of 1987 requires payment of relocation expenses and satisfactory
relocation in the demolition and disposition of HUD projects. Pub. L. No. 100-242, § 121(b)(3)(F),
(G), 101 Stat. 1815, 1838 (1988), seeks to halt the sale and conversion of subsidized housing, id. §§
201-203, 101 Stat. at 1877, provides for a program of public housing home ownership, prohibits
eviction, and provides for assistance to nonparticipating families, id. § 123, 101 Stat. at 1842, 1846.
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million affordable units."'3 At the same time, rather than offering access
to housing and protection for children, welfare policy too often encour-
ages homelessness and even child abandonment. 8 4 Homelessness, a
symptom of the vanishing promise of low income housing, also presents
the specter of an underclass; there exists a growing poverty class living
in shelters and shanty towns, segregating America along class and racial
lines in a manner never previously envisioned. Low income housing and
welfare reform advocates need to align with fair housing activists to co-
ordinate strategy and combine constituencies in order to resolve this
catastrophic problem. Although few specific platforms emerged in the
1988 Presidential race, Governor Dukakis supported an increase in sub-
sidies to pre-Reagan levels, while President Bush's campaign position
held generally to the status quo.285 Expansion of the low income hous-
ing supply may indeed be the most fundamental policy initiative re-
quired to advance the struggle for reduced housing discrimination.
283. Lack of Low-Income Housing Is Main Cause of Homelessness, Panel Says, 15 [Current
Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 877 (1988) (statements of Cushing Dolbeare); see also
W. APGAR & J. BROWN, THE STATE OF THE NATION's HOUSING: 1988 (1988) (loss of affordable hous-
ing and rising costs causing increasing shortages), summarized in American Housing Problems
Growing in Scope, Says Harvard Study, 15 [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA)
836 (1988); Getlin, Shortage of Low-Income Apartments Seen With Conversions to Condos, L.A.
Times, July 3, 1988, pt. I, at 24, col. 1 (final ed.) (predicting that up to 1.5 million federally subsi-
dized units, more than half of the 2.9 million in operation, could be lost within 10 years); Moore,
supra note 281, at 3, col. 1 (reporting that for more than a decade median renter income has
declined, while rents increased 25% in West between 1981 and 1986; from 1974 to 1983 more than
two million units renting at less than $250 per month were abandoned or converted into more
expensive housing).
284. J. KoZOL, supra note 280, at 47-50.
285. See Bush, Dukakis Discuss Housing Issues in Debate, 16 [Current Developments]
Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 421 (1988) (Bush calling for more vouchers, Dukakis favoring affordable
housing production; both supporting home ownership; Bush supporting aid for the homeless and
use of certain Army bases for shelters); Bush, Dukakis Plot Different Courses for Housing, Ac-
cording to Representatives, 15 [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 876 (1988);
Democratic Platform Calls for Decent Housing for All Americans, 16 [Current Developments]
Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 196 (1988) (urging end to homelessness); Dukakis Housing Agenda
Includes Detailed Approach; Bush Focuses on Overall Economy, 16 [Current Developments]
Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 155, 156 (1988) (Democratic housing budget between $16.5 and $24.5
billion, Bush proposals between $3 and $5 billion); Dukakis Unveils Program to Promote First-
Time Homeownership Opportunities, 16 [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 469
(1988); Low-Cost Housing a Concern for Bush Administration, Aide Says, 16 [Current Develop-
ments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 643 (1988) (still no specifics from President-elect). But cf. My-
ers, Housing Looms as a Key Subject at Conventions, L.A. Times, July 17, 1988, pt. VIII, at 1, col.
4 (amorphous Dukakis call for funding of local rather than federally controlled projects reflecting
higher levels of funding than previously existed, yet with emphasis on first-time single family home
buyers rather than the poor; Bush position to be announced).
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B. The Cloud and the Symbol of McLean
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,2 8 6 a seemingly routine employ-
ment discrimination case brought under section 1981,287 inquired
whether racial harassment in the workplace was covered by that stat-
ute. When the appeal reached the United States Supreme Court, to the
surprise of the litigants, the Court on its own initiative converted the
case into a vehicle to reconsider whether the 1866 Civil Rights Act, de-
spite landmark interpretations in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.28 8 and
Runyon v. McCrary, s9 reaches private discrimination.29 ° Jones, decided
prior to passage of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, made
section 1982291 the cornerstone of fair housing litigation and allowed
unlimited damages and fee awards against all discriminators. 92 Runyon
prohibited discrimination by private schools in a ruling on the right to
contract.23 The rulings have also extended into the employment
area.291 Only the new, ultraconservative composition of the Court can
explain the Court's motivation to act in this unprecedented way. Partic-
ularly in light of McLean, the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988
represents a significant achievement. Title VIII now, for the first time,
provides a litigation vehicle superior to section 1982,295 as it now pro-
vides generous damages and fees as well as more liberal standing, cover-
age, and burden of proof standards.
The Court's majority has possibly launched the first volley in a
skirmish that could escalate into a reversal of the civil rights advances
of the last generation. The direction of the Supreme Court is a function
of its perception of, and commitment to, its mandate from a conserva-
tive society. The Nation and its highest judicial tribunal, having been
denied national civil rights leadership since the administration of Presi-
dent Johnson, have wandered from the ideals of the civil rights move-
ment. The history of the Court discloses that its rulings give license to
286. 805 F.2d 1143 (4th Cir. 1986) (racial harassment in the workplace ruled not covered by §
1981), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 65 (1987) (No. 87-107); Reidinger, supra note 92.
287. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
288. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
289. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
290. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 108 S. Ct. 1419 (1988) (per curiam) (restoration to
docket for oral argument), argued, 57 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1988); Savage, supra note 262,
at 1, col. 1 (Kennedy casting deciding vote).
291. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982).
292. J. KUSHNER, supra note 14, §§ 1.02, 9.02, 9.14.
293. 427 U.S. at 160.
294. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 285-96 (1976); Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975); see also Eisenberg & Schwab, The Impor-
tance of Section 1981, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 596 (1988).
295. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982).
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practices not invalidated, as has happened in the case of segregation." 6
Perhaps the Court will withdraw its invitation to disaster in Mc-
Lean if it recognizes that McLean is potentially the Dred Scott297 deci-
sion of the twentieth century-a decision capable of launching a new
civil rights movement and even a civil war. Alternatively, the Court
may, in a rush of revisionism, rule that Congress in fact did not intend
to reach private behavior. Such a ruling would validate, endorse, and
encourage private market discrimination in housing, schools, and em-
ployment, while leaving it to Congress to revise the ruling through an
extension of current civil rights legislation. Or the Court could take a
safe course and rule that subsequent congressional acquiescence in the
Jones and Runyon rulings indicated agreement with the Court's statu-
tory interpretation.28 The worst case scenario would find the Court rul-
ing not only that Congress never intended the results in Jones and
Runyon, but that the Congress lacks the power to reach private behav-
ior. Such a decision could set in motion a series of rulings that would
dramatically curtail congressional power, even to the extent of effec-
tively repealing the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Title VIII as impermissi-
ble limitations on discrimination by private landlords, employers, and
private owners of public accommodations. s0  Apartheid in America
296. J. KUSHNER, supra note 5, at 68 n.153. The Author's book noted that the Plessy v. Fer-
guson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), law segregating Louisiana railroad cars was not passed until after Lou-
isville, New Orleans & Texas Railway Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587 (1890), which upheld the
conviction of a railroad for not complying with a local segregation law, a decision which did not
address the rights of passengers, and Hall v. DuCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878), a case ruling that the
commerce clause prevented state prohibition of segregation on interstate railroads. J. KUSHNER,
supra note 5, at 68 n.153.
297. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). Dred Scott ruled that blacks had no
constitutional rights and invalidated a federal law prohibiting slavery in the Northwest territories,
enacted to provide freedom to a slave transported to free soil, as a violation of property rights. The
ruling led to the confrontation that culminated in the Civil War.
298. See Savage, Court May Let Key Rights Rulings Stand, L.A. Times, Oct. 13, 1988, pt. I,
at 14, col. 1 (comments of Justice Scalia); see also Savage, Clue to Court's Direction Seen in
Rights Case, L.A. Times, Dec. 25, 1988, pt. I, at 1, col. 3 (no hint to outcome, but case would
indicate a new conservative revisionist era). The limited scholarship generated by the Court's call
for reargument has centered on whether the Court will follow stare decisis. Symposium: Patterson
v. McLean, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1988).
299. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding that the fourteenth amendment
limits congressional power to legislate against civil rights violations to actions of the state); see also
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (holding that the thirteenth amendment is
limited to peonage and slavery).
300. E.g., Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719 (1983) (42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (1982) (interference
with federal court litigant); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (Title VIII of the
1968 Fair Housing Act reaching private discrimination); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971)
(42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1982) (conspiracy to interfere with civil rights); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971) (Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act reaching private employment practices);
Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969) (extension of public accommodations provision of the 1964
Civil Rights Act to private recreation facility); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (while a
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would then no longer be simply a fact, but a legal reality.301 Loss of
prestige or even recognition in the free world would likely follow. That
is the choice and the crisis invited by the Court.
C. Affirmative Action
The most troubling paradox for fair housing is the identification of
the movement's goals. Generally, all involved believe that people should
not be denied a dwelling because of the color of their skin. However,
many set as their goal an integrated society with diverse schools and
neighborhoods-a society in which racially concentrated neighborhoods
are not ghettos but communities like those of other ethnic minorities
where inhabitants live by choice and a desire for the cultural attractions
of community.302 Unfortunately, these goals are incompatible in the
short run. In reality, policies carry either an integrative or segregative
effect, and current policy is decidedly segregative 30 Only through af-
firmative action can integrated projects, neighborhoods, and communi-
ties be established and maintained. Bizarre as it may seem, only
through discrimination can we get past discrimination. Affirmative ac-
tion, however, has become a symbol. Whites and blacks favoring segre-
gation as an end in itself have joined with minorities seeking
segregation as means to other ends, such as less resistance to new hous-
ing, political power through district concentration and economic devel-
opment through concentrated minority markets, to demand the
dismantlement of integration and techniques to achieve it.
The Supreme Court has attempted a political middle ground, an
impossible course, by endorsing both integration0 4 and nondiscrimina-
voting rights case, the reasoning extends the reach of congressional power to arguable discrimina-
tory nexus); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 756 (1966) (42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (conspiracy to
interfere with travel rights and access to public facilities); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (public accommodations applied to private motel); Katzenbach v. Mc-
Clung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (restaurant).
301. The Court would itself be engaged in the advocacy and authorization of racism and
discrimination condemned in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (rejecting state constitu-
tional amendment measure which sought to repeal fair housing legislation and permanently disable
legislative power to engage in such enactments).
302. Title VIII was designed to replace ghettos with "truly integrated and balanced living
patterns." 114 CoNG. REc. 3422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale), quoted in Trafficante v. Met-
ropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972); accord Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of
Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 936 (2d Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 109 S. Ct. 276 (1988); United States v.
Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1106-07 (2d Cir.) (Newman, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 376 (1988); Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1134 (2d Cir. 1973); Goe-
ring, Preface, to HOUSING DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY, supra note 15, at ix (stating that
Mondale's promise has proved to be an "unfulfilled prediction").
303. Kushner, supra note 31.
304. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (voluntary affirmative action
employment plan to integrate traditionally segregated job classifications); Brown v. Board of
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tion.305 It considers affirmative action quotas to be acceptable only as a
remedy for past discrimination,306 temporary relief to achieve the racial
composition one would expect absent past bias,07 or preferences in pur-
suit of a compelling state interest.308 An integrated community may not
be such a compelling interest in the Court's eye.309
Effective fair housing enforcement also requires realistic affirmative
marketing plans and programs for existing and proposed housing
projects. These programs should include the following: Mandatory min-
imum quota obligations for showing units to members of racial groups
not likely to apply; preferential rents, financing, or other incentives
such as tax incentives to attract persons to integrated neighborhoods or
neighborhoods where they are in the racial minority; incentives for real
estate professionals who facilitate choice and integration; and advertis-
ing tours of project areas conducted through outreach agencies or real
estate professionals. 10 Affirmative action techniques should be used to
assure that integration opportunities exist in section 8 and rental
voucher programs. Current rent supplement programs intensify segre-
gation because virtually all rent supplement recipients locate housing in
neighborhoods where they are in the racial majority.311 Congress has
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (school desegregation).
305. See Starrett City, 109 S. Ct. at 376; Firefighters Local No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561
(1984) (court not to amend seniority pacts by modification of consent decree silent on seniority
and preferential layoff policy); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (invalida-
tion of floor racial quotas in higher education admissions).
306. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448 (1980); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265. But cf. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 616 (apparently eliminating
finding of past discrimination as prerequisite for voluntary affirmative action, allowing instead a
mere finding of significant minority underrepresentation in the workplace to suffice).
307. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 616; United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
308. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265.
309. But cf. Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95 n.9 (1977) (ban on
for sale signs invalid as applied, with potential validation if necessary to maintain integration and
avoid panic sales).
310. See generally South Suburban Hous. Center v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors,
Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) % 15,602 (N.D. III. Dec. 19, 1988) (approving affirmative action
"special outreach efforts to promote integration"); Ohio Op. Att'y Gen. No. 87-095, Fair Hous.-Fair
Lending Rep. (P-H) T 23,003 (Dec. 14, 1987) (housing finance agency may make single family mort-
gages available for integrative moves); see also J. KUSHNER, supra note 5; G. ORFIELD, URBAN INTE-
GRATION, supra note 21 (suggesting affirmative housing action, including local government as
developer, subsidized integrative moves, increased fair housing enforcement, and metropolitan
school desegregation); Daye, The Race, Class and Housing Conundrum: A Rationale and Proposal
For a Legislative Policy of Suburban Inclusion, 9 N.C. CENT. L.J. 37 (1977); Kushner, supra note
31, at 252-54; Comment, supra note 36, at 928-30; Note, Tipping the Scales of Justice: A Race-
Conscious Remedy for Neighborhood Transition, 90 YALE L.J. 377 (1980).
311. E.g., D. FAILK & H. FRANKLIN, supra note 55, at 22-30; Bullard, supra note 55 (stating
that an ethnic and economic mix does not exist in Houston); Kushner & Keating, supra note 55;
McGee, supra note 55, at 44; Comment, supra note 55; Study Recommends Curbs on In-Place
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also recognized the importance of affirmative action in the quest for fair
housing; in the passage of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988
the House rejected an amendment designed to prohibit affirmative
action. 12
Many in the fair housing community simply ignore the inconsis-
tency of goals; yet to do so may result in use of fair housing as a segre-
gationist tactic. Fair housing may require supporting the opponents of
fair housing. The only middle course in pursuit of the integrated society
is to endorse affirmative action integration programs that include gov-
ernment-provided subsidies and alternative comparable housing to
those minorities or majorities discriminatorily denied housing.
In the first judicial contact with affirmative action in the housing
context, the Second Circuit ruled in Otero v. New York City Housing
Authoritys13 that a public housing agency could, in the name of inte-
grated housing and under HUD's affirmative obligation to further fair
housing, deny priority to minority residents of the complex previously
on the site. The agency instead gave preference in the new complex to
white members of an historic neighborhood synagogue because of their
safety concerns in having to walk to weekly Sabbath observance, and
because such a preference would result in an integrated pattern of occu-
pancy within the project and neighborhood. Otero stood for over a dec-
ade as a resounding vote for integration maintenance under Title VIII.
Starrett City is the Emerald City of America.3 14 Within a segre-
gated metropolis, this community stands as an ideal, completely inte-
grated neighborhood housing nearly seventeen thousand people.3 15 The
community's buildings, schools, and neighborhood facilities are all inte-
grated. But integration is a fragile, isolated, and temporary condition in
America, and the desirability of units in Starrett City to the many mi-
norities in search of decent housing presents a threat to racial balance
within the community. The waiting list is long and predominantly mi-
nority. Awarding units on a first come-first served basis would surely
tip Starrett City to a predominantly minority, and ultimately an all mi-
nority, project mirroring the surrounding neighborhoods. Starrett City,
however, adhered to the American dream of diversity by implementing
Section 8 Leasing, 5 [Current Developments] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 1002 (1978) (no integra-
tion under Cleveland program).
312. 134 CONG. REC. H4902-08 (daily ed. June 29, 1988) (rejecting the Hyde amendment).
313. 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973).
314. J. KUSHNER, supra note 5, at 1 (referring to Justice Rehnquist's cynical comment in the
Cleveland school case that "no equitable decree can fashion the Emerald City where all races,
ethnic groups, and persons of various income levels live side by side in a large metropolitan area");
see also 134 CONG. REC. H4907 (daily ed. June 29, 1988) (positive description of Starrett City by
Congressman Schumer who represents the district).
315. Starrett City, 840 F.2d at 1103 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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an integration maintenance program limiting minority participation. 18
Starrett City, however, represented the evil empire that the Civil
Rights Division of the Justice Department under Edwin Meese attacked
using the Department's fair housing resources. The tragedy of Starrett
City is that it represented the Reagan Administration's commitment to
civil rights: The targeting of civil rights enforcement resources to
thwart and dismantle racial integration.
The Second Circuit, in United States v. Starrett City Associ-
ates,11 accepted the Justice Department's argument that permanent
minority ceiling quotas violated Title VIII. The Second Circuit distin-
guished Otero and stressed that Starrett City had employed more than
start-up or temporary affirmative action policies.3 1  The ruling is
strange, in that it does endorse the use of racial discrimination for good
faith, albeit temporary, affirmative action. The Second Circuit summa-
rily dismissed the significance of a controversial issue: At what point
would the project reach a "tipping point" in minority participa-
tion-the point at which whites' exodus or failure to apply transforms
the project into a predominantly minority populated city.319 The ques-
tion is an important one. The majority's dismissal of the question,
which resulted from a dispute between experts over the definition of
the precise Starrett City tipping point, 20 is troublesome but not critical
in a case in which the natural effect of the disparately composed minor-
ity admissions waiting list 21 will continually and swiftly replace white
residents with minorities. Curiously, the court simultaneously endorsed
a lower court ruling that approved integration quotas where necessary
to achieve or maintain integration.322 The Second Circuit, apparently
feeling constrained by the recent Supreme Court ruling in Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, 2 3 failed to face the segregative effect of its rul-
316. Minorities were limited to 35% of the apartments. This resulted in a 45% minority
population because of the tendency for minority units to be taken by families, particularly large
families. Id. at 1104 (Newman, J., dissenting).
317. 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988) (invalidating the quota and emphasizing concern for a
ceiling quota on minority admissions, but appearing to premise the ruling on the nontemporary
nature of the program); see also United States v. Atrium Village Assocs., No. 87c-6527 (N.D. Ill.
filed July, 1987) (challenging racial quotas in admission to rental housing).
318. Starrett City, 840 F.2d at 1102-03.
319. Goering, Neighborhood Tipping and Racial Transition: A Review of Social Science Ev-
idence, 44 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 68 (1968); Rubinowitz & Trosman, Affirmative Action and the
American Dream: Implementing Fair Housing Policies in Federal Homeotinership Programs, 74
Nw. U.L. REV. 491, 533-36 (1979); Wolf, The Tipping-Point in Racially Changing Neighborhoods,
29 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 217 (1963).
320. Starrett City, 840 F.2d at 1099.
321. Id. (minorities almost 72% of 1985 priority waiting list).
322. Id. at 1100, 1102 (endorsing Burney v. Housing Auth., 551 F. Supp. 746 (W.D. Pa.
1982)).
323. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
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ing and the obvious need for integration maintenance policies if inte-
gration is to survive. Only Judge Newman in his dissent recognized the
stark symbol of the majority's segregationist ruling.
24
Johnson is among the most recent in a line of Supreme Court af-
firmative action decisions. 25 The case arose when a white, passed over
in the promotion process by the county transportation agency, chal-
lenged the promotion of a woman pursuant to a voluntary hiring and
promotion plan. The High Court rejected the Title VII32 6 attack,
stressing the traditional gender-based job segregation of highway agen-
cies, 27 the extraordinary underrepresentation of women in the agency's
work force, 3 2 and the temporary nature of the voluntary affirmative ac-
tion program, which was designed to last only until women were appro-
priately represented on the agency work force.32"
The Second Circuit in Starrett City3 30 stressed that controls must
be temporary, even though the plan in Johnson might continue for a
generation or more in light of the low turnover and skilled nature of
highway construction and maintenance jobs. 33l In reality, Starrett City
presented the Second Circuit with a unique problem that temporary
controls would not address. Both the Supreme Court and the Second
Circuit apparently agree on the appropriateness of the integration
maintenance policy goals. But would the Supreme Court say that such
an appropriate goal was an impermissible objective if no means other
than permanent controls existed for its achievement? 332 Clearly Star-
rett City presents an affirmative action dilemma. The Second Circuit
324. Starrett City, 840 F.2d at 1108 (Newman, J., dissenting).
325. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (invalidating a 30% minority
public works set-aside program administered by a city governed by a minority-dominated city
council in a case lacking a record of past local contractual bias or underparticipation of minority
contractors in city contracts); Paradise, 480 U.S. at 149 (remedial promotion quota); Local No. 93,
Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986) (consent decree promotion
preference); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (court-or-
dered union recruitment preference); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (holding
that collective bargaining may not permit layoff of nonminorities with more seniority than retained
minority teachers); Firefighters Local No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (court not to amend
seniority pacts by modification of consent decree silent on seniority and preferential layoff policy);
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)
(voluntary plan by private employer consistent with Title VII).
326. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982) (Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act).
327. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 631-32, 634 (1987).
328. Id. at 620-21, 631-34, 640 ("manifest imbalance").
329. The Court also eliminated the earlier requirement that an appropriate legislative or ad-
ministrative agency make a finding of past discrimination as a prerequisite to the imposition of
affirmative action. Id. at 633, 639-40 (attain, not maintain).
330. Starrett City, 840 F.2d at 1096.
331. Id. at 1103 (citing Johnson, 480 U.S. at 622-23, 639 n.16).
332. Burney v. Housing Auth., 551 F. Supp. 746 (W.D. Pa. 1982); Middlesboro Hous. Auth. v.
Commonwealth Comm'n on Human Rights, 553 S.W.2d 57, 65-67 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
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concluded that the end would never justify the means, while the Su-
preme Court since Bakke has suggested that the means may be tailored
to the appropriate end.333
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Starrett City.33' Although
such denial carries no precedential value, the refusal to review Starrett
City stands as a tacit endorsement of the Second Circuit's rejection of
affirmative action in the form of integration maintenance ceiling quotas
for minorities. It also stands as the most significant endorsement of
apartheid in America since Plessy v. Ferguson,335 which upheld the in-
stitution of racial segregation.
The Supreme Court's decision in Town of Huntington v. Hunting-
ton Branch, NAACP,"3 6 rendered the same day as the Starrett City de-
nial of certiorari, upheld a finding of a Title VIII violation in suburban
apartment exclusion, and might appear to contradict the segregative la-
bel suggested by Starrett City. While Huntington appears to lend im-
portant support to the "effects" prima facie case under Title VIII, the
case is not likely to generate integration. The dismantlement of the fed-
eral subsidized housing production program has rendered new projects
and interested developers a rarity. In addition, suburban subsidized
housing development has typically exacerbated metropolitan segrega-
tion. This housing is often white-occupied and is likely to make the
suburbs accessible to lower income whites-a group previously rele-
gated to the central city housing market and one whose migration may
worsen central city school and neighborhood segregation. The most in-
teresting application of Huntington will be the generation of a few crea-
333. See generally J. KUSHNER, supra note 14, § 7.17; J. KUSHNER, supra note 10, §§ 8.01-
8.06; Ackerman, Integration For Subsidized Housing and the Question of Racial Occupancy Con-
trols, 26 STAN. L. REV. 245 (1974); Bittker, The Case of the Checker-Board Ordinance: An Experi-
ment in Race Relations, 71 YALE L.J. 1387 (1962); Gelber, Race-Conscious Approaches to Ending
Segregation in Housing: Some Pitfalls on the Road to Integration, 37 RUTGERS L. REv. 921 (1985)
(endorsement of affirmative marketing and temporary limited quotas); Hellerstein, The Benign
Quota, Equal Protection, and "The Rule in Shelley's Case", 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 531 (1963); Lamb,
Housing Discrimination and Segregation in America: Problematical Dimensions and the Federal
Legal Response, 30 CATH. U.L. REv. 363 (1981); Lind, Maintaining Residential Integration: Mu-
nicipal Practices and Law, 31 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 603 (1982); Smolla, In Pursuit of Racial Utopias:
Fair Housing, Quotas, and Goals in the 1980's, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 947 (1985); Smolla, Integration
Maintenance: The Unconstitutionality of Benign Programs That Discourage Black Entry to Pre-
vent White Flight, 1981 DuYE L.J. 891; Comment, supra note 36; Note, The Legality of Race-
Conscious Access Quotas Under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 9 CARDozo L. REv. 1053 (1988);
Note, Benign Steering and Benign Quotas: The Validity of Race-Conscious Government Policies
to Promote Residential Integration, 93 HARV. L. REv. 938 (1980); Note, The Use of Racial Housing
Quotas to Achieve Integrated Communities: The Oak Park Approach, 6 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 164
(1975); Note, The Integration Ordinance: Honi Soit Qui Mal Y Pense, 17 STAN. L. REv. 280 (1965);
Note, supra note 310.
334. Starrett City, 109 S. Ct. at 376.
335. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See generally J. KUSHNER, supra note 5.
336. 109 S. Ct. 276 (1988) (per curiam), aff'g 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988).
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tive lawsuits challenging municipal housing and land use policies that
have had the effect of suburban segregation.
The Court in Starrett City failed to endorse the only initiative in
the Nation designed to achieve and maintain integration. The message
of Starrett City is to tailor voluntary affirmative action programs to the
achievement of integration, utilizing controls only when trends indicate
a loss of balance, and to undertake only those cases that display dis-
crimination when imposing broad temporary affirmative action reme-
dial quota schemes." 7
IX. THE FUTURE OF FAIR HOUSING
The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 is the most significant
civil rights initiative in a generation. The new law, if aggressively en-
forced and administered, can generate fees and damage awards to en-
courage private enforcement and affirmative action in pursuit of
neighborhood integration. The administrative enforcement mechanism
can provide fair housing to those long without effective remedies. A
combination of local legislative efforts, aggressive local programs for
monitoring and testing, and creative judicial and administrative reme-
dies seeking affirmatively to advance fair housing and integration may
permit Title VIII finally to achieve the promise which eluded it during
its first generation.
The fair housing community, together with policymakers, has to
face fundamental questions about whether the pervasive level of hous-
ing discrimination is to be stemmed and whether America is to be cast
permanently in segregation. The Nation is at a crossroads. Despite
President Reagan's belated positive leadership in supporting passage of
the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988,338 his Administration pur-
sued a predominantly anti-civil rights agenda. That agenda, symbolized
by the Reagan Justice Department and led by the Reagan legacy of the
Rehnquist Court, has driven the country in the direction of racism and
ignorance. The Bush Administration3 1 9 could offer long absent civil
rights leadership toward the Kennedy, Johnson, and King legacy, the
337. See generally J. KUSHNER, supra note 10, §§ 8.01-8.06 (devoted exclusively to affirma-
tive action).
338. Statement by the Assistant to the President for Press Relations on the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988, 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 842 (June 21, 1988); Senate Acts to En-
force Housing Law, Wall St. J., Aug. 3, 1988, at 9, col. 4 (President expressing pleasure with pas-
sage); Eaton, Senate OKs Tough Housing Bias Ban, L.A. Times, Aug. 3, 1988, pt. I, at 1, col. 5
(reporting support for passage of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988).
339. The Candidates Respond, 74 A-BA. J. 52-53 (Oct. 1988) (stating that President Bush
during his campaign endorsed the use of affirmative action, yet eschewed rigid numerical quotas in
favor of aggressive recruitment); cf. Nelson & Balzar, Bush: New Job, Empty Briefcase, L.A.
Times, Nov. 13, 1988, pt. I, at 1, col. 1 (final ed.) (stating that Bush has no agenda).
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dream of diversity and equality. The state of fair housing in the firma-
ment of civil rights entering upon the Bush Presidency is more fragile
and tentative than ever. New national leadership reflecting a commit-
ment to the aspirations of the Nation's founders and dreamers and to
the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 can make a difference in the
second generation struggle for fair housing.
